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EDITOR'S NOTE
This second issue of the Water Law Review builds upon the success of the
inaugural issue. Not only have we attempted to respond to our readers' suggestions in selecting articles, but we have expanded the journal's format in
response to recommendations made by our Advisory Board.
We begin this issue with two articles that look at the topic of instream
flows. Wendy Weiss authors our lead article in which she discusses the government's "efforts to adjudicate reserved and appropriative instream flow water rights, the use of federal regulatory authority to maintain instream flows
absent federal water rights, and negotiated efforts to satisfy federal instream
flow demands within state law." Cynthia F. Covell approaches the issue of instream flows from the perspective of the western states. She provides a survey
of state programs and a discussion of unique issues that confront each state in
managing their respective programs - issues ranging from constraints on
appropriations to issues revolving around administrative obstacles.
Basic Exchange 101, by Casey S. Funk and Amy M. Cavanaugh, provides an
introduction to the fundamentals underlying water exchanges. The authors
argue that water quality regulations must be consistent with the doctrine of
prior appropriations and the Colorado Constitution if we are to achieve the
goal of maximum beneficial use of water.
From the historical perspective, Professor Daniel Tyler identifies the contributions of Delphus E. Carpenter in the formation, ratification, and interpretation of the Colorado River Compact. Tyler's meticulous research into
Carpenter's personal records provides new insight into the process of solving
interstate water problems through. negotiations and compacts.
Veronica Sperling and David Brown provide an outline of Colorado
ground water law. Beginning with the passage of the Colorado Ground Water
Management Act, the authors walk the reader through statutory provisions,
subsequent amendments, as well as administrative and judicial responses,
painting a succinct picture of the evolution of ground water law in Colorado.
The journal's newest feature is the Commentary section. The first piece
is written by Robert F. Welborn, a participant in the formulation of Colorado's Water Right Determination and Administration Act. Mr. Welborn
gives his views on how legislation and policy making have failed to respond
adequately to the issues surrounding the depletion of underground water aquifers. He concludes by stressing the importance of sustainable development
and rational planning for the use and stewardship of our natural resources.
In the Water Court Reports, coverage is expanded to include jurisdictions
beyond Colorado's boundaries. It is our intent to brief significant water law
cases throughout the United States.
The Editorial Board thanks the Rocky Mountain Mineral Law Foundation
for its generous support. We also appreciate the continuing support and
guidance of our Faculty Advisor, Professor George "Rock" Pring, and ProfessorJan Laitos, Chair, Environmental and Natural Resource Law Program.
Vicki L. Spencer
Editor-in-Chief
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IN TRIBUTE
This issue of the Water Law Review is dedicated to the memory of
John U. Carlson, a much respected and beloved member of the Colorado Water Bar. Born in Terry, Montana in 1940, Mr. Carlson graduated from the. University of Montana in 1962. After attending Queens
College at Oxford as a Rhodes Scholar, he graduated from Yale Law
School in 1967. In 1968, he joined the Denver law firm of Holland &
Hart. Mr. Carlson founded his own law firm in 1985, currently known
as Carlson, Hammond, and Paddock.
Having grown up on a Montana ranch, Mr. Carlson was aware of
the importance of natural resources from an early age. As an adult, he
was able to pursue his interest in water when he joined Holland &
Hart. His amicus brief on behalf of the Twin Lakes Reservoir and Canal Company in United States v. New Mexico is largely credited with the
court created measure and limit of federal reserved water rights for
federal reserved lands. This doctrine was further defined in United
States v. City and County of Denver with respect to national forests,
monuments, parks, public springs, water holes, and hot springs, where
he again represented Twin Lakes. Mr. Carlson continued to participate in later federal reserved water rights cases, most notably United
States v. Jesse and United States v. Bell.
Mr. Carlson's impact on the development of Colorado water law
was evident in other significant cases such as Alamosa-Lajarav. Gould,
where he represented, among others, the Rio Grande Water Users Association. The case determined the effect of state rules promulgated
to meet interstate compact obligations on water rights granted under
the prior appropriation system. In addition, the court's opinion further defined the outlines of the doctrine of reasonable means of diversion with respect to surface streams and tributary groundwater. Mr.
Carlson also ably represented the cities of Westminster, Pueblo, and
Colorado Springs in their acquisition of crucial water rights through
exchange for municipal growth.
Mr. John Carlson passed away in 1992. He is remembered both as
a force in Colorado water law and as a model attorney who cared
deeply for each of his clients, representing them to the best of his
abilities.
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INTRODUCTION
Federal-state relations in the area of water law were historically
characterized by federal deference to state water allocation systems
However, this has undergone a dramatic reversal in recent years, a fact
nowhere more evident than in federal agencies' efforts to secure instream flows for various federal purposes. The result has been frustration and mistrust on all sides, negotiation and litigation that have
I Wendy Weiss is the First Assistant Attorney General for the Federal and Interstate Water Unit of the Colorado Attorney General's Office. She wishes to express her
appreciation to the Attorney General's Office for its support in preparing this paper,
but to note that she is solely responsible for content and opinions expressed herein.

1. The history of federal water policy is surveyed in California v. United States, 438

U.S. 645 (1978). See also United States v. New Mexico, 438 U.S. 696 (1978).
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reached almost epic proportions, and a surfeit of over-the-top rhetoric. The federal government and environmentalists accuse the states
and traditional water users of inflexibility in the face of changing social
values, while the states and water users feel betrayed and indignant at
having their settled expectations upset and their large investments
placed at risk.
Two developments in the law converged to create the current
situation. First, in 1952, Congress enacted the McCarran Amendment, 2 which waived the United States' sovereign immunity and consented to its joinder in state water adjudications. As a result, federal
agencies began (albeit reluctantly) to assert water right claims in state
courts during the 1970s. Because the federal government's prior failure to participate in state adjudications was privileged, its water rights
were entitled to receive their true priorities, even when that meant antedating priorities awarded in earlier adjudications! This allowed the4
United States to cut in line ahead of previously decreed water rights.
Not surprisingly, the owners of 1?reviously decreed water rights vigorously opposed the federal claims.
The second development was heightened legal recognition of environmental values in the 1960s and 197 0s. Besides passing landmark
environmental legislation,6 Congress changed the missions of existing
federal agencies to incorporate these environmental values.7 Consequently, federal agencies with an often new found interest in instream
flows for purposes such as fish and wildlife habitat, recreation, and aesthetics began asserting claims for instream flow water rights8 in state

2. 43 U.S.C. § 666 (1994).
3. Cappaert v. United States, 426 U.S. 128 (1976); United States v. Bell, 724 P.2d
631 (Colo. 1986); United States v. Denver, 656 P.2d 1 (Colo. 1982).
4. Bel, 724 P.2d at 640-45 (discussing the relationship between antedation and
Colorado's postponement doctrine). See also Navajo Development Co. v. Sanderson,
655 P.2d 1374 (Colo. 1982).
5. The United States' claims in the consolidated cases reviewed in Denver originally drew objections from 169 parties, represented by at least seventy different attorneys. Denver, 656 P.2d at 11. See also Bell 724 P.2d at 634 n.4 (sixty-six statements of
opposition filed).
6. E.g., National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) of 1969, 42 U.S.C. § 4321
(1994 & Supp. 1 1995); Clean Water Act (CWA), 33 U.S.C. § 1251 (1994 & Supp. I
1995); Endangered Species Act (ESA), 16 U.S.C. § 1531 (1994 & Supp. 11995).
7. E.g., Multiple-Use, Sustained-Yi'eld Act (MUSYA) of 1960, 16 U.S.C. § 528
(1994); Federal Land Policy and Management Act (FLPMA) of 1976, 43 U.S.C. § 1701
(1994 & Supp. 11995).
8. The term "instream flow water right" refers to a right to maintain flows in a
given stream reach without a diversion or other means of control (such as a hydropower plant). See City of Thornton v. City of Fort Collins, 830 P.2d 915, 931 (Colo.
1992) ("A minimum stream flow does not require removal or control of water by some
structure or device. A minimum stream flow between two points on a stream or river
usually signifies the complete absence of a structure or device."); Board of County
Comm'rs of Arapahoe County v. Upper Gunnison River Water Conservancy Dist., 838
P.2d 840, 854 (Colo. 1992) (storage in a reservoir for subsequent instream uses not an
instream flow right). This article will also use the term as a shorthand for rights to
maintain natural lake levels or volumes.
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proceedings.' Aside from the antedation issue, these claims were particularly sensitive because a diversion has historically been an essential
element of a water right in the western states, and an instream flow
right by its very nature lacks a diversion." Although many states now
recognize instream flow rights," they generally exercise control over
their creation out of concern that 2freely granting such rights could
preclude future water development.
As noted, the federal government's instream flow claims were often
hotly contested. The Forest Service was particularly unsuccessful in
the courts" and began relying on its permitting authority to force
holders of state water rights with facilities in the national forests to relinquish a portion of their rights for instream flows.14 This only escalated the conflict. Faced with seemingly endless political and legal battles, federal agencies, state agencies, water users, and environmental
groups are exploring new ways to integrate federal instream flow uses
into state legal systems.
This article discusses the United States' efforts to adjudicate reserved and appropriative instream flow water rights, the use of federal
regulatory authority to maintain instream flows absent federal water
rights, and negotiated efforts to satisfy federal instream flow demands
within state law. Due to both my own experience and the fact that
Colorado has often been at the center of the controversy, this article
focuses on Colorado's experience.

9. See, e.g., United States v. New Mexico, 438 U.S. 696 (1978); United States v.
Denver, 656 P.2d 1 (Colo. 1982).
10. See discussion of appropriative instream flow rights infra pp. 167-71.
11. See Cynthia F. Covell, A Survey of State Instream Flow Programs in the Western United
States, 1 U. DENy. WATERL. REV. 177 (1998).
12. One commentator advocating state recognition of private instream flow rights
has argued that if the diversion requirement were eliminated, there would be no principled basis for distinguishing between appropriating water in a reservoir for canoeing
and appropriating instream flows for the same purpose. Christine A. Klein, The Constitutional Mythology of Western Water Law, 14 VA. ENvTL. L.J., 343, 379 n.216 (1995). It is
that very concern that has motivated most western states to regulate the ownership
and/or purposes of instream flow rights. A reservoir can hold only a limited amount
of water (if its sole use is recreation, the only draft on the river after the initial fill will
be to replace seepage and evaporation), while an instream flow right could potentially
command the entire flow of a river every year.
13. See, e.g., New Mexico, 438 U.S. at 696; Denver, 656 P.2d at 1; In the Matter of the
Amended Application of the United States of America for Reserved Water Rights in
the Platte River in Boulder, Clear Creek, Douglas, El Paso, Gilpin, Jefferson, Larimer,
Park and Teller Counties, (Dist. Ct., Water Div. No. 1, Colo. 1993) (Nos. W-8439-76, W8977-77, W-9052-77, W-9064-77 and W-9065-77), [hereinafter Division 1 National Forests Case]. See also cases cited infra notes 34 and 55.
14.

See REPORT OF THE FEDERAL WATER RIGHTS TASK FORCE CREATED PURSUANT TO

SECTION 389(D) (3) OF P.L. 104-127, PART III (Aug 25, 1997), [hereinafter Task Force
Report]; James S. Witwer, The Renewal of Authorizations to Divert Water on NationalForests,
24 COLO. LAw. 2363 (Oct. 1995).
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The doctrine of federal reserved water rights 15 is itself the subject
of many law review articles' 6 and is summarized in the leading cases."
Simply stated, when Congress or the President reserves lands for a specific purpose, ' 8 the courts will imply the intent to reserve appurtenant
unappropriated water "to the extent needed to accomplish the purpose of the reservation."'9 Federal reserved rights "are not dependent
upon state law or state procedures,"' and cannot be frustrated by state
law.' However, because Congressional intent is implied rather than
expressed, and because of past Congressional deference to state water
law, reserved rights are subject to several important limitations:" the
reserved right is for only that amount of water necessary to fulfill the
primary purposes of the reservation, so that "without the water the
purposes of the reservation would be entirely defeated." 3
The United States originally resisted attempts to compel it to assert
its reserved rights claims in Colorado water adjudications, arguing that
the McCarran Amendment did not apply to reserved water rights and
that the Colorado statutory scheme was not a general adjudication
within the meaning of the McCarran Act.2 5

The United States Su-

15. Also known as the Winters Doctrine because it originated in Winters v. United
States, 207 U.S. 564 (1908) - a controversy over water for the Fort Belknap Indian
Reservation in which the Court found an implied intent to reserve water in order to
avoid great injustice to the tribe. The doctrine was originally thought to be peculiar to
Indian law, see FrankJ. Trelease, FederalReserved Water Rights Since PLLRC, 54 DENV. L.J.
473, 475 (1977), and was not applied to other federal reservations until Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546 (1963).
16. See, e.g., Alan E. Boles & C.M. Elliott, United States v. New Mexico and the Course of
Federal Reserved Water Rights, 51 U. COLO. L. REv. 209 (1980); Star L. Waring & Kirk S.
Samuelson, Non-Indian FederalReserved Water Rights, 58 DENV. L.J. 783 (1981); Hank
Meshorer, Federal Reserved Water Rights Litigation, 28 RocKY MTN. MIN. L. INST. 1283
(1982) (for the personal perspective of a U. S. Department ofJustice attorney).
17. See, e.g., Cappaert v. United States, 426 U.S. 128 (1976); United States v. New
Mexico, 438 U.S. 696 (1978); United States v. Denver, 656 P.2d 1 (Colo. 1982).
18. Unreserved federal lands, such as those administered as public domain by the
Bureau of Land Management under FLPMA, do not give rise to reserved rights. Sierra
Club v. Watt, 659 F.2d 203 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
19. Cappaert,426 U.S. at 138. Of course, Congress can also expressly reserve water,
as was actually the case in Cappaert. See, e.g., Wild and Scenic Rivers Act, 16 U.S.C. §
1271 (1994 & Supp. 11995), discussed infra pp. 164-65.
20. Cappaert,426 U.S. at 145; see also United States v. Bell, 724 P.2d 631, 641 (Colo.
1986).
21. Bell, 724 P.2d at 644-45. For instance, a reserved right cannot be abandoned
for nonuse. Denver, 656 P.2d at 34. But, the federal government must comply with
such state procedural rules as filing deadlines, Bell, at 643-44, and rules governing
pleading, discovery, and the admissibility of evidence, United States v. Idaho, 508 U.S. 1,
7 (1993). The result is a mix of state and federal law, in which state law is applied so
long as it does not "impinge[ ] on vital federal interests." Denver,656 P.2d at 20.
22. New Mexico, 438 U.S. at 701-02 (1978).
23. Id. at 700 (footnote omitted).
24. United States v. Dist. Ct. for Eagle County, 401 U.S. 520, 523 (1971).
25. United States v. Dist. Ct. for Water Div. No. 5, 401 U.S. 527, 529 (1971).
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preme Court disagreed 6 and, after one last unsuccessful attempt to adjudicate Indian claims in federal court,27 the United States resigned itself to asserting both its Indian and non-Indian reserved rights claims
in Colorado proceedings."' The first Colorado case to try the issue was
a consolidated proceeding for Colorado's Water Divisions 4, 5, and 69
(the Gunnison, Colorado, and Yampa river basins, respectively)." The
federal claims included reserved instream flow rights and reserved and
appropriative rights for out-of-stream uses (i.e., utilizing diversion
structures).S That proceeding ultimately culminated in United States v.
Denver,2 the leading Colorado reserved rights case.

26. See Eagle County, 401 U.S. at 523; Water Div. No. 5, 401 U.S. at 529.
27. Colorado River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800 (1976)
[hereinafter Akin, the name by which the case is commonly known in Colorado].
28. The long jurisdictional struggle over the adjudication of federal reserved rights
in the Colorado River basin in Colorado is summarized in Denver, 656 P.2d at 1. The
United States and various Indian tribes on occasion, and unsuccessfully, continued to
challenge the adequacy of other state fora. See Arizona v. San Carlos Apache Tribe,
463 U.S. 545 (1983);Jicarilla Apache Tribe v. U.S., 601 F.2d 1116 (9th Cir. 1979), cert.
denied, 444 U.S. 995 (1979). But see United States v. Adair, 723 F.2d 1394 (9th Cir.
1984).
29. In the Matter of the Application for Water Rights of the United States of America (Dist. Ct., Water Div. No. 4, Colo.) (Nos. W-425 through W-438); In the Matter of
the Application for Water Rights of the United States of America (Dist. Ct., Water Div.
No. 5, Colo.) (Nos. W-467 and W-69); and In the Matter of the Application for Water
Rights of the United States of America (Dist. Ct., Water Div. No. 6, Colo.) (Nos. W-85
and W-86) [hereinafter consolidated proceeding for Divisions 4, 5, and 6].
30. Colorado has seven water divisions, each corresponding to one of the major
river basins. The others are: Division 1-the South Platte; Division 2-the Arkansas; Division 3-the Rio Grande; and Division 7-the San Juan. COLO. REV. STAT. § 37-92-201
(1997).
31. The United States' claims in this and other proceedings included so-called instream flow water rights for such purposes as fire protection, wildlife and stock watering, and recreational use (for human consumption, rather than boating or fishing).
These are not really instream flow rights at all, but rights to divert water for out-ofstream uses without a permanent diversion structure, and have not encountered the
same opposition as true instream flow rights. See infra note 153.
32. United States v. Denver, 656 P.2d 1 (Colo. 1982). Despite the fears of the
United States and others (see infra note 39) that the federal government's claims would
not get a fair hearing in state courts, the Denver decision was so well-reasoned and
even-handed that the federal government did not seek review in the United States
Supreme Court. The same was true of United States v. Bell, 724 P.2d 631 (Colo. 1986).
Similarly, a perhaps surprising number of water court decisions have not been appealed by either side - testimony to the fairness of the water judges across the state.
But see DAVID M. GILuLAN & THOMAS C. BROWN, INSTREAM FLOW PROTECTON: SEEKING
ABALANCE IN WESTERN WATER USE 181 (1997) for a contrary view of state courts generally. Although Gillilan and Brown (a Forest Service employee) recognize that methodological problems have plagued the federal government's technical cases, id. at 19193, they appear to blame state courts and objectors for requiring the government to
prove its case.
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NATIONAL FORESTS

While the consolidated case for Divisions 4, 5, and 6 was still making its way through the Colorado courts,3 the United States Supreme
Court addressed the issue of reserved instream flow rights for the national forests in United States v. New Mexico.34 In 1970, the New Mexico
State Engineer initiated a general adjudication for the Rio Mimbres.3
The Forest Service sought instream flow rights for aesthetic, environmental, recreational, and fish preservation purposes in Gila National37
Forest.3 6 The New Mexico Supreme Court denied the federal claims
and the United States Supreme Court granted certiorari.38
In New Mexico, the Court applied those principles of statutory construction discussed above to rein in the federal government's expansive claims. 3" The Court scrutinized the legislative history of the Organic Administration Act of 1897,40 which defined the purposes for
which national forests could be reserved, and concluded that Congress
reserved the national forests to serve only two primary purposes: to secure favorable conditions of water flow for settlers of the arid west, and
to furnish a continuous supply of timber; the forests were not reserved
for aesthetic, environmental, recreational, or wildlife preservation
purposes. 4' The Court noted pointedly that the additional purposes
claimed by the government would partially defeat Congress' primary

33. The history of the consolidated proceeding for Divisions 4, 5, and 6 is traced in
United States v. Denver. Denver, 656 P.2d at 10-12. The United States' claims first went
to a master-referee, who held hearings over a period of approximately three years and
submitted a report and a proposed decree to the water court in 1976. Denver, 656 P.2d
at 11. Objections were then submitted to the water court, which, in 1979, adopted the
master referee's proposed decree with modifications and entered an order under
COLO. R. Civ. P. 54(b) allowing an immediate appeal, although some aspects of the
decree were not yet final. Id. at 11-12.
34. United States v. New Mexico, 438 U.S. 696 (1978). The issue was also decided
by the Idaho state courts. In 1975, an Idaho district court adjudicated a reserved right
for the entire natural flow of three creeks in Caribou National Forest, but was reversed
by the Idaho Supreme Court on appeal. Avondale Irrigation Dist. v. North Idaho
Properties, Inc., 577 P.2d 9 (Idaho 1978). The case did not go any higher and New
Mexico became the leading case.
35. New Mexico, 438 U.S. at 697.
36. Id. at 704.
37. Mimbres Valley Irrigation Co. v. Salopek, 564 P.2d 615 (N.M. 1977).
38. New Mexico, 438 U.S. at 698.
39. One commentator, criticizing Akin, supra note 27, on the ground that state
courts would be likely to discriminate against federal claims, had argued that the New
Mexico Supreme Court had "misapplied the Cappaertstandard" and pointed to the decision as "demonstrat[ing] the danger state court adjudication poses to important federal policies." Robert H. Abrams, Reserved Water Rights, Indian Rights and the Narrowing
Scope of FederalJurisdiction: The Colorado River Decision, 30 STAN. L. REV. 1111, 1136, 1139
(1978). Rather than viewing New Mexico as vindicating the state courts, however, those
favoring a more expansive reserved rights doctrine criticized the decision as flawed
and argued for restricting its use as precedent. See GILULAN & BROWN, supra note 32,
at 188-90.
40. 16 U.S.C. § 473 (1994).
41. New Mexico, 438 U.S. at 707-08.
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goal of enhancing the quantity of water available to settlers.
The Court then considered the Multiple-Use, Sustained-Yield Act
of 1960 ("MUSYA") 43 and found that it established supplementary secondary purposes, for which Congress did not intend to reserve additional water, particularly since doing so would defeat one of the primary purposes of the forest. 4 The Court stated that where water was
only sought for a secondary purpose, the federal government was required to "acquire water in the same manner as any other public or
private appropriator. ' 45

The Court affirmed denial of the United

States' instream flow claims, stating, "Congress intended that water
would be reserved only where necessary to preserve the timber or to
secure
favorable water flows for private and public uses under state
, 46
law.
By the time the consolidated cases reached Colorado's highest
court, New Mexico had been decided. Undeterred, the federal government continued to press for instream flow reserved rights with a
1960 priority under MUSYA, arguing that the language to the contrary
in New Mexico was only dictum.47 The Colorado Supreme Court was
not persuaded; following the Supreme Court's lead in New Mexico, it
denied the government's claim and told it to "proceed under state
law
4
in the same manner as any other public or private appropriator. 8
After Denver, the State and other objectors, relying on stare decisis
and collateralestoppel, filed a motion for summary judgment on the Forest Service's instream flow claims in Water Division 2.49 The water
court granted the motion and the United States appealed. This time
the government argued that instream flows were needed for one of the
primary national forest purposes identified in New Mexico:1
[R]ecent advances in the science of "fluvial geomorphology" have
shown that strong, recurring instream water flows are necessary to

42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.

Id. at 713.
42 U.S.C. § 528 (1994).
New Mexico, 438 U.S. at 714-15.
Id. at 702.
Id. at 718.
Denver, 656 P.2d at 24.

48. Id. at 27. Still undeterred, the United States asserted its MUSYA claim yet again
in Idaho's ongoing Snake River adjudication, and yet again the claim was denied. In re
SRBA, Case No. 39576, slip op. at 22 (D. Idaho Dec. 18, 1997) [hereinafter Idaho Order]. The United States is appealing the decision. United States v. City of Challis,
Case No. 24560 (Idaho filedJune 11, 1998).
49. United States v.Jesse, 744 P.2d 491, 498 (Colo. 1987).
50. Id. at 499.
51. Id. To some, this looked suspiciously like a post hocjustification for the claims,
hastily cobbled together to circumvent New Mexico and Denver. The Forest Service admitted that its shift in emphasis was "partially in response to . . . United States v. New
Mexico," but contended that it had not sought to quantify channel maintenance flows
earlier because it had assumed that fisheries maintenance flows would also accomplish
the channel maintenance purpose. Id. at 499 n.8.
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maintain efficient stream channels and to secure favorable conditions of
waterflows, and that diversions of water within the national forests by
private appropriators reduce stream flows and
threaten the equilib52
rium that preserves natural stream channels.

In United States v. Jesse,53 the Colorado Supreme Court reversed and
remanded to give the federal government the opportunity to prove
that "the purpose of the Organic Act will be entirely defeated unless
the United States is allowed to maintain minimum instream flows
over
54
the forest lands ....Otherwise, the claims should be denied.
After Jesse, the focus shifted to Water Division 1 where the Forest

Service and objectors geared up for what was generally viewed as the
next big test case.55 The Forest Service claimed instream flow rights for
channel maintenance at 241 quantification points on streams in the
national forests. 5 For each "QP," the claimed right included peak or

"bankfull" flows, rise and recession flows, and baseflows.5 ' The trial,
which began in January 1990, took more than a hundred days; in-

volved field visits, many technical witnesses, and over a thousand exhibits; and produced a six inch stack of post-trial briefs. 5 Ultimately,1
the Forest Service failed to prove two essential elements of its case:
first, that the claimed rights were necessary to secure favorable water
flows ° and, second, the minimum amount of water needed to ensure
that the purposes of the forests would not be entirely defeated.5
Moreover, the Forest Service's own experts were forced to admit the

52. Id. at 498 (emphasis added).
53. United States v.Jesse, 744 P.2d 491 (Colo. 1987).
54. Id. at 503. The Court specifically instructed:
For each federal claim of a reserved water right, the trier of fact must examine the documents reserving the land from the public domain and the Organic Act; determine the precise federal purposes to be served by such legislation; determine whether water is essential for the primary purposes of the
reservation; and finally determine the precise quantity of water necessary to
satisfy such purposes.
Id. at 503 n. 11.
55. The Forest Service had previously failed to prove the necessity of instream flows
for watershed protection or timber production for Toiyabe National Forest in Nevada.
United States v. Alpine Land and Reservoir Co., 503 F. Supp. 877 (D. Nev. 1980), af'd,
697 F.2d 851 (9th Cir. 1983). However, the evidence presented in support of the
claims in that case was "insignificant." Id. at 893. The Forest Service also claimed
channel maintenance flows for Organic Act purposes in the Big Horn River adjudication in Wyoming, but settled the case by agreeing to subordinate its rights to all existing and future water development projects, making the rights practically worthless.
GILuILAN & BROWN, supranote 32, at 190-91, and authorities cited therein.
56. Amended Application for Confirmation of Reserved Water Rights (Instream
Flows), Division 1 National Forests Case, supra note 13.
57. Id.
58. Trial court record, Division 1 National Forests Case, supra note 13.
59. See supra note 54.
60. Memorandum of Decision and Order at 23, 24, 32, Division 1 National Forests
Case, supra note 13.
61. Id. at 29-32.
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inadequacy of their methodology." The applications were denied.63
Contrary to the water court's expectation,' the United States did not
appeal.'
Although it vindicated the objectors' contention that the Forest6
Service's instream flow claims were a solution in search of a problem,
the Division 1 case also demonstrated how litigation can disappoint
expectations of getting a final answer to a recurring question. Despite
all the time and money spent on what was to be the test case, the legal
questions were not resolved and applications in Divisions 2, 3, and 7
remained outstanding.67 In addition, without abandoning its reserved
rights theory, the Forest Service began pursuing other strategies to obtain instream flows (i.e., regulatory requirements and applications for
appropriative rights). Due to both the fact-specific nature and, hence,
limited precedential value of the Division 1 decision and the subsequent conflicts over appropriative rights and permit conditions, the
parties to the Division 2, 3, and 7 cases have been trying to negotiate
settlements that will address all the national forest instream flow uses
in one package. To date, these negotiations have been frustratingly
unproductive. Meanwhile, the United States is preparing to try a re62. The Forest Service's experts were forced into that awkward position in order to
support an eleventh hour motion to amend the claims. Id. The water court denied
the motion on the ground that it would have been unfair to the objectors to trigger "a
new round of investigations.., and several more months of trial." Id. at 32.
63. Id.
64. "This court has come to the conclusion that the applicant has not shown the
claims for reserved water rights to be necessary, but is under no apprehension that its
word will be the final one on this question." Id.
65. The United States probably chose not to appeal because the decision was based
on the facts (and was well-supported by the record) and did not rule out the possibility of instream flow rights as a matter of law if the United States were to present a better case.
66. Certain Objectors Joint Opening Post-Trial Brief Regarding the Necessity and
Quantification of Channel Maintenance Flows at 109, Division 1 National Forest Case,
supra note 13. The Forest Service has also looked to instream flow rights to prevent
channel degradation, rather than addressing the problem's real causes - such activities as grazing, road building and maintenance, and the use of motorized recreational
vehicles. See Memorandum of Decision and Order at 19-20. Id.
67. See In the Matter of the Applications for Water Rights of the United States of
America in Water Division No. 2 (Dist. Ct., Water Div. No. 2, Colo. 1998) (Nos. 79-CW176, 81-CW-220, 81-CW-221, 81-CW-222, 81-CW-223, 82-CW-18, 82-CW-19, 82-CW-20,
82-CW-27, 82-CW-28, 82-CW-29, 82-CW-30, 82-CW-31, 82-CW-32, 82-CW-33, 82-CW-34);
Concerning the Application for Water Rights of the United States of America (Dist.
Ct., Water Div. No. 3, Colo. 1981) (No. 81-CW-183 (consolidated)); In the Matter of
the Application for Reserved and Appropriative Water Rights of the United States of
America in Archuleta, Hinsdale, La Plata, Mineral, and San Juan Counties (Dist. Ct.,
Water Div. No. 7, Colo. 1976) (No. W-1605-76-B); In the Matter of the Application for
Reserved Water Rights of the United States of America to Water on, in and under the
San Juan National Forest (Dist. Ct., Water Div. No. 7, Colo. 1973) (Nos. 1146-73, 114773, 1148-73).
68. Most recently, the parties to the Division 2 litigation agreed to a further extension of time, rather than breaking off negotiations, after the Forest Service repudiated
key settlement principles previously agreed to in writing. See Stipulation for Extension
of Time and Approval of Minimum Principles for Further Negotiations, In the Matter
of the Applications for Water Rights of the United States of America in Water Division
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vised version of its channel maintenance claims in Idaho's Snake River
adjudication.69
NATIONAL PARKS AND MONUMENTS

In the consolidated proceeding for Divisions 4, 5, and 6, the
United States also asserted claims for reserved instream flow rights for
Dinosaur National Monument, Black Canyon of the Gunnison National Monument, and Rocky Mountain National Park.70 The water
court granted the federal government an instream flow right in the
Gunnison River for Black Canyon National Monument, and gave it five
years from the entry of a final decree to quantify the right.71 This claim
apparently drew little opposition as it is only mentioned in passing in
the appeal.7" A final decree for the Monument has not been entered,
and the right has yet to be quantified."
The Dinosaur National Monument claims were more controversial,
largely because of the monument's location "at the lowest reaches of
the Yampa River in Colorado. 74 A federal instream flow right would
have significantly affected many upstream junior rights and would
have caused Colorado to deliver more Yampa River water to Utah than
75
the minimum required by the Upper Colorado River Basin Compact.
The United States claimed instream flows for two purposes: recreational boating and the preservation of fish habitats of historic or scientific interest. The water court denied the recreational boating claim,
but held that an instream flow might exist to preserve fish habitats. 77 It
ordered further proceedings to determine whether the proclamation
creating the monument intended to reserve instream flows for fish
habitats of endangered species of historic and scientific interest and, if
so, to quantify the minimum amount of water necessary to fulfill that
78
purpose.

No. 2 (Dist. Ct., Water Div. No. 2, Colo. 1998) (Nos. 79-CW-176, 81-CW-220, 81-CW221, 81-CW-222, 81-CW-223, 82-CW-18, 82-CW-19, 82-CW-20, 82-CW-27, 82-CW-28, 82CW-29, 82-CW-30, 82-CW-31, 82-CW-32, 82-CW-33, 82-CW-34).
69. Trial is presently scheduled to begin in late 1998. Forest Service claims are also
pending in Utah, Nevada, Arizona, Oregon, and Montana. Telephone conversation
withJamesJ. DuBois, attorney, U.S. Dept. ofJustice (May 5, 1998).
70. Consolidated proceeding for Divisions 4, 5, and 6, supra note 29.
71. Interlocutory Decree at 91-92, consolidated proceeding for Divisions 4, 5, and
6, supra note 29.
72. United States v. Denver, 656 P.2d 1, 13 (Colo. 1982).
73. After the case was remanded, the United States never submitted, and the water
court never entered, a final decree on this portion of the case. Therefore, the five year
period still has not run. Quantification has been complicated by the parties' desire to
coordinate the right with the operation of the Aspinall storage project and reservoir
releases for the benefit of the Colorado River endangered fish species.
74. Denver, 656 P.2d at 27 n.44.
75. Id.
76. Consolidated proceeding for Divisions 4, 5, and 6, supra note 29.
77. Interlocutory Decree at 442, 445-57, consolidated proceeding for Divisions 4, 5,
and 6, supra note 29.
78. Id. at 448.
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The Colorado Supreme Court agreed with the water court's conclusions: 9 the monument was indeed established for the purpose of
preserving objects of historic and scientific interest8 ° and the proclamation placing management under the National Park Service Act of
19168 did not enlarge the monument's purpose.82 The federal government was therefore not entitled to a reserved instream flow right
for recreational purposes.83 However, the Court remanded the case for
a determination of whether the purposes for which the monument was
reserved included preservation of fish habitats."
On remand, the Division 6 Water Court entered summary judgment denying the instream flow claim in its entirety on the ground
that the purpose of the proclamation was to preserve dinosaur remains, prehistoric archeological artifacts, and other objects of historic
and geologic interest, but not fish. The United States filed an appeal
from the water court's decision, but subsequently dismissed it.86
In Water Division 3, the United States claimed instream flow rights
for a number of creeks in the Great Sand Dunes National Monument.87
The claims were acceptable to the state and to the other objectors, all
of whom stipulated to a decree granting and quantifying the rights. 88
The federal government has had the easiest time with its national
park claims. This is hardly surprising since the "fundamental purpose"
of the National Park Service Act of 1916 is "to conserve the scenery
and the natural and historic objects and the wild life [sic] therein and
to provide for the enjoyment of the same in such manner and by such
means as will leave them unimpaired for the enjoyment of future generations."8 9 As with Black Canyon National Monument, the water court
awarded instream flow rights for the west slope side of Rocky Mountain National Park, again apparently without controversy, and gave the
federal government five years from the entry of a final decree to quan79. Denver, 656 P.2d. at 27-29, 36.
80. Id. at 27 (citing to the Presidential Proclamation of Oct. 4, 1915, 39 Stat. 1752
(1915), based on the American Antiquities Preservation Act of 1906, 16 U.S.C. § 431).
81. 16 U.S.C. § 1 (1994 & Supp. I. 1995).
82. Denver, 656 P.2d at 28-30.
83. Id. at 29, 36.
84. Id.
85. Order Granting Motion for Summary Judgment, as modified, Order Clarifying
Order Dated March 14, 1985, Granting Motion for Partial Summary Judgment; and
Denying Motion to Alter or Amend Judgment, In the Matter of the Application for
Water Rights of the United States of America in Dinosaur National Monument in Moffat County, Colorado (Dist. Ct., Water Div. No. 6, Colo. 1985) (No. W-85).
86. United States of America v. Wes Signs, et al, No. 85 SA 260 (Colo. April 17,

1986).

87. In the Matter of the Application of the United States of America for Water
Rights in the Rio Grande River Drainage, in Alamosa and Saguache Counties (Dist.
Ct., Water Div. No. 3, Colo. 1981) (No. 81-CW-164).
88. Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Decree, In the Matter of the Application of the United States of America for Water Rights in the Rio Grande River Drainage, in Alamosa and Saguache Counties (Dist. Ct., Water Div. No. 3, Colo. 1981) (No.
81-CW-164).
89. 16 U.S.C. § 1 (1994 & Supp. I. 1995).
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tify the rights."' The supreme court affirmed.9 ' A final decree still has
not been entered 92 and the parties are now in the process of negotiating quantities.
The United States subsequently filed a motion for summary judgment in Water Division 1, seeking water rights to all unappropriated
waters on the east slope of Rocky Mountain National Park. Despite
objections that the federal government had not shown that the entire
flow was needed, or that, given the park's headwaters location, a water
right was necessary to protect the flows, 94 the water court nonetheless
found that Congress intended to reserve all of the unappropriated water in the park to preserve its scenic beauty95 and granted the motion.96
This time it was the objectors who did not appeal.
The United States also claimed instream flow rights in the Mancos
River in Mesa Verde National Park, located in Water Division 7.7 The
primary purposes of Mesa Verde, the preservation of ruins and relics
and the protection of wildlife, are narrower than those of Rocky
Mountain National Park.98 Consequently, the United States, Colorado,
and local water users were able to reach a compromise that quantified
instream flow reserved rights in amounts acceptable to all the parties,
and the case was resolved by consent decree."
WILDERNESS AREAS

While it asserted reserved rights for a broad range of federal reservations, the federal government did not claim reserved rights for the

90. Interlocutory Decree at 268-70, consolidated proceeding for Division 4, 5, and
6, supra note 29.
91. The only issue that the court considered on appeal was the proper priority date
of the rights. Denver, 656 P.2d at 30, 36
92. See supra note 73.
93. Memorandum of Decision and Order at 1, Concerning the Application for Water Rights of the United States of America for Reserved Rights in Rocky Mountain National Park in Boulder and Laramie Counties (Dist. Ct., Water Div. No. 1, Colo. 1993)
(No. W-8439-76 (W-8788-77)), [hereinafter Division 1 RMNP Case].
94. Certain Objectors' Memorandum in Response to Applicant's Motion for Summary Judgment, Division 1 RMNP Case, supra note 93. The objectors argued that the
need for water does not necessarily equate with the need for a water right, when the
location of the reservation coupled with the Forest Service's regulatory authority adequately protect the water resource. Although the court found that argument persuasive in the Division 1 National Forests Case, Memorandum of Decision and Order at
11-12, Division 1 National Forests Case, supra note 13, the court simply ignored the argument in deciding the Division 1 RMNP Case.
95. Memorandum of Decision and Order at 8-9, Division 1 RMNP Case, supra note
93.
96. Id. at 11.
97. Concerning the Application of Water Rights for the United States of America
in the County of Montezuma (Reserved Water Rights for Mesa Verde National Park),
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Decree at 4 (Dist. Ct., Water Div. No. 7,
Colo. 1997) (No. W-1633-76).
98. Id. at 5.
99. Id. at 1-2, 8.
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twenty-four designated wilderness areas in Colorado.' ° In 1984, the
Sierra Club sued the Secretary of Agriculture and the Chief of the Forest Service, seeking both a declaratory judgment that wilderness reserved water rights exist and the federal defendants' failure to assert
the rights was unlawful and an order requiring that the defendants
take action to protect the rights.'0 ' The case had a long and convoluted history. and became a cause c ikbre,'0° as intervenors and amid
jumped in on both0 4sides to argue over the existence of wilderness reserved water rights.
The district court seemed positively eager to "explicitly hold and
05
enter final declaratory judgment" as to the existence of the rights,
but had more trouble with the remedy. Explaining that the separation
of powers doctrine prevented it from ordering the federal defendants
to instigate litigation to claim the rights, it instead ordered them to
reevaluate their alternatives and submit a written plan for fulfilling
their statutory duty to protect wilderness water resources.' 7 The federal defendants complied by filing a disrespectfully short report." After further wrangling,'0 the Forest Service submitted a longer, more
detailed report that found no present or foreseeable future threats to
the wilderness resources and outlined a number of options, including
the assertion of reserved rights, that the Forest Service could use to
protect wilderness water values should they be threatened in the future."0 The Sierra Club did not challenge the second plan and took

100. These wilderness areas were designated pursuant to the Wilderness Act of 1964,
16 U.S.C. § 1131 (1994 & Supp. I. 1995).
101. Sierra Club v. Block, 622 F. Supp. 842, 846 (D. Colo. 1985).
102. Traced in Sierra Club v. Yeutter, 911 F.2d 1405, 1408-10 (10th Cir. 1990). During
the course of litigation, the Secretary of Agriculture changed three times, and the case
was successively captioned Sierra Club v. Block, Sierra Club v. Lyng, and Sierra Club v. Yeutter.
103. The lawsuit delayed new wilderness designation in Colorado until 1993. See
J.L. Weis, FederalReserved Water Rights in Wilderness Areas: A Progress Report on a Western
Water Fight, 15 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 125 (1987), for a discussion of the political impasse as of the date of the article.
104. Yeutter, 911 F.2d at 1407-08 n.97. The main issues were (and are): (1) are wilderness areas "reservations"?; (2) are wilderness purposes primary or (as with MUSYA)
secondary?; (3) what is the meaning of section 4(d)(7) of the Wilderness Act, 16
U.S.C. § 1133(6)(d), which states, "[n]othing in this chapter shall constitute an express or implied claim or denial on the part of the Federal Government as to exemption from State water laws."?
105. Block, 622 F. Supp. at 851.
106. Id. at 864.
107. Id. at 867.
108. The plan first submitted by the federal defendants was less than three pages
long "in its portentous... entirety." Sierra Club v. Lyng, 661 F. Supp. 1490, 1495 (D.
Colo. 1987).
109. Judge Kane roundly excoriated the defendants and threatened them with sanctions. Id. at 1501-02.
110. Yeutter, 911 F.2d at 1409-10. The Colorado wilderness areas are almost exclusively located at the headwaters of stream systems, so that there is little opportunity to
take water above them, and the construction of new diversion or storage facilities in
the wilderness areas themselves would require presidential approval. See M. Tristani,
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the position that "Judge Kane's ruling constitutes a declaratory judgment on all legal issues in this case and no additional relief is
sought.... The court then dismissed all claims
for relief "other than
' 2
the adjudicated claim for declaratory relief."
On appeal, the Tenth Circuit held that the issues presented were
not ripe for adjudication because the harm sought to be alleviated was
remote and speculative"' and that the district court had erred in taking jurisdiction and declaring that the Wilderness Act creates federal
reserved water rights." 4 Thus, after six years of hard fought litigation,
Judge Kane's judgment that wilderness reserved rights exist was vacated."15 The question remained open until late 1997, when an Idaho
trial court entered an order granting the United States' motion for
summary judgment awarding instream flow rights for 7three wilderness
areas." 6 The State of Idaho is appealing the decision."
One healthy result of the wilderness water rights controversy is that
it has forced Congress to squarely address the water rights issue when
designating new wilderness areas, rather than remaining silent and
abdicating responsibility to the courts."8 The question is now likely to
be resolved on a case-by-case basis at the time an area is designated,
rather than by judicial fiat years, or even decades, after the fact. The
Colorado Wilderness Act of 1993,"" enacted after the smoke of litigation finally cleared, is a good example. The Act includes findings that
the headwater locations of these wilderness areas allow few, if any, opportunities for upstream water development; that the wilderness lands
themselves are not suitable for new or expanded water resource facilities; and that it is therefore possible to protect the wilderness values of
the lands in ways different from those used in other wilderness legislation. 20 The Act goes on to explicitly disclaim any intent to create reserved water rights.' 2' Other recent wilderness designations in western

Interior Turns Off Tap for Wilderness Areas, 29 NAT. RES. J. 877 (1989) ("Given that most
wilderness areas are located at the headwaters of streams, the question arises why Federal reserved water rights need to be asserted for wilderness areas at all."). Ms. Tristani
correctly concludes that the issue is more political than real.
111. Yeutter, 911 F.2d at 1410, n.97 (quotingJudge Kane's characterization of the
Sierra Club's position).
112. Id. (again quotingJudge Kane).
113. Id. at 1419-21.
114. Id. at 1421.
115. Id.
116. Idaho Order, supra note 48.
117. In re SRBA, Case Nos. 24545, 24546, 24547, 24548, 24557, 24558, and 24559
(Idaho filed Feb. 24, 1998).
118. In the words of one commentator, "[Tihere is no justification for a prudent
government ever intentionally to rely on implications for the existence, quantity, priority, and nature of its right or rights enjoyed by its people." Charles Corker, A Real
Live Problem or Two for the Waning Energies of FrankJ Trelease, 54 DENVER L. J. 499, 503
(1977).
119. Pub. L. No. 103-77, 107 Stat. 756 (August 13, 1993).
120. Id. § 8.
121. Id.
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states have expressly reserved water rights,' but the touchiness of the
subject is reflected in the fact that most of the recent wilderness statutes include a statement that they are not intended to set a precedent
for future wilderness designations.'
OTHER RESERVED INSTREAM FLOW RIGHTS
In contrast to the 1964 Wilderness Act, the Wild and Scenic Rivers

12
Act' 24 contains an express reservation, albeit in negative terms: 1

(c) Reservation of waters for other purposes or in unnecessary quantities prohibited.
Designation of any stream or portion thereof as a national wild, scenic, or recreational river area shall not be construed as a reservation
of the waters of such streams for purposes other than those specified
in this chapter, or in quantities greater than necessary to accomplish
these purposes.
However, like the Wilderness Act, the Wild and Scenic Rivers Act does

not resolve the question of how to handle new designations, which
might not be possible in the face of water user opposition to poten-

tially large instream flow rights. Colorado affords another example of
a negotiated compromise: the designation of the Cache la Poudre, "' a

tributary of the Platte River, located west of the city of Fort Collins.
Only the upper portion of the Cache la Poudre was designated 128 and
that with several express conditions. The first of these conditions allows downstream development, even if such development affects the

122. See, e.g., California Desert Protection Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-433, 108 Stat.
4471 (Oct. 31, 1994); Arizona Desert Wilderness Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-628, 104
Stat. 4469 (Nov. 28, 1990); Nevada Wilderness Protection Act of 1989, Pub. L. No. 101195, 103 Stat. 1784 (Dec. 5, 1989); Washington Park Wilderness Act of 1988, Pub. L.
No. 100-668, 102 Stat. 3961 (Nov. 16, 1988); El Malpais National and Conservation
Area, Pub L. No. 100-225, 101 Stat. 1539 (Dec. 31, 1987). The Arizona and California
acts also expressly disclaim any reserved rights to the water of the Colorado River for
the Havasu or Imperial Wilderness Areas, located in both states.
123. The Colorado, California, Arizona, Nevada, and New Mexico statutes, supra
notes 119 and 122, all contain such "no precedent" language.
124. 16 U.S.C. § 1271 (1994 & Supp. 11995).
125. The Idaho district court in the Snake River adjudication, supra note 48, recently
reached this same conclusion. Memorandum Decision Granting, in Part, and Denying, in Part, the United States' Motion for Summary Judgment on Reserved Water
Rights Claims (July 27, 1998).
126. 16 U.S.C. § 1284 (1994). The Idaho district court in the Snake River adjudication held that the United States was not entitled to all unappropriated flows as a matter of law, but was required to prove "the minimum quantity necessary to fulfill these
general purposes and such specific values as were attached by each designation."
Memorandum Decision Granting, in Part, and Denying, in Part, the United States'
Motion for SummaryJudgment on Reserved Water Rights Claims (July 27, 1998) at 11.
127. Pub. L. No. 99-590, 100 Stat. 3330 (Oct. 30, 1986).
128. The designated portions of the Cache la Poudre and South Fork of the Cache
la Poudre are further broken down into five segments, three of which are classified as
wild and two of which are classified as recreational. Id. §101 3(a)(56).
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designated portion.'2 The second provides that the reserved water
right established by the designation shall be adjudicated in Colorado
water courts and shall have a priority date as of the date of enactment.""
The issue of reserved water rights also arises in the context of national recreation areas and national conservation areas.' These may
include wilderness areas, rivers designated under the Wild and Scenic
Rivers Act, or national monuments. 2 Sometimes the designating legislation specifically addresses the issue of water reservation. For example, the Acts designating the San Pedro Riparian National Conservation Area 33 and the El Malpais National Monument and Conservation
Area 34 contain express reservations of water, 3 5 while the Act designating the Hells Canyon National Recreation Area 3 6 states that neither
that Act nor the Wild and Scenic Rivers Act "shall in any way limit, restrict, or conflict with present and future use of the waters of the Snake
River and its tributaries" upstream from the area and that "[n]o flow
requirements of any kind may be imposed on the waters of the Snake
River" within the area.137
However, other Acts, like the one creating the Sawtooth National
Recreation Area, 38 state that "[n] othing in this subchapter shall constitute an express or implied claim or denial on the part of the Federal
Government as to exemption from State water laws.' 39 By taking the
easy way out, Congress leaves to the courts what should be a legislative
decision.4 0 Although such language has become less acceptable since
129. Id. § 102.
130. Id. As contemplated by the Act, the United States applied for a reserved water
right and the parties to the case stipulated to a decree. Revised Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Decree, Concerning the Application of the United States of America for Reserved Water Rights for the Cache La Poudre Wild and Scenic River in Larimer County (Rocky Mountain National Park and Roosevelt National Forest) (Dist.
Ct., Water Div. No. 1, Colo. 1986) (No. 86-CW-67).
131. See 16 U.S.C. § 460 (1994).
132. Id.
133. Arizona-Idaho Conservation Act of 1988, 16 U.S.C. § 460xx (1994 & Supp. I
1995).
134. 16 U.S.C. § 460uu (1994 & Supp. 11995).
135. Id. §§ 460xx-l(d) and 460uu-49(a) (1994).
136. Id. § 46 0gg (1994 & Supp. 11995).
137. Id. § 460gg-3(a) (b) (1994). An Idaho district court has construed the Hells
Canyon National Recreation Area Act to expressly reserve all unappropriated waters
originating in tributaries within the area boundaries. Idaho Order, supra note 48.
However, it seems more likely that the failure to include "and its tributaries" in subsection (b) was due to sloppy legislative drafting than that it expressed Congress' considered intent to reserve all tributary water within the area boundaries. The State of
Idaho is appealing the ruling. In re SRBA, Case Nos. 24545, 24546, 24547, 24548,
24557, 24558, and 24559 (Idaho filed Feb. 24, 1998).
138. 16 U.S.C. § 460aa (1994).
139. Id. § 460aa-8. See also Indian Peaks Wilderness Area, the Arapahoe National
Recreation Area and the Oregon Islands Wilderness Area Act, 16 U.S.C. § 460jj-4
(1994) (Arapahoe National Recreation Area).
140. The rationale for implied reserved rights is that, when a reservation of land
does not expressly address water, the court will review the creative act and legislative
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the wilderness controversy, it still occurs.141
APPROPRIATIVE INSTREAM FLOW RIGHTS
Under the doctrine of prior appropriation, adopted by most of the
western states, water rights are created by diverting water and placing it
to beneficial use. The doctrine developed in response to mining and
agricultural water needs 143 at a time when most instream uses were
barely a blip on anyone's radar screen.1 44 Therefore, it is hardly surprising that the doctrine, as originally conceived, did not recognize instream flow water rights which by their very nature do not involve a diversion. 45 The law of most western states has since evolved to integrate
instream flow rights into their prior appropriation systems. 146 Two
states, Arizona and Nevada, simply do not require a diversion as an
element of an appropriation.14 ' Thus, in Nevada, the Bureau of Land
Management was granted an appropriative right for recreation and
fishery purposes in a natural lake. 48 However, other states impose requirements that may impede a federal agency's appropriation of instate
stream flows. 1 49 For example, most states designate one or more
50

agencies as the only entities that can hold instream flow rights.
In Colorado, only the Colorado Water Conservation Board
("CWCB") may be granted a decree adjudicating an instream flow water right.' 5' The CWCB may appropriate the waters of natural streams
and lakes to preserve the natural environment to a reasonable degree

history for the particular reservation and determine what Congress would have done
had it considered whether to reserve water. Thus, language explicitly disclaiming any

intent presents a real conundrum for a court. There is a good argument that a court

should not imply an intent to reserve water when Congress deliberately shirks the is-

sue.
141. See, e.g., 16 U.S.C. § 460iii-5(d) (1994) (Snake River Birds of Prey National Conservation Area).
142. Wyoming v. Colorado, 259 U.S. 419, 458-59 (1922). See also GEORGE VRANESH,
1 COLORADO WATER LAW § 2.3, at 66-72 (1987), for a general discussion of the elements of an appropriation.
143. See e.g., VRANESH, supra note 142, § 2.3 at 60-64; WELLS A. HUTCHINS, 1 WATER
RIGHTS LAW IN THE NINETEEN WESTERN STATES, U.S. DEPT. OF AGRICULTURE, Misc. Pub.

No. 1206, at 157-71 (1971).
144. But see Empire Water and Power Co. v. Cascade Town Co., 205 F. 123 (8th Cir.
1913), in which a Colorado resort town sought unsuccessfully to protect its scenic waterfalls, for an early case in which the prior appropriation system was inadequate to
protect instream flows.
145. See Covell, supra note 11, at 178.
146. Id. at 180-88.
147. Id. at 188-89. See also the discussion of recent changes in New Mexico's approach to instream flows. Id. at 190-91.
148. Nevada v. Morros, 104 Nev. 709, 766 P.2d 263 (1988).
149. Such state law requirements do not limit reserved rights, which are created by
federal law.
150. See Covell, supra note 11, at 180-88.
151. COLO. REv. STAT. § 37-92-102(3) (1997).
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and may also acquire water and water rights for that purpose.'52 No
federal agency has ever been granted a decree for a new appropriative
right for instream flows under Colorado law,5 although, in the mid1980s, there were a few anomalous cases in which the Forest Service
and the National Park Service each purchased existing agricultural
water'54 rights and obtained decrees changing them to instream flow
uses.
However, although Colorado law does not allow the federal
government to appropriate instream flows, the Colorado instream flow
statute is tailored to encourage federal agencies' to rely on the CWCB
to protect instream flows for federal purposes. Prior to appropriating
or acquiring
instream flows,
the
CWCB must request
recommendations from the United States Department of Agriculture
and the United States Department of the Interior. Additionally, the
CWCB may acquire water or water rights from other governmental

152. Id.
153. In 1987, a Fish and Wildlife Service application for a new appropriative instream flow right on Vermillion Creek in the Browns Park National Wildlife Refuge
was denied by the water court based in part on the CWCB's exclusive authority. Ruling of Referee (confirmed by the water court Apr. 28, 1988), Concerning the Application of Water Rights of: the United States of America, in Moffat County (Dist. Ct., Water Div. No. 6, Colo. 1988) (No. 87-CW-135).
In the consolidated proceeding for Divisions 4, 5, and 6, supra note 29, the master-referee awarded the Bureau of Land Management several hundred very small appropriative rights within natural streams for fire protection, livestock and wildlife watering, and recreation. Partial Master-Referee Report Regarding the Claims of the
United States of America (August 6, 1976) [hereinafter Report], consolidated proceeding for Divisions 4, 5, and 6, supra note 29. The master-referee expressly found
that the rights would be diverted for use outside the course of the streams. Report at
508-09. "The manner of these diversions is immaterial, so long as they exist." Id. at 509
(emphasis added). He noted that the recreational uses were for drinking, cooking, or
the like, which required diversions, and that "[tio the extent such claimed recreational use requested the maintenance of flows for fish propagation, they must, of
course, be denied under the terms of Rocky Mountain Power.". Id. The water court
quoted the referee-master's report with approval. Findings, Conclusions and Order
of the Court with Reference to the Partial Master-Referee's Report Covering All of the
Claims of the United States of America and the Proposed Interlocutory Decree at 6061 (March 6th, 1978), consolidated proceeding for Divisions 4, 5,and 6, supra note 29.
The Colorado Supreme Court simply noted that the master-referee had ruled that the
United States' claim for appropriative rights was valid "notwithstanding the absence of
a permanent man-made diversion structure" and that there were no objections to his
ruling. United States v. Denver, 656 P.2d 1, 14-15 (Colo. 1982). In a subsequent dispute over whether Colorado law allows the federal government to appropriate instream flow rights, the Forest Service mischaracterized these as instream flow rights.
See, e.g., letter from Richard E. Rominger, Deputy Secretary, Dept. of Agriculture, to
Gale A. Norton, Attorney General, State of Colorado, (May 17, 1995); letter from
Elizabeth Estill, Regional Forester, to Senator Don Ament, Chair, Agriculture, Natural
Resources, and Energy Committee (May 8, 1995). It is clear from the record, -however,
that these rights are for out-of-stream uses, not instream flows.
154. See memorandum from Chuck Lile, Director, Colorado Water Conservation
Board, to U.S. Representative Entz, Chairman, House Committee on Agriculture,
Livestock and Natural Resources, and to U.S. Senator Ament, Chairman, Senate
Committee on Agriculture, Natural Resources and Energy (Subject: USFS and Instream Flow Protection) (April 25, 1995) [hereinafter Lile Memo].
155. COLO. REV. STAT. § 37-92-102(3) (1997).
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entities and contract with them to specify how the CWCB will use the
water or water right.16 As a result of the law's paired prohibition and
invitation, the Bureau of Land Management and the Fish and Wildlife
Service have looked to the CWCB to secure instream flows. 57
NATIONAL FORESTS

In an obvious test case,5 in 1984, the Forest Service filed for a
small appropriative instream flow right on East Middle Creek, a tributary of Saguache Creek, located in the Rio Grande National Forest. 5 9
The claimed uses were fisheries, aesthetics, outdoor recreation, range
management, timber, watershed protection, and wildlife. 160 However,
the Forest Service press release gave only one purpose: "to protect
habitat for the Rio Grande Cutthroat Trout.' 6' The press release also

stated that the Forest Service "intend[ed] to work with the Colorado
Water Conservation Board to the fullest extent possible.' 62 Yet, despite the fact that the CWCB routinely appropriates instream flows to
protect trout fisheries, 63 the Forest Service did not request that the
The Forest
CWCB make an appropriation on East Middle Creek.'
Service initially justified its failure to go through the CWCB based on
the Service's "independent mandated requirements, priorities and resource needs that may not coincide with those of the Board."' 65 However, since the Forest Service's ostensible purpose was protecting trout
habitat, and since the CWCB can and does appropriate instream flows
for that purpose,'166 that justification was not terribly convincing. The

CWCB responded by filing a statement of opposition to the Forest
Service's application6 and then filing its own application for an instream flow right on East Middle Creek.'
156. Id.
157. Lile memo, supra note 154.
158. As was evidenced by the press release that followed the filing of the application.
Forest Service News, Rio Grande National Forest Public Affairs Office, Forest Service
Files for Water Right (Dec. 28, 1994) [hereinafter Press Release].
159. Application for Water Rights (Surface), Concerning the Application for Water
Rights of the United States of America in the Rio Grande River, in Saguache County
[hereinafter Division 3 National Forest Appropriative Rights Case] (Dist. Ct., Water
Div. No. 3, Colo. 1994) (No. 94-CW-39).
160. Id.
161. Press Release, supra note 158.
162. Id.
163. See, e.g., Development of Instream Flow Recommendations in Colorado Using R2Cross,
Colorado Water Conservation Board (Jan. 1996).
164. Lile memo, supra note 154.
165. Press Release, supra note 158.
166. See Colorado River Water Conservation Dist. v. Colorado Water Conservation
Board, 594 P.2d 570 (Colo. 1979); Development of Instream Flow Recommendations in Colorado, supra note 163.
167. Statement of Opposition (dated Feb. 28, 1995), Division 3 National Forest Appropriative Rights Case, supranote 159. Other users also opposed the application.
168. Application for Water Rights to Protect the Natural Environment to a Reasonable Degree, In the Matter of the Application for Water Rights of the Colorado Water
Conservation Board on Behalf of the People of the State of Colorado in East Middle
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After the inevitable public debate and politicking,' 69 the Forest
Service, the CWCB, and other parties agreed to stay both cases and
negotiate.'
Since then, the cases have been inactive while the parties
have worked on a comprehensive Division 3 settlement intended to resolve all of the Forest Service's reserved and appropriative rights
claims, as well as to prevent future regulatory restrictions on forest
permittees.
Before the dust had settled in Division 3, the Forest Service was
back, requesting that the CWCB apply for an instream flow right for
the East Fork of Dead Horse Creek, located in the White River National Forest, for recreation, aesthetics, fish, and wildlife purposes.17 '
The creek is the source of water for Hanging Lake and Bridal Veil
Falls, popular scenic attractions in Glenwood Canyon.'72 The Forest
Service requested that the CWCB appropriate the entire unappropriated flow of the creek, stating that "[a] nything less would diminish the
aesthetic qualities of these features . . . . ,,1'3The requested instream
flows were not to protect fisheries, the CWCB's usual standard for
quantifying
its claims, but to protect a unique environment and ecosys74
tem.

Although the request was an unusual one for the CWCB to consider, the CWCB and Forest Service staffs cooperated on the technical
documentation 75 and the CWCB applied for all unappropriated flows
in Dead Horse Creek17 and its east and west 7 forks and for the en-

Creek, a Natural Strfam in the Watershed of the Closed Basin in Saguache County,
Colorado (Dist. Ct., Water Div. No. 3, Colo. 1995) (No. 95-CW-34) [hereinafter Division 3 CWCB Case].
169. Federal-state water law conflicts invariably generate a good deal of political
heat, not to mention law review articles. In this case, there were exchanges of letters
between public officials (e.g., letter from U.S. Senator Hank Brown to Richard E.
Rominger, Acting Secretary of Agriculture (March 23, 1995); letter from Gale Norton,
Colorado Attorney General, to Richard E. Rominger, Acting Secretary of Agriculture,
re: Forest Service water right application (Feb. 16, 1995); Rominger and Estill letters,
supra note 153) and the Colorado General Assembly passed Senate Joint Resolution
95-15, requesting that the Forest Service withdraw its filing and seek an appropriative
right through the CWCB in accordance with state law.
170. See Order to Stay All Proceedings, Division 3 National Forest Appropriative
Rights Case, supra note 159.
171. Letter from Elizabeth Estill, Regional Forester, U.S. Forest Service, to Chuck
Lile, Director, Colorado Water Conservation Board (April 25, 1995).
172. Id.
173. Id.
174. David Frey, Safeguardsfor HangingLake Run Deep, GLENWOOD PoST, Dec. 3, 1996,
at 1.
175. Memorandum from Dan Merriman, Colorado Water Conservation Board staff
member, to Colorado Water Conservation Board Members (Nov. 18, 1996) (Subject:
Agenda Item 20a, November 25-26, 1996, Board Meeting - Instream Flow Program Final Notice Water Division 5, Garfield County, with attachments).
176. Application for Water Rights to Protect the Natural Environment to a Reasonable Degree, In the Matter of the Application for Water Rights of the Colorado Water
Conservation Bd., in Dead Horse Creek, Garfield County, (Dist. Ct., Water Div. No. 5,
Colo. 1996) (No. 96-CW-350).
177. Application for Water Rights to Protect the Natural Environment to a Reason-
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tire volume of Hanging Lake." However, the Forest Service did not
abandon its efforts to acquire an instream flow right. Expressing concern that the CWCB might not adequately protect the rights, it sought
to become a co-applicant or to hold some other property interest in
the rights."' To avoid inconsistency with state law, the CWCB instead
offered to execute an enforcement agreement with the Forest Service
to ensure future protection of the rights.' The CWCB and the Forest
Service never came to terms on an enforcement agreement, but decrees for the four CWCB rights were signed by the water judge on May
7, 1997.12
NON-RESERVED WATER RIGHTS
No discussion of federal water rights would be complete without
mention of the theory of non-reserved water rights. The theory origi8 3 and, over an approximately three
nated in a 1979 solicitor's opinion1
year period, generated two more solicitor's opinions,' an opinion
from the Department of Justice, 8 5 and a flurry of law review articles, 86
but never resulted in a single water right filing.8

7

The 1979 Krulitz

able Degree, In the Matter of the Application for Water Rights of the Colorado Water
Conservation Board, in East Fork Dead Horse Creek, Garfield County (Dist. Ct., Water
Div. No. 5, Colo. 1996) (No. 96-CW-351).
178. Application for Water Rights to Protect the Natural Environment to a Reasonable Degree, In the Matter of the Application for Water Rights of the Colorado Water
Conservation Board, in West Fork Dead Horse Creek, Garfield County (Dist. Ct., Water Div. No. 5, Colo. 1996) (No. 96-CW-352).
179. Application for Water Rights to Protect the Natural Environment to a Reasonable Degree, In the Matter of the Application for Water Rights of the Colorado Water
Conservation Board, in Hanging Lake, Garfield County (Dist. Ct., Water Div. No. 5,
Colo. 1996) (No. 96-CW-353).
180. See Letter from James S. Lochhead, Executive Director, Department of Natural
Resources, to Elizabeth Estill, Regional Forester, U.S. Forest Service (Feb. 11, 1997).
181. Id.
182. Findings and Ruling of Referee and Decree, Applications, supranotes 176-79.
183. Solicitor's Opinion No. M-36914, 86 Interior Dec. 553 (1979) [hereinafter
Krulitz Opinion].
184. Supplement to Solicitor's Opinion No. M-36914, 88 Interior Dec. 253 (1981)
[hereinafter Martz Opinion]; Second Supplement to Solicitor's Opinion No. M-36914,
88 Interior Dec. 1055 (1981) [hereinafter Coldiron Opinion].
185. Memorandum from Theodore B. Olson, Assistant Attorney General, Office of
Legal Counsel, to Carol E. Dinkins, Assistant Attorney General, Land and Natural Resources Division (June 16, 1982) [hereinafter Dinkins Memorandum] (generally referred to as the 'Dinkins Memorandum', although written by Theodore B. Olson, Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel).
186. See, e.g., Gary K King, Case Note, Federal Non-Reserved Water Rights: Fact or Fiction?, 22 NAT. RES.J. 423 (1982); Barry C. Vaughan, Comment, FederalNonreserved Water
Rights, 48 U. CHI. L. REv. 758 (1981); David D. Freudenthal, Comment, FederalNonReserved Water Rights, 15 LAND & WATER L. REV. 67 (1980); Bruce A. Machmeier, Note,
FederalAcquisition of Non-Reserved Water Rights After New Mexico, 31 STAN. L. REv. 885
(1979).
187. In Denver, the court specifically noted that the United States had not advanced
any claims based upon he theory of federal non-reserved water rights. United States
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Opinion created a sensation'88 by asserting that, absent an express
Congressional prohibition, a federal agency could claim appropriative
rights necessary to serve any Congressionally authorized land management function, without regard to state substantive or procedural
law.'9 The opinion explicitly stated, "the appropriation for authorized
federal purposes cannot be strictly limited by what state water law says
is a 'diversion' of water to a 'beneficial use' for which water can be appropriated."' 90
The Martz Opinion narrowed the Krulitz Opinion by finding that
neither the Federal Land Policy and Management Act ("FLPMA") T'
nor the Taylor Grazing Act' 9 authorized the Department of the Interior to a9p ropriate water in a manner inconsistent with state substantive law.
The subsequent Coldiron Opinion completely reversed
course, concluding that "there is no federal 'non-reserved' water
right"'194 and that, absent a reserved right, "consistent with the express
language in the New Mexico decision, federal entities must acquire water as would any other private claimant within the various states." 95
The 1982 Dinkins Memorandum had the last, and perhaps bestreasoned, word. Rather than treating the question as one unique to water law, the opinion relied on general principles of federal preemption. The Dinkins Memorandum concluded that there is a presumption that the western states retain control over the allocation of water
within their borders and that "the federal constitutional authority to
preempt state water law must be clearly and specifically exercised, either expressly or by necessary implication."' 96 The Supreme Court's
1993 statement in United States v. Idaho97 that "the McCarran Amendment submits the United States generally to state adjective law, as well
as to state substantive law of water rights"' further undercut the nonreserved rights theory and, to date, no federal agency has pressed a
preemption claim.

v. Denver, 656 P.2d 1, 11 n.20 (Colo. 1982). To date, the Division 3 National Forest
Appropriative Rights Case is probably as close as the United States has come to claiming anything resembling a non-reserved right, at least in Colorado.
188. Some indication of state reactions can be gleaned from the Dinkins Memorandum, supra note 185, at 2 n.1.

189. Krulitz Opinion, supra note 183.
190. Id. at 575.
191. 43 U.S.C. § 1701 (1994 &Supp. 11995).
192. 43 U.S.C. § 315 (1994).
193. Martz Opinion, supra note 184, at 257-58.
194. Coldiron Opinion, supra note 184, at 1064.
195. Id. at 1065.
196. Dinkins Memorandum, supra note 185, at 79.
197. United States v. Idaho, 508 U.S. 1 (1993).
198. Id. at 8. The statement occurs in the context of a holding that language in the
McCarran Amendment expressly providing "that no judgment for costs shall be entered against the United States" precluded the State of Idaho from assessing large fees
against the federal government. Id
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THE BYPASS FLOW END RUN
The Division 1 National Forests Case opinion contained a discussion of the Forest Service's ability to use its permitting authority to
2°°
control harmful diversions.'" That discussion, taken out of context,
came back to haunt water users in the subsequent controversy over
permits for existing water supply facilities. Soon after its loss in Division 1, the Forest Service tried a new tack: when special use permits for
existing water supply facilities located in national forests in Division 1
came up for renewal under FLPMA,20 ' the Forest Service began demanding that the owners bypass a certain amount of their yields to
provide instream flows. 2 2 The ensuing controversy, 20°which included
the Secretary of Agriculture's issuance of a policy in 1992 that new bypass flows would not be imposed on existing facilities (the Madigan
Letter)204 and his successor's subsequent silent withdrawal of the policy
in 1994,205 led to the creation of a federal task force to study the is206
sue.
The use of permit conditions in lieu of water rights to secure instream flows raises questions about the interpretation of federal land

199. Memorandum of Decision and Order at 9-15, Division 1 National Forests Case,
supranote 13.
200. What is often overlooked is that the Forest Service had conceded that the
stream channels had adjusted to existing diversions. See, e.g., id. at 12-13. Most tellingly, the federal government was willing to subordinate its claims to all existing uses.
There were forty-six such subordinations, thirty-five of which were introduced as exhibits. Division 1 National Forests Case, supra note 13 (U.S. Exs. A-1458, A-1459, A1462-65, A-1467, A-1471, A-1472, A-1477, A-1478, A-1487, A-1493, A-1496-1501, A-152124, A-1528, A-1538, A-1539, A-1559, A-1568-72, A-1574, A-1599, and A-1600). Thus, the
court's allusion to permitting authority only pertained to new diversions. B. Raley,
Chaos in the Making: The Consequences of Failureto IntegrateFederalEnvironmental Statutes
with McCarranAmendment Water Adjudications, 41 ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. INST. 24-1 at 2445 (1995). See also D. McConkey, FederalReserved Rights to Instream Flows in the National
Forests, 13 VA. ENvrL. L.J. 305, 321 (1994) (disagreeing with the court's reliance on the
Forest Service's permit authority in part because it would not affect existing rights, but
would apply only to new appropriations).
201. 43 U.S.C. § 1701 (1994 & Supp. 11995).
202. See Witwer, supra 14; Raley, supra note 200. Conflicts between federal agency
permits and state water law were nothing new. See, e.g., California v. FERC, 495 U.S.
490 (1990) (the Rock Creek Case); D. Craig Bell & Norman K. Johnson, State Water
Laws and Federal Water Uses: The Histoiy of Conflict, the Prospects for Accommodation, 21
ENvrL. L. 1, 30-37 (1990). But the Forest Service's use of its regulatory authority as a
substitute for a water right put a new spin on the conflict.
203. Well documented in Witwer, supra note 14; Raley, supra note 200. GILWnAN &
BROWN, supra note 32, at 208-12 give a detailed account of the political maneuvering
from another perspective. Although presenting both sides of the controversy, they
appear to take the Forest Service position at face value (e.g., Forest Service opponents
"accused," while Forest Service officials "repeatedly explained" or "pointed out").
204. Letter from Edward Madigan, Secretary of Agriculture, to U.S. Senator Hank
Brown (Oct. 6, 1992); see Witwer, supra note 14.
205. In an unusual maneuver, the Forest Service did not disclose that the Madigan
letter had been withdrawn for more than a year, Witwer, supra note 14, at 2364, so that
the Madigan Letter's demise was analogous to a tree falling in the forest where no one
hears it.
206. See Task Force Report, supra note 14.
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use statutes and the McCarran Amendment, 27 as well as about possible
0 ' Moreover, requiring bypass
takings of pre-FLPMA vested rights."
flows directly contravenes one of the two primary purposes of the national forests - securing favorable flow conditions for water users in order to further secondary purposes. It also frustrates the reasonable expectations of water users, often municipalities or other public
entities, who located their facilities on national forest lands years ago
at the invitation of the federal government.
The task force concluded that the Forest Service had not been
delegated the legal authority to impose bypass flows as a condition on
the grant or renewal of land use authorizations for existing water facilities on national forests and that it should utilize other means to
achieve the secondary purposes of the forests."' However, by the time
the report came out, the Forest Service and its permittees had largely
resolved their initial dispute through a joint operations plan whereby
those permittees with reservoirs located in the Cache la Poudre River
basin agreed to coordinate the operation of their reservoirs
to provide
•. 210
instream flows while still preserving their water supplies.
In the course of permitting, another issue emerged. When the
Madigan Letter undercut Forest Service authority to require bypass
flows, the Forest Service remembered its duty to consult with the U. S.
Fish and Wildlife Service under Section 7 of the Endangered Species
Act2 " to determine whether renewal of the permits would jeopardize
the continued existence of listed species or would adversely modify
such species' critical habitat. 21 2 The answer came back "yes"; the Fish
and Wildlife Service issued biological opinions finding that reissuing
the special use permits to allow the continuation of historic depletions
would jeopardize the continued existence of the whooping crane, least
tern, piping plover, and pallid sturgeon and adversely modify the
whooping crane's critical habitat (all located on the mainstem of the
207. Raley, supra note 200.
208. Witwer, supra note 14. A ditch and reservoir company on Colorado's west slope
successfully challenged a Forest Service special use permit requiring the release of bypass flows by showing that it actually had a pre-FLPMA easement for its facilities.
Overland Ditch and Reservoir Co. v. United States, No. 96 N 797 (D. Colo. Dec. 16,
1996).
209. Task Force Report, supra note 14, at Part VII, 1-6. A minority of the Task Force
disagreed with the conclusion that the Forest Service lacked legal authority to exact
bypass flows, but concurred in recommending that the Forest Service rely on other
means whenever possible. Id. at Part IX, 1-10.
210. Id. at Part VIII, 1-6. Ironically, it was an environmental organization, Trout Unlimited, that challenged one of the permits, issued for Long Draw Reservoir, because it
did not require bypass flows. Trout Unlimited v. United States Dep't of Agric., No. 95
CV 1075 (D.D.C. filed Sept. 8, 1995). The case was filed in the D.C. district court and
then transferred to the Colorado district court, No. 96-WY-2868-WD (D. Colo.). The
Task Force Report, supra note 14, was filed with the court in May 1997, and the case
has since languished.
211. 16 U.S.C. § 1536 (1994 & Supp. 11995).
212. For a fuller discussion of ESA permitting issues, see Deborah L. Freeman &
Carmen M. Sower, Against the Flow: Emerging Conflicts Between Endangered Species Protection and Water Use, 40 ROCKY MTN. MIN. LAw INST. 23-1 (1994).
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Platte River, more than 300 miles downstream in Nebraska) 25 The
Fish and Wildlife Service proposed two reasonable and prudent alternatives that would allow the Forest Service to issue the permits: the
permittees could either (1) deliver water at the Colorado-Nebraska
state line to replace their depletions; or (2) pay money to buy habitat
and water to benefit the species and participate in a yet-to-be developed basinwide recovery program.2 4 The facility owners opted to accept the second alternative and not challenge the opinions.
THE PROSPECTS FOR COMPROMISE
Litigating federal-state water disputes is costly, and the outcomes
are uncertain and often inconclusive. For example, one might have
thought that New Mexico would put an end to the Forest Service's quest
for reserved instream flow water rights; yet that quest is still going
strong after twenty years. As a result, there has been a trend towards
trying to resolve these disputes through negotiation and compromise.
The United States, Colorado, and water users are trying to address all
present and future national forest instream flow uses in Water Divisions 2, 3, and 7 through comprehensive settlements. The CWCB and
the Forest Service cooperated on the Hanging Lake filings to preserve
a unique natural environment located on federal lands. Additionally,
in both the Colorado and Platte River basins, the federal government,
states, water users, and environmental groups have implemented or
are in the process of developing recovery programs that are intended
to recover endangered species consistent with state laws and interstate
compacts and decrees.
Even so, the prognosis for negotiated solutions is uncertain. Negotiations in Divisions 2, 3, and 7, which had been moving slowly in any
event, suffered a serious setback when the United States repudiated
key principles of settlement to which it had previously agreed.2 7 It remains to be seen whether the Forest Service will be satisfied with instream flow rights held by the CWCB, or will renew its efforts to secure
213.

See, e.g., FISH AND WILDLIFE SERVICE, U.S.

DEP'T OF THE INTERIOR, FINAL

BIOLOGICAL OPINION TO AcCOMPANY THE FINAL ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT FOR

LAND USE AuTHORIZATION FOR: JOE WRIGHT RESERVOIR (1994) [hereinafterJOE WRIGHT
FINAL BIOLOGICAL OPINION]; Witwer, supra note 14. The Fish and Wildlife Service had
previously taken a similar position in the Colorado River basin based on the preservation of four endangered fish species.
214. See, e.g., FISH AND WILDLIFE SERVICE, U.S. DEP'T OF THE INTERIOR, DRAFF
BIOLOGICAL OPINION FORJOE WRIGHT RESERVOIR (1993); JOE WRIGHT FINAL BIOLOGICAL
OPINION, supra note 213; Witwer, supra note 14.
215. See, e.g., JOE WRIGHT FINAL BIOLOGICAL OPINION, supra note 213; Witwer, supra
note 14.
216. See FISH AND WILDLIFE SERVICE, U.S. DEP'T OF ThE INTERIOR, FINAL RECOvERY
IMPLEMENTATION PROGRAM FOR ENDANGERED FISH SPECIES IN THE UPPER COLORADO RIVER

BASIN (1987); COOPERATIvE AGREEMENT FOR PLATTE RIVER RESEARCH & OTHER EFFECTS
RELATING TO ENDANGERED SPECIES HABITATS ALONG THE CENTRAL PLATITE RIVER,

NEBRASKA (July 1997).

217. See supra note 68.
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independent appropriative rights. The Colorado River recovery program, which is premised on providing water under state law, is in a
state of flux"8 and the Platte River recovery program is still undergoing
review pursuant to the National Environmental Policy Act, 9 although
the participants are proceeding under the cooperative agreement
signed last July. 220

One of the biggest obstacles to these efforts has

been the federal government's tendency to view instream flows as the
panacea for environmental ills. 22 1 If the federal government is willing

to look first to non-flow options, if it is willing to recognize that stateowned water rights can meet its needs, and if state agencies and water
users are willing to meet federal agencies halfway when water truly is
needed, federal instream flow needs can be met within the framework
of state law.
Twenty-six years ago Charles Corker commented, "[i]f every
speaker who has talked in the last twenty years or so about federalstate relations in water law were laid end to end, it would be a good
and merciful thing., 2 2 The alternative to compromise is to continue
down the well worn path of confrontation and litigation, thereby
ensuring that there will be many more speakers to be laid, purely
hypothetically, end to end.

218. The recovery program contemplated a number of CWCB instream flow rights
on the Colorado, Yampa, Green, Little Snake, Gunnison, and White Rivers. Eric
Kuhn, General Manager of the Colorado River Water Conservation District and CWCB
member, has described these rights as "the result of a shotgun marriage" between the
ESA and state water law. Hot topics in NaturalResources Luncheon ProgramSeries (Apr. 29,
1998), UPPER COLORADO RIVER FISH RECOVERY PROGRAM. The bride and groom are not
yet at the altar, however, and the role, if any, that CWCB instream flow rights will play
in the recovery program is still an open question. Two rights on the Colorado River
have been decreed and four more applications on the Colorado and Yampa Rivers are
pending, but have been so controversial that the CWCB is presently considering withdrawing some or all of them. See Heather McGregor, Groups give up fight over claims on
flows of river, GRANDJUNCTION DAILY SENTINEL, May 7, 1998, at 1.
219. 42 U.S.C. § 4321 (1994 & Supp. I 1995).
220. See supra note 216.
221. For instance, the Forest Service focused on instream flows to prevent channel
degradation, while ignoring more immediate land management problems. Supra note
66. Similarly, the Fish and Wildlife Service has emphasized the need for instream
flows to recover the Colorado River endangered fish, while other experts believe that
predation and competition by non-native fish and physical barriers in the rivers may
be the primary factors limiting recovery. HAROLD M. TVUS & JAMES F. SAUNDERS III,
COOPERATIVE INSTITUTE FOR RESEARCH IN ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES, UNIVERSITY OF
COLORADO AT BOULDER, DRAFT- WORKPLAN OVERVIEW, RECOVERY NEEDS FOR ENDANGERED
FISHES IN THE UPPER COLORADO RIVER (1998). A notable exception is the Forest Serv-

ice's recognition that it can protect the water resources of upstream wilderness areas
without water rights.
222. Charles E. Corker, Federal-StateRelations in Water Rights Adjudication and Administration, 17 ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. INST. 579, 579 (1972).
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INTRODUCTION
Nearly a century and a half after the birth of the West's prior appropriation doctrine, its fundamental tenet, first in time first in right,
has spawned a large body of legislation and case law addressing withdrawal and use of the West's limited water supply. Since the prior appropriation doctrine recognizes a usufructuary right in certain quantities of water applied to approved uses, the concepts of diversion and
beneficial use have become cornerstones of most western water rights.
The prior appropriation doctrine provided a viable and accepted
system for water allocation during early western settlement, where irrigation and mining uses predominated. With the growth in urban
populations, the demand for municipal water has increased dramatically, resulting in reallocation of older irrigation rights as well as development of newer year-round rights. The ever-increasing diversion
of water to serve western water needs has resulted in actual harm to
river and riparian ecosystems that rely on certain levels of stream flow,
and has affected the fishing industry, recreational activities and river
navigation as well.
Recognition of this threat to the stream environment, coupled with
the control being exerted under such federal legislation as the Clean
Water Act' and the Endangered Species Act2 has prompted most western states to devise methods for protecting water flows within streams
and rivers, and for maintaining lake levels. However, this has been
more difficult than it might alipear, for several reasons.
First, a typical appropriative water right requires a diversion of water away from the source, while an instream flow right is an in situ
right. By its very nature, an instream flow is not diverted from the
stream. Since the appropriation doctrines of most states historically
required that an appropriation be initiated by the diversion of water
from a stream system, the appropriation of instream flows was initially
considered impossible. A mechanism for appropriation without diversion was therefore needed. In some states, this required changes in
legislation; in other states, courts held that the purposes for which water could be appropriated encompassed instream uses and therefore
no diversion was necessary.
1. 33 U.S.C. § 1251 (1994 & Supp. 11995).
2. 16 U.S.C. § 1531 (1994 & Supp. 11995).
3.

Seediscussion infra pp. 180-91.
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The second issue that needed to be addressed was the concept of
beneficial use. In addition to diversion, a typical appropriative right
required that the water diverted be applied to a beneficial use. Because beneficial use historically included municipal, domestic, irrigation, commercial and industrial uses, the concept had to be expanded
to include environmental and recreational uses.
Third, the identification of proper purposes for instream flows and
their quantification is a complex process, requiring considerable study
and negotiation among competing interests. There has been considerable debate about methods of quantification, even after acceptable
instream uses are agreed upon.
However, establishing an instream flow program is only a state's
first step. The effective integration of instream water rights with the
traditional appropriation system has also been a challenge. For example, administration of instream flow rights is difficult because traditional administrative procedures involve quantifying diversions from
the stream rather than those amounts remaining in the stream. The
cost of installing the necessary gauging, reading the gauges, and then
actually assuring that instream flows are met is often prohibitive.4
Among the western states, Alaska, California, Colorado, Wyoming,
Montana, Idaho, Oregon, Washington, Kansas, Nebraska and Utah
have statutory schemes permitting appropriation of instream flows.
Arizona and Nevada allow such appropriations as part of their administrative appropriation procedures. New Mexico's Attorney General
has recently opined that the state's existing statutes and case law permit instream flow applications.
This paper provides a brief survey of western state instream flow
programs and discusses some of the unique issues associated with instream water rights. It also looks at ways in which the states protect instream flows outside their statutory instream flow programs. Additionally, brief mention is made of the impact federal legislation has had on
state instream flow programs.'

4. For instance, in sparsely-populated Alaska, which has liberal instream flow legislation, over ninety-nine percent of the rivers and streams are ungauged. See Mary Lu
Harle & Christopher C. Estes, An Assessment of Instream Flow Protection in Alaska, in
INSTREAM FLOW PROTECTION IN THE WEST 9-15 (Lawrence J. MacDonnell & Teresa A.
Rice eds., 1993).
5. For a more comprehensive analysis of policy issues surrounding instream flow
programs, the reader is directed to DAVID M. GILLILAN & THOMAS C. BROWN, INSTREAM
FLOW PROTECTION: SEEKING A BALANCE IN WESTERN WATER USE (1997).
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SURVEY OF STATE INSTREAM FLOW PROGRAMS
STATUTORY INSTREAM FLOW PROGRAMS

The Northwestern States: Idaho, Oregon, Washington
The northwestern states have had a particularly long history of instream flow protection. The first legislative steps toward enunciating
state instream flow preservation policies began over forty years ago in
Idaho, Oregon, and Washington.
Idaho
In Idaho, the first minimum stream flows and lake levels were appropriated by legislative enactment as early as 1925.6 Pursuant to
Idaho's first State Water Plan, minimum flows were established at
three points on the Snake River
By 1978, a statutory instream flow
program was established.8 Under the current statutory scheme, it is
the exclusive responsibility of the Idaho Water Resources Board to file
applications for minimum flows, although other interested parties may
petition the Board to do so as well.9 Flows may be appropriated "for
the protection of fish and wildlife habitat, aquatic life, recreation, aesthetic beauty, transportation and navigation values and water quality."'"
If an application is approved by the Department of Water Resources,
the permit is sent to the legislature for approval." Those appropriations that are granted are limited to the minimum flow required to
sustain the resource for which the flow is requested. 2
Oregon
Dating back to 1955, Oregon's instream flow legislation is also one
of the older state statutory schemes. 3 Oregon's current statute reaffirms its early policy, stating that "l[t] he maintenance of minimum perennial stream flows sufficient to support aquatic life, to minimize pollution and to maintain recreational values shall be fostered and
encouraed if existing rights and priorities under existing laws will
permit." Under the 1955 law, these minimum perennial stream flows

6. Legislative appropriation of lake levels for scenic beauty, health and recreation
were accomplished in 1925 (Act of February 25 1925, ch. 83, 1925 Idaho Sess. Laws
117-18) and in 1927 (Act ofJanuary 24, 1927, ch. 2, 1927 Idaho Sess. Laws 6-7).
7. Josephine P. Beeman, Instream flows in Idaho, in INSTREAM FLOW PROTECTION IN
THE WEST, supra note 4, at 9-15.
8. IDAHO CODE § 42-1501 (1997).
9. Id. § 42-1504.
10. Id. § 42-1501.
11. Id. § 42-1503.
12. Id.
13. Act of May 26, 1955, ch. 707, 1955 Or. Laws 924-55.
14. OR. REv. STAT. § 536.310(7) (1996).
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were established administratively 5 based on applications by the Department of Environmental Quality and the Department of Fish and
Wildlife. 6 A minimum perennial stream flow became effective upon
adoption by the Water Resources Commission. The Water Resources
Commission had the authority to establish or modify minimum perennial stream flows."
Additional protection of instream flow values in Oregon is now
provided by the In-Stream Water Rights statute enacted in 1987.9 An
instream flow in Oregon is the minimum quantity of water necessary to
support the requested use. Instream flow rights may be requested by
the Department of Fish and Wildlife for "the conservation, maintenance and enhancement of aquatic and fish life, wildlife and fish and
wildlife habitat, '2' by the Department of Environmental Quality to protect and maintain water quality standards,2 and by the Parks and Recreation Department for recreation and scenic attraction uses. 2' The
instream flow rights, when approved, are held by the Water Resources
Department as trustee,24 and have the same status as other water
rights. 25 Instream flows may also be created by changing another existing water right.26 Finally, the 1987 instream flow legislation required
conversion of the minimum perennial stream flows to instream flow
rights2 7 with the priority date of the original minimum perennial stream
flow.

Like the instream flow rights in many other states, Oregon's originally appropriated instream flow rights can be subordinated. The
right to use water for multipurpose storage projects, municipal uses by
municipal applicants, or hydroelectric projects can take precedence
over instream rights.28 This subordination does not apply to instream
rights obtained by conversion of minimum perennial stream
flows or
29
to instream rights obtained by conversion of other rights.

15. Michael J. Mattick, Instream Flow Protection in Oregon, in INSTREAM FLOW
PROTECTION IN THE WEST, supra note 4, at 13-3.
16. OR. REV. STAT. § 536.325(1) (1996).
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.

Id. § 536.325(3).
Id. § 536.325(2).
Id. §§ 537.332-537.360.
Id. § 537.332(2).
Id. § 537.336(1).
Id. § 537.336(2).
Id. § 537.336(3).
Id. § 537.341.
Id. § 537.350(1).
Id. § 537.348.
Id. § 537.346(1).
Id. §§ 537.352, 537.360.
Id. § 537.352.
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Washington
Long concerned with the adverse impact of reduced stream flows
on its anadromous fish population,3 0 Washington began enacting instream flow legislation in 1949. Over time, through a series of legislative acts, instream flow protection broadened in scope. Today, Washington's Department of Ecology may set minimum stream flow levels
for the purposes of protecting fish, game, birds, or other wildlife resources, or recreational or aesthetic values of ublic waters whenever it
appears to be in the public interest to do so. Water quality may also
be protected.33 Under the current legislative scheme, the DeVartment
of Ecology establishes instream flows by a rulemaking process.
Newer State Instream Flow Legislation:Montana, Alaska, California,
Colorado, Wyoming, Kansas, Nebraska, and Utah
Montana
Montana first initiated efforts to protect instream flows in 1969
with legislation allowing the Fish and Game Commission to appropriate instream flows to preserve fish and wildlife habitat on a number of
the state's blue ribbon trout streams.3 ' This legislation was replaced by
Montana's present statutory system allowing reservation of instream
flows. 3 Now both federal and state agencies may request a reservation
on any stream for consumptive uses (which may include future
irriga37
tion, storage and municipal needs) as well as instream flows.
Instream flow reservations by the state are limited to fifty percent
of the average annual flow of the stream for which the application is
submitted, as shown by stream gauge records. Procedurally, applications for instream flows are processed in the same manner as applications for water permits for consumptive uses:33 the applicant must establish the purpose of the reservation, the need for the reservation, the
amount of water necessary for the purpose of the reservation, and that
30. Kenneth 0. Slattery & Robert F. Barwin, ProtectingInstreamResources in Washington State, in INSTREAM FLOW PROTECTION IN THE WEST, supra note 4, at 20-3.
31. Act of March 16, 1949, ch. 112 1949 Wash. Laws 272 (current version at WASH.
REV. CODE § 75.20.050 (1994)) (declaring that a permit to divert or store water could
be denied if issuance might result in lowering the flow of water in a stream below the
flow necessary to adequately support food fish and game fish populations in the
stream).
32. WASH. REV. CODE § 90.22.010 (Supp. 1998).
33. Id.
34. Kenneth 0. Slattery & Robert F. Barwin, ProtectingInstream Resources in Washington State, in INSTREAM FLOW PROTECTION IN THE WEST, Supra note 4, at 20-5 to 20-6.
35. Act of March 13, 1969, ch. 345, 1969 Mont. Laws 879-81; see MatthewJ. McKinney, Instream Flow Policy in Montana: A History and Blueprint for the Future, in INSTREAM
FLOW PROTECTION IN THE WEST, supra note 4, at 15-4.

36.

MONT. CODE ANN. § 85-2-316 (1997).

37.

Id.

38.

MONT. CODE ANN. § 85-2-316(6) (1997).

39.

Id. § 85-2-316(3).
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40
the reservation is in the public interest.
Under certain circumstances, the Montana Department of Natural
Resources and Conservation, the agency which issues instream flow
permits, may order that a state water reservation permit be subordi4
nated to permits or certificates for groundwater development. 1
Moreover, instream flow reservations, unlike conventional appropriations, are subject
41 to mandatory review every ten years subsequent to
their issuance. Upon review, instream flow reservations may be modified or eliminated if 43the Department decides their original purpose is
no longer being met.
Additionally, if the Department finds that the original reservation
is no longer required by the original purposes, and that the need for
reallocation outweighs the need of the original reservant, an instream
flow may be modified to allocate the reservation or a portion thereof
to another qualified reservant. 44 In other words, since state reservations may be made for consumptive uses, an instream flow could theoretically be reallocated to future municipal needs. Reallocation of any
particular reservation may occur once every five years. Conversely,
because a state water reservation may be transferred from one authorized reservant to another, 46 a reservation originally made for consumptive purposes could perhaps be transferred to instream flow uses.

Alaska
Of all the western states, Alaska's statutory instream flow program
may be the most comprehensive. It also may be the least utilized. In
1980, instream flow reservations were authorized in Alaska by statute.4
This broad statute allows "[t] he state, an agency or political subdivision
of the state, an agency of the United States or a person" to apply for
the right "to reserve sufficient water to maintain a specified instream
flow or level of water at a specified point on a stream or body of water,
or in a specified part of a stream, throughout the year or for specified
times" for a variety of instream flow uses:48 the protection of fish and
wildlife habitat, migration purposes, propagation purposes, recreational and park purposes, navigation41and transportation ipurposes, and
sanitary and water quality purposes. In order to obtain a permit reserving an instream flow, there must be unappropriated water sufficient for the reservation, the rights of prior appropriators may not be

§ 85-2-316(4) (a) (1997).
Id. § 85-2-316(9)(d).
Id. § 85-2-316(10).
Id.
MONT.CODE ANN. § 85-2-316(11) (1997).
Id.
MONT. CODEANN. § 85-2-316(13) (1997).
47. Act ofJune 19, 1980, ch. 84, 1980 Alaska Sess. Laws 3 (codified at ALASKA STAT.
§ 46.15.145 (1997)).
48. AiAsKASTAT. § 46.15.145(a) (1997).
49. Id.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.

MONT. CODEANN.
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affected by the reservation, and the applicant must demonstrate a
need for the reservation.
The instream flow reservation is a second class citizen in the water
rights community. It is subject to review every ten years to verify that
the purpose for the reservation continues to be valid, that the need for
the reservation continues to exist, that there remains unappropriated
water sufficient to fulfill the reservation, and that the rights of prior
appropriators continue to be unaffected. 5'
California
With a longer and more complex history of water law, California
initially had to overcome case law holding that appropriations could
not be made for the purpose of maintaining minimum stream flows.
However, in 1991, California enacted legislation which allowed an existing appropriator to dedicate to instream flow purposes water rights
that were previously appropriated for other uses. 3 The statute allows
"[a]ny person entitled to the use of water, whether based on an appropriative, a riparian, or other right

54

to petition for a change of the

water right "for purposes of preserving or enhancing wetlands habitat,
fish and wildlife resources, or recreation in, or on, the water."55 The
California statute requires that the proposed change meet certain requirements: it must not increase the amount of water available under
the original appro5griation, and it must "not unreasonably affect any
legal use of water."
Colorado
Colorado's instream flow program was created by statute in 197357
in response to concerns that the aquatic habitat required some legislative protection.5 s Early attempts to expand the concept of beneficial
use to allow water to remain in streams met with considerable resistance." Because of the political turmoil surrounding the idea of instream flows, the instream flow protection statute initially passed by the
Colorado Legislature was brief. It has been broadened slightly over
time, but continues to provide that instream flow rights may only be
appropriated or held by the Colorado Water Conservation Board

50. ALASKASTAT. § 46.15.145(c) (1997).
51. Id. § 46.15.145(f).
52. California Trout, Inc. v. State Water Resources Control Bd., 153 Cal. Rptr. 672
(1979); Fullerton v. State Water Resources Control Bd., 153 Cal. Rptr. 518 (1979).
53. CAL. WATER CODE § 1707 (West Supp. 1998).

54. Id. § 1707(a).
55.

Id.

56. CAL. WATER CODE. § 1707(b)(1), (2) (West Supp. 1998).
57. Act of April 23, 1973, ch. 442, 1973 Colo. Sess. Laws 97.
58. Steven J. Shupe, The Legal Evolution of Colorado's Instream Flow Program,17 COLO.
LAw. 861 (1988).

59. Id.
60. Id.
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("CWCB") .61 The CWCB may appropriate "such water of natural
streams and lakes as the board determines may be required for minimum stream flows or for natural surface water levels or volumes for
natural lakes to preserve the natural environment to a reasonable degree. ' , 62 The CWCB, in order to initiate an appropriation, must determine that the natural environment will be preserved to a reasonable
degree by the water available for the appropriation to be made; that
there is a natural environment that can be preserved to a reasonable
degree with the Board's water right, if granted; and that such environment can exist without material injury to water rights. 3
The Colorado instream flow right is something less than a full
fledged water right because, unlike other new appropriations, it is subject to both senior decreed water rights and to undecreed water uses,
exchanges or "water practices" in existence when the instream flow
appropriation is made.6
A 1986 amendment to the statute permits the CWCB to acquire
water rights for instream flow purposes by "grant, purchase, bequest,
devise, lease, exchange or contractual agreement.""'
Wyoming
Wyoming's statute allows instream flow appropriations to establish
or maintain new or existing fisheries. 6 Appropriations for such instream flow uses may be made from unappropriated waters of the state
"if such use does not impair or diminish the rights of any other appropriator in Wyoming., 67 The amount of water that can be appropriated
for fisheries is the minimum amount necessary to establish or maintain
fisheries, or, in the case of existing fisheries, the minimum amount
necessary to maintain or improve such existing fisheries."8 The statute
includes a complicated methodology for determining where and how
much water to appropriate for instream flows. 69
The state is the only entity allowed to appropriate instream flows.76
Applications are filed by the Water Development Commission in the
name of the state and are based on recommendations by the State
Game and Fish Commission.7
61.

COLO. REV. STAT. § 37-92-102 (1997).

Although water has occasionally been

decreed to others for uses that appear to be instream flows, City of Thornton v. City of
Fort Collins, 830 P.2d 915 (Colo. 1992), the Colorado Supreme Court has consistently
held that the judiciary is without authority to decree an instream flow right to any private entity. See City of Thornton v. Bijou Irrigation Co., 926 P.2d 1, 94 (Colo. 1996).
62. COLO. REv. STAT. § 37-92-102(3) (1997).

63. Id. § 37-92-102(3)(c).
64. Id. § 37-92-102(3)(b).

65. Id. § 37-92-102(3).
66. Wyo. STAT. § 41-3-1001(a) (1997).
67.

Id. § 41-3-1001(b).

68. Id. § 41-3-1001(c), (d).
69. Id. §§ 41-3-1003(b),-1004(a), -1006(b).
70. Id. § 41-3-1002(e).
71.

Id. §§ 41-3-1003(c), -1006(b).
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Kansas
Like California, Kansas had to overcome the requirement of a "diversion" in order to allow instream flow rights." However, in 1980,
Kansas enacted minimum stream flow legislation, and provided a
method for legislative reservation of instream flows.73 The statute required that the state identify "minimum desirable stream flows to preserve, maintain, or enhance base flows for in-stream water uses relative
to water quality, fish, wildlife, aquatic life, recreation, general aesthetics, and domestic uses and for the protection of existing water
rights .... ,7 The Kansas legislature was to approve a minimum desir-

able stream flow, and the state's Chief Engineer was authorized to
"withhold from appropriation that amount of water deemed necessary
to establish and maintain for the identified water course the desired
minimum stream flow." 5 The amount of water to be reserved in any
particular stream system was negotiated by key water agencies for the
State of Kansas, and was based on the needs of the stream ecosystem
and the actual availability of water." Appropriative rights applied for
after April 12, 1984, the statute's effective date, are subject to the
minimum desirable stream flow requirements,77 although a junior water right for domestic purposes can take priority over an instream flow
reservation.
Nebraska
Instream flows have had a particularly rocky history in Nebraska.
Given the importance of agriculture to Nebraska's economy, this is
perhaps not surprising. As one author has noted, "[i]nstream appropriations were only reluctantly granted entry into Nebraska water law,
as grudging response to successful environmental litigation stopping
proposed water projects."79 Nebraska's instream flow legislation was
first passed in 1984, and authorized the Nebraska Natural Resources
Commission to obtain instream appropriations." An "instream appropriation" is defined as the "undiverted application of the waters in a
natural stream within or bordering upon the state for recreation or

72. Act of March 26, 1945, ch. 390, 1945 Kan. Sess. Laws 665-71.

73. Act of April 18, 1980, ch. 332, 1980 Kan. Sess. Laws 1334-35 (current version at

KAN. STAT. ANN. § 82a-703(c) (1997)).
74. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 82a-928(i) (1997).

75. Id. § 82a-703(a).
76. Leland E. Rolfs, Minimum Desirable Stream Flow in Kansas, in INSTREAM FLOW
PROTECTION IN THE WEST, supra note 4, at 14-1.
77. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 82a-703b(a) (1997).

78. Id.
79. J. David Aiken, Nebraska Instream Appropriation Law and Administration, in
INSTREAM FLOW PROTECTION IN THE WEST, supra note

4, at 16-1.

80. Act of April 10, 1984, 1984 Neb. Laws 1341-68; NEB. REV. STAT. § 46-2, 108
(1997 & Supp.). The statute was amended in 1985 to authorize Natural Resource Districts and the Game and Parks Commission to apply for instream appropriations,
rather than the Natural Resources Commission.
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fish and wildlife purposes., 81 The amount of the instream flow may be
only that amount necessary for recreation or fish and wildlife.82
Before approving an instream appropriation, the Director of the
Division of Water Resources must find that there is unappropriated
water available for appropriation, that the requested instream appropriation is necessary to maintain the instream use or uses for which the
appropriation has been requested, that the appropriation will not interfere with any senior surface water appropriation, that the rate and
timing of the flow is the minimum necessary to maintain the instream
use for which the appropriation has been requested, and that the instream appropriation is in the public interest. In making the public
interest determination, the Director must consider the following factors:
1. The economic, social, and environmental value of the instream
use or uses, including but not limited to, recreation, fish and
wildlife, induced recharge from municipal water systems, and water quality maintenance; and
2. The economic, social, and environmental value of reasonably
foreseeable alternative out-of-stream uses of water that will be
foregone or accorded junior status if the appropriation is
granted.
Instream flows in Nebraska are identified by stream reaches and times
of the year, and are limited to the amount of water "necessary to provide adequate instream flows."85 The Director of Water Resources
must modify existing instream appropriations or pending applications
that have
to avoid interference with other water right applications
86
important.
more
be
to
legislature
the
by
deemed
been
A recent amendment to the statute, effective September 13, 1997,
requires the Director to hold a hearing every fifteen years from the87
date of granting a permit to appropriate water for instream flows.
The purpose of the hearing is to receive evidence regarding whether
the water appropriated under the permit still provides the beneficial
uses for which the permit was granted and whether the permit is still in
the public interest. The hearing is to proceed under the rebuttable
presumption that the appropriation continues to provide the beneficial uses for which the permit was granted and that the appropriation
is in the public interest. After the hearing, the Director may, by order,
88
modify or cancel, in whole or in part, the instream appropriation.
81.

NEB. REV. STAT.

§ 46-2, 108 (1997).

82. Id.
83. NEB. REv. STAT. § 46-2, 115 (1997).

84. Id. § 46-2, 116.
85.

Id. § 46-2, 110.

86. Id. § 46-2, 113.
87.
88.

Id. § 46-2, 112.
Id.
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In addition, the 1997 amendments changed the approval standards
for instream flow applications by requiring the Director of Water Resources to find, with regard to applications pending or filed after
January 1, 1997, that there is unappropriated water available to provide the approved instream flow rate at least twenty percent of the time
during the period requested."9 The Director must also find that the
appropriation is necessary to maintain the existing recreational uses or
needs of existing fish and wildlife species. 90 Finally, the statute makes
clear that the application may be granted for a rate of flow that is less
than that requested by the applicant or for a shorter period of time
than requested by the application.9'
Utah
Utah, like California, permits its Division of Wildlife Resources or
Division of Parks and Recreation to file applications for permanent or
temporary changes for the purpose of providing water for instream
flows for the propagation of fish, public recreation, or the reasonable
preservation or enhancement of the natural stream environment. 9 Instream flow rights may not be appropriated from unappropriated water. 9 The statute makes clear that an actual diversion is not required
to implement a change to an instream flow use.94
Change to an instream flow right may not allow enlargement of the
water right sought to be changed, and the change may not impair any
vested water right. ' The change application must include a legal description of the instream flow reach, appropriate studies, reports, or
other information as required by the State Engineer to demonstrate
the necessity for the instream flow in the reach, and the projected
benefits to the public that will result from the change.96
INSTREAM FLOW APPROPRIATIONS WITHOUT SPECIAL ENABLING
LEGISLATION

Arizona
Arizona allows instream flow appropriations to be made in the
same manner as other water right appropriations. The Arizona Surface Water Code states that "[a] ny person, the State of Arizona or a political subdivision thereof may appropriate unappropriated water
for.., stock watering.., recreation, wildlife, including fish ....

89.
90.

NEB. REV. STAT.

§ 46-2, 115 (1) (1997).

Id. § 46-2, 115 (2).

91. Id.
92. UTAH CODEANN. § 73-3-3(11) (a) (Supp. 1997).
93. Id. § 733-3(11)(g)(i).
94. Id. § 73-3-3(11)(c).

95. Id. § 73-3-3(11)(d).
96. Id. § 73-3-3(11) (e).
97. ARiz. REv. STAT. ANN.

§ 45-151.A (West Supp. 1997).
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Properly submitted applications must be approved unless the application for the proposed use "conflicts with vested rights, is a menace to
public safety, or is against the interest and welfare of the public. 9 8 The
statute also provides a hierarchy of uses as between two or more pending conflicting applications if the water supply is not sufficient for all
applications. In the hierarchy of values, recreation and wildlife rank
fourth out of five uses, and are preceded by domestic and municipal
uses, irrigation and stock watering uses, and power and mining uses.
The Arizona statutes neither expressly authorize nor expressly exclude instream appropriations.' 1 However, the Arizona Court of Appeals determined that "in 1941 when 'wildlife, including fish' and in
1962 when 'recreation' were added to the purposes for appropriation,
the concept of in situ appropriation of water was introduced it appearing to us that these purposes could be enjoyed without a diversion.' 0 2
Without statutory guidelines, the Arizona Department of Water Resources needed to determine how to evaluate instream flow applications."' An instream flow task force, organized in 1986, developed information that enabled the Arizona Department of Water Resources to
issue a guide to filing applications for instream flow water rights,
thereby providing useful assistance to those seeking to appropriate instream flows.'0 4
Nevada
Nevada's appropriation statute contains a general statement that
"[slubject to existing rights, and except as otherwise provided in this
section, all water may be appropriated for beneficial use as provided in
this chapter and not otherwise."' The use of water for any recreational purpose is specifically declared to be a beneficial use. 6 In 1988,
the Nevada Supreme Court recognized that the recreational use of water mandates recognition of an in situ water appropriation for recreation, and that wildlife watering is encompassed in the definition of recreation as a beneficial use of water, holding that Nevada law recognizes
the recreational value of wildlife and the need to provide wildlife with
water.'07

98.
99.
100.
101.

ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 45-153.A (West Supp. 1997).

Id. § 45-157.A.
Id. § 45-157.B.
Herb Dishlip, Instream Flow Water Rights: Arizona's Approach, in INSTREAM FLOW
PROTECTION IN THE WEST, supra note 4, at 10-1 to 10-2.
102. McClellan v.Jantzen, 547 P.2d 494, 496 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1976).
103. Herb Dishlip, Instream Flow Water Rights: Arizona's Approach, in INSTREAM FLOW
PROTECTION IN THE WEST, supra note 4, at 10-4.
104. Id. at 10-6.
105. NEV. REv. STAT. § 533.030(1) (1995).
106. Id. § 533.030(2).
107. State v. Morros, 766 P.2d 263 (Nev. 1988).
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New Mexico
Until recently, New Mexico was one of the few western states that
did not recognize instream flows as a protectable beneficial use of water. °8 Over the past twenty-five years, as instream flow protection has
found acceptance in the West, various commentators have argued that
New Mexico's statutory scheme could allow for instream flow water
rights. 0° They contended that since water rights appropriations and
changes must be consistent with "public welfare," and because the
State Engineer has broad authority in the issuance of permits for water
rights, instream flows could properly be appropriated."' Nevertheless,
for many years the State Engineer took the position that actual diversion of water was legally required in order to appropriate a water right
in New Mexico, so there could be no valid instream water rights."'
However, the current State Engineer has determined that under
appropriate circumstances, an existing water right can be changed to
instream uses if statutory criteria for a change are met."2 On March
27, 1998, New Mexico Attorney General Tom Udall issued Attorney
General Opinion No. 98-01 ("Opinion") in which he concluded that
New Mexico law "permits the State Engineer to afford legal protection
to instream flows for recreational, fish or wildlife, or ecological purposes.""..3 The Opinion is carefully reasoned, and addresses only
changes of water rights from traditional diversionary uses to instream
flows, noting that since New Mexico's surface waters are already fully
appropriated, the issue of new appropriations for instream flow uses
need not be addressed.14 The Opinion concludes that New Mexico's
Constitution and statutes do not require actual diversion or impoundment in order to validly appropriate a water right, and distinguishes several cases that had been the basis of the previous State Engineer's contrary opinion."5
Moreover, the Opinion asserts the
Attorney General's belief that a court will recognize recreational, fish6
and wildlife, and "ecological" uses as proper beneficial uses of water."
Although the New Mexico statutes governing applications for new
appropriations appear to contemplate construction of dams, ditches or
other "works," the Opinion determines that this condition would be
108. Tim DeYoung, Protecting New Mexico's Instream Flows, in INSTREAM FLOW
supra note 4, at 17-1.
109. See Consuelo Bocum, Implementing the Public Welfare Requirement inNew Mexico's
Water Code, 36 NAT. RESOURCESJ. 441 (1996); Susanne Hoffman-Dooley, Determining
What isinthe Public Welfare inWater Appropriations and Transfers: The Intel Example, 36
NAT. RESOURCESJ. 103-04 (1996);John B. Draper, Comment, Appropriation by the State of
Minimum Flows inNew Mexico Streams, 15 NAT. RESOURCESJ. 809 (1975).
110. Id.; see N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 72-5-6,-7 (1997).
PROTECTION IN THE WEST,

111. Memorandum from the State Engineer Legal Division to Tom Turney, State
Engineer (January 8, 1998) (on file with author).
112. Id.
113. New Mexico Attorney General Opinion 98-01 at I (March 27, 1998).
114. Id.at 2.
115. Id.at 3,5,7-11.
116. Id. at 5.
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satisfied by imposition of the State Engineer's announced requirement
of "accurate and continuous gauging" of instream flows throughout
the permitted stream reach." 7 Since the State Engineer indicated that
such gauging would be a requirement of any change to instream flow
uses, the Attorney General's Opinion assumes that such measuring devices will be required. It does not address other sorts of "works" that
might also meet the statutory requirement."'
Whether the State Engineer's current approach to instream flows,
bolstered by the Attorney General's Opinion, will result in actual
changes of water rights to instream flow uses remains to be seen. The
State Engineer specifically declined to opine whether the gauging he
expected to require was in fact technologically or financially feasible." 9
Moreover, the senior water rights that would be the most effective
candidates for change to instream flow uses may simply be too costly to
devote to such uses, given the fully-appropriated status of New Mexico's rivers and streams.
UNIQUE PROBLEMS WITH INSTREAM FLOW RIGHTS
LIMITATIONS ON THE NATURE OF THE RIGHT

Some western states authorize appropriation of an instream flow
right, 20 while others reserve a minimum stream flow from the appropriation by others.'2 1 Montana blurs the distinction by defining the
term "appropriate" to include reservations of instream flows.

22

Reser-

vation of an instream flow should theoretically have the same impact as
appropriation of an instream flow; both methods should assure that a
minimum amount of water remains in a stream for the designated instream purposes.
Commentators in states where minimum stream flows are reserved
are quick to point out that an instream flow reservation is not really a
water right.12 However, both reserved and appropriated instream flow
rights are often subject to limitations not generally placed on other water rights. For example, in states where an instream flow right can be
acquired or held only by a specified state agency, transferability is obviously limited. 12 4 Some states require review of an instream flow right

117. Id. at 5-6.
118. Id.
119. Id. at 6, n.4.
120. ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 45-151.A (West Supp. 1997); COLO. REv. STAT. § 37-92102(3) (1997); Wvo. STAT. § 41-3-1001(a) (1997); IDAHO CODE § 42-1501 (1997); OR.
REv. STAT. § 536.310(7) (1997); NEv. REV. STAT. § 533.030 (1995); NEB. REV. STAT. §
46-2, 107 (1997).
121. ALASKASTAT. § 46.15.145(a) (1997); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 82a-703b (1997).
122. MONT. CODEANN. § 85-2-102(1)(b) (1997).
123. Leland E. Rolfs, Minimum Desirable Stream Flow in Kansas, in INSTREAM FLOW
PROTECTION INTHE WEST, supra note 4, at 14-1 to 14-2.
124. See CoLo. REv. STAT. § 37-92-102(3) (1997); Wyo. STAT. § 41-3-1001(b) (1997);
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on a periodic basis to assure that the purpose for which the instream
flow was appropriated, as well as the quantity and reach of the inIn some states, an instream flow
stream flow, continue to be valid.
right can be subordinated to other uses.126
WHO MAY ACQUIRE OR RESERVE INSTREAM FLOWS

In most states, instream flows may be acquired only by specified
state agencies, typically those charged with the protection of wildlife,
recreation opportunities, or environmental quality. 27 This limitation
reflects a general legislative perception that instream flows should be
carefully limited or they may prevent development of water reFor example, although protection of fisheries may be a
sources.
value promoted by non-profit environmental or recreational organizations, such as Trout Unlimited, most states would not allow such an
organization to obtain an instream flow.
Even in Arizona, where instream flow appropriations may be made
by any person in the same manner as other water rights are appropriated, it has been difficult to obtain instream flow rights.'29 As of 1993,
all of the instream flow rights requested in Arizona had been sought in
the name of only three entities: the Arizona Nature Conservancy, the
Bureau of Land Management, and the Tonto National Forest.'3 Because Arizona requires sophisticated scientific analysis to establish, justify and administer the right, an instream flow application is generally
beyond the reach of most private citizens.3
MONT. CODE ANN. § 85-2-316(1) (1997); IDAHO CODE § 42-1502 (1997); OR. REV. STAT.
§ 536.220(2) (a), 537.336 (1997); WASH. REV. CODE § 90.22.010 (Supp. 1998); NEB. REV.
STAT. § 46-2, 108 (1997 & Supp.); UTAH CODE ANN. § 73-3-3(11)(a) (Supp. 1997).
Montana, however, permits transfer of instream flow rights from one authorized reservant to another. SeeMONT. CODEANN. § 85-2-316(13) (1997).
125. SeeALASKA STAT. § 46.15.145(f) (1997) (requiring a review every fifteen years);
MONT. CODE ANN. § 85-2-316(10) (1997) (requiring a review every ten years); NEB.
REV. STAT. § 46-2, 112 (1997 & Supp.) (requiring a review every fifteen years). See also
Aspen Wilderness Workshop v. Colorado Water Conservation Bd., 901 P.2d 1251
(Colo. 1995) (declaring that any attempt to reduce a decreed instream flow requires
notice and an opportunity for public participation and water court approval).
126. See ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 45-157.b (West 1997) (stating that if there are conflicting applications for limited supply, recreation and wildlife uses will rank fourth out
of five); COLO. REV. STAT. § 37-92-102(3) (b) (1997) (stating that instream flows are
subject to undecreed uses existing when instream flow is appropriated); KAN. STAT.
ANN. § 82a-703b(a) (1997) (noting that instream flows reservation may be subordinate
to domestic rights); OR. REV. STAT. § 537.352, 360 (1997) (stating that instream flow
reservations may be subordinate to certain storage projects, municipal uses and hydropower uses).
127.

See, e.g., Stephen D. Mossman, Whiskey is for Drinkin' But Water is for Fightin'

About: A FirstHand Account of Nebraska's Integrated Management of Ground and Surface WaterDebateand Passageof L.B. 108, 30 CREIGHTON L. REV. 67, 88-87 (1996).
128. Id.
129. See, Herb Dishlip, Instream Flow Water Rights: Arizona's Approach, in INSTREAM
FLOW PROTECTION IN THE WEST, supra note 4, at 10-1 (discussing the instream flow
permitting process).
130. Id. at 10-4.
131. Id. at 10-6 to 10-9; see also Mary Lu Harle & Christopher C. Estes, An Assessment
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Alaska appears to provide the greatest opportunity for private citizen involvement in an instream flow program. Its statute permits instream flow reservation by any local, state or federal government
agency, as well as any private person.32 Although an applicant for an
instream flow reservation is required to disclose the method used to
quantify the instream flow request, no particular method must be
used. 33 This flexibility allows public-private partnerships for the protection of instream flows and makes perfect sense in Alaska, a state of
The owner of a remote fishing
extensive waterways and few people.
lodge may well wish to reserve a significant instream appropriation for
the tourists who fly in for a week of fishing.' 35 Similarly, isolated villages which depend on river flows for both fishing and transportation
may need to assure that sufficient water remains to support these activities." 6 Although it is probably difficult for most Alaskans to believe
that there will be sufficient consumptive appropriation from their
streams and rivers to necessitate instream flow reservations, Alaska is in
a unique position to integrate instream flows fully into its prior approsystem, since many of its water resources are not yet appropripriation
3 7
ated.1

PURPOSES OF INSTREAM FLOW APPROPRIATIONS

Limiting the purposes of instream flow appropriations helps to
counter fears of unreasonable restriction on water development.
All states discussed in this article permit instream flow reservations
The use of instream flow
or appropriations to maintain fisheries.'
rights to protect fisheries is comparatively simple. It is intuitively obvious that stream flows in some amount are needed to protect fisheries.
Fishing is a significant part of the tourism industry in most western
states as well as a significant commercial industry in the northwest.
Protection of fisheries is thus perhaps not as controversial as other in-

of Instream Flow Protection in Alaska, in INSTREAM FLOW PROTECTION IN THE WEST, supra
note 4, at 9-1, 9-13 to 9-15 (regarding similar difficulties in Alaska's system).
132. ALASKASTAT. § 46.15.145 (1996).
133. Mary Lu Harle & Christopher C. Estes, An Assessment of Instream Flow Protection in
Alaska, in INSTRFAM FLOW PROTECTION IN THE WEST supranote 4, at 9-6.
134. Id. at 9-1 to 9-3.
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. Id. at 9-3.
138. See ALASKA STAT. § 46.15.145(a) (1996); Arizona (see discussion supra p. 188-89);
CAL. WATER CODE § 1707(a) (West Supp. 1998); COLO. REv. STAT. § 37-92-102(3)
(1997) (while not mentioning protection of fisheries specifically, the Colorado statute
has been applied by the Colorado Water Conservation Board to allow instream flow
appropriation for the protection of fisheries, see discussion supra pp. 184-85); IDAHO
CODE § 42-1501 (1997); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 82a-928(i) (1997); MONT. CODE. ANN. § 852-316 (1997); NEB. REV. STAT. § 46-2, 108 (1993) (Nebraska does not specifically mention fisheries, but presumably they would fall within "recreation" as a designated beneficial use of water. See discussion supra pp. 186-88); OR. REv. STAT. § 537.336(a)
(1997); UTAH CODE ANN. § 73-3-3(11) (1989); WASH. REv. CODE § 90.22.020 (1996 &
Supp. 1998); WYo. STAT. ANN. § 41-3-1001(a) (1997).

WATER LAW REVIEW

Volume 1

stream values.13 9 Furthermore, scientific evidence can be adduced to
determine appropriate stream flows for the maintenance of fisheries. " °
Although there is ultimately a good deal of judgment and subjectivity
in the determination of minimum flows needed for fisheries, the
methods and conclusions may nevertheless be analyzed and challenged, and, in fact, may be subject to experimentation.
Protection of fish and wildlife habitat, wetlands, and the natural
stream environment are appropriate instream flow purposes in most
states as well."' Instream flows for recreational uses are clearly permitted in Alaska, Arizona, Idaho, Oregon, Washington, Nevada, Kansas,
Nebraska and Utah.' Water quality protection is also specifically allowed in several states.4 3 Finally, transportation and
navigation are ac4
ceptable instream flow uses in Alaska and Idaho."
While water quality and navigation uses may be susceptible of determination if appropriate criteria are developed, recreational and aesthetic values are perhaps harder to establish. An initial determination
of the scope and extent of the value must first be made, and then
found to be acceptable. For example, the permitting agency must determine how much water is actually the minimum necessary to maintain a kayaking course. Similarly, the extent of riparian habitat and
wetlands protection that could be provided by an instream flow leads
to a tangled web. Ecosystems change depending on the distance from
a stream or lake, but the change is often a gradual alteration in the
concentration of particular plant and animal life. Reduction or enhancement of stream flow could affect ecosystems miles from the
stream. What limits should be placed on instream flows for the protection of habitats or natural stream environments? Aesthetic values, of
course, are the most difficult. How does one practically determine
what stream flow is necessary to protect scenic beauty? 5
139. The cautious pace at which instream flow programs have typically proceeded
indicates that even fishery protection cannot be easily undertaken.
140. See, e.g., Herb Dishlip, Instream Flow Water Rights: Arizona's Approach, in INSTREAM
FLOW PROTECTION IN THE WEST, supra note 4, at 10-4 to 10-6 (discussing Arizona's development of instream flow evaluation criteria).
141. SeeALAsKA STAT. § 46.15.145(a) (1997); ARiz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 45-151.A. (West
Supp. 1997); CAL. WATER CODE § 1707(a) (West Supp. 1998); IDAHO CODE § 42-1502
(1997); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 82a-928(i) (1997); MONT. CODE ANN. § 85-2-102(2)(a)
(1997); OR. REv. STAT. § 537.336(1) (1997); UTAH CODE ANN. § 73-3-3(11)(a)(iii)
(Supp. 1997).
142. ALASKA STAT. § 46.15.145(a) (1997); Aiuz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 45-151.A. (West
Supp. 1997); IDAHO CODE § 42-1502 (1997); OR. REv. STAT. § 537.336(3) (1997); WASH.
REV. CODE § 90.22.010 (Supp. 1998); NEv. REV. STAT. § 533.030(2) (1995); KAN. STAT.
ANN. § 82a-928(i) (1997); NEB. REv. STAT. § 46-2, 107, 108 (1997 & Supp.); UTAH CODE
ANN. § 73-3-3(11) (a) (ii) (Supp. 1997).
143. See ALASKA STAT. § 46.15.145(a) (1997); IDAHO CODE § 42-1502 (1997); KAN.
STAT. ANN. § 82a-928(i) (1997); OR. REV. STAT. § 537.336(2) (1997); WASH. REV. CODE
§ 90.22.010 (Supp. 1998).
144. ALASKA STAT. § 46.15.145(a) (1997); IDAHO CODE§ 42-1502 (1997).
145. Both Idaho and Oregon permit instream flows for such purposes. See IDAHO
CODE § 42-1501 (1997) (using the terminology "aesthetic beauty"); OR. REV. STAT. §
537.336(3) (1996) (using the terminology "scenic attractions").

Issue 2

STATE INSTREAM FLOW PROGRAMS

Another issue that arises when instream flows may be appropriated
for many different purposes is the problem of overlapping reaches. A
determination must be made whether the instream appropriations are
cumulative or additive. Moreover, it is possible that the minimum
stream flow desirable for one use may actually impair another use. For
example, a recreation use might cause inundation of riparian habitat.
As instream flow programs mature, greater guidance will probably
evolve regarding the protection of the various instrean values and
their overall integration into the prior appropriation system.
WATER REQUIREMENTS FOR INSTREAM FLOWS

The western states have generally limited instream flows to that4 6
minimum amount of water necessary to accomplish the purpose.1
This approach reflects the general understanding that water rights
should be limited to the amount that can be beneficially used without
waste. However, some states, such as Wyoming, permit minimum
stream flows to establish or improve fisheries.
Similarly, California
and Utah, both of which allow instream flows only by change of other
water rights, permit such rights to be used to enhance wetlands, fish
and wildlife and recreation (California) ,148 and the natural stream environment (Utah). 49 As discussed above, it can be difficult to quantify
minimum stream flows necessary to protect values such as recreation,
aesthetics, wetlands and riparian habitat.
ADMINISTRATION

In addition to the constraints placed on instream flow rights, state
instream flow programs have encountered obstacles in administration.
Given their generally junior nature and the requirement that, in some
cases, they be subordinated, many have questioned the ability of instream flow rights to actually accomplish their purpose. In the absence of careful administration, such rights may provide little real assistance to fish, wildlife, recreation and other instream values.
It is difficult to keep track of instream flows in order to determine
when they may place a call5 againstjunior water rights. Unlike other
water rights, instream flows are not diverted from a river, so there is often no flume or gauge to measure the amount of the appropriation at
the point of diversion. Since an instream flow extends throughout an
entire stream reach, it is theoretically necessary to measure at least the
146. But see ALASKA STAT. § 46.15.145(a) (1996) (permitting a reservation of "sufficient" water for the specified use). Arizona and Nevada, which permit appropriation
of instream flows like other water rights, will presumably impose "minimum" standards
on instream flow rights, since appropriations may not take more water than they can
beneficially use. SeeARIz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 45-153 (West 1997).
147. Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 41-3-1001(c), (d) (1997).
148. CAL. WATER CODE § 1707(a) (West Supp. 1998).
149. UTAH CODE ANN. § 73-3-3(11)(c) (1989).
150. A call is a request to the administrative authority that junior water rights be curtailed to make water available to the calling senior water right.
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downstream terminus of every stream reach for which a minimum flow
has been obtained. If the gauge indicates that the minimum stream
flow is not being met at the lower end of the reach, a call should be
placed for the needed water. In some cases, it may be necessary to
have measurements made at the beginning of a reach, and perhaps at
the points of junior water right diversions within the reach as well, so
that junior rights can be curtailed in order of priority when the instream flow right calls. It is simply not economically possible for most
state agencies to provide the necessary stream measuring devices, or
the necessary personnel to read them and compile the data.151 Administration of instream flows in most western states is now in its infancy. As satellite monitoring of stream flows and computerized data
collection become more available, there may be real opportunities for
effective administration of instream flows.
ADDITIONAL WAYS TO PROTECT INSTREAM FLOWS
A number of states have discovered ways of protecting instream
flows within the context of other statutory and judicial schemes: 1)
through existing water rights statutes, which require a finding that new
appropriations are in the public interest; 2) through interstate compacts and other statutes which protect entire watersheds; and 3)
through judicial application of the public trust doctrine. Other protections that have been considered include market reallocation and
reduction of waste. Finally, of course, federal statutes and programs
also regulate instream flows.
PUBLIC INTEREST CRITERIA

Some states require an evaluation of the "public welfare" or "public
interest" as part of the approval or adjudication process for every water
right. For example, Alaska's Water Use Act, which did not originally
permit appropriation or reservation of instream flows,'5 2 now considers
sanitary, fish, wildlife, and recreational uses of water to be beneficial
uses, and requires evaluation of public interest criteria when adjudicat-

151. Pursuant to its statutory authority to accept donations of water rights and interests in water rights, see COLO. REV. STAT. § 37-92-102(3) (1997), the Colorado Water
Conservation Board ("CWCB") has approved intergovernmental agreements with two
cities allowing the cities to act as its agent to monitor instream flows in and around the
cities. See Agreement between Colorado Water Conservation Board and the City of
Boulder, July 20, 1990 (as amended by the First Addendum to Agreement dated December 14, 1990), and Intergovernmental Agreement between Colorado Water Conservation Board and City of Aspen, March 10, 1998. It is also developing a pilot program to train and authorize Trout Unlimited members to read and report gauge
readings. The CWCB will then determine when it should place a call for its rights.
These partnerships may assist in overcoming a big hurdle to instream flow enforcement in Colorado: the lack of measuring, monitoring and reporting of stream flows.
152. Mary Lu Harle & Christopher C. Estes, An Assessment of Instream Flow Protection in
Alaska, in INsTREAM FLOW PROTECTION IN THE WEST, supra note 4, at 9-4.
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ing water rights. 5 3 These criteria include "the effect on fish and game
resources and on public recreational opportunities" as well as "the effect on public health.' ' 54 In fact, the Alaska Department of Natural Resources has issued permits under this statutory scheme with requirements that stream flows be maintained for fish and wildlife.
Kansas law similarly requires a finding that a proposed use of water
156
does not "prejudicially and unreasonably affect the public interest.'
Ifthe application is found to prejudicially and unreasonably affect the
public interest, it must be rejected and modified "to conform to the
public interest to the end that the highest public benefit and maximum economical development may result from the use of such water. 51 1 Since the established minimum desirable stream flows are to be
considered in determining whether a proposed use will prejudicially
and unreasonably affect the public interest,' it is not clear whether
additional protection for instream flows is afforded by the public interest criterion. However, the Kansas statutory scheme may permit additional instream flow protection because it allows the Chief Engineer
to require applicants or owners of water rights to adopt and implement conservation plans and practices if he finds that such plans and
practices "will assure public benefit and promote public interest. ' 9
Likewise, New Mexico requires the State Engineer to consider
whether applications for water permits are detrimental to the "public
welfare."' There is no legislative direction and little New Mexico case
law establishing standards for the public welfare evaluation. 6' Without
such guidance, the State Engineer has historically been reluctant to
make policy decisions involving public welfare, such as the type of
growth that should occur in a particular area.162
In Utah, new appropriations can only be made following consideration of anticipated impact on public recreation and the natural
stream environment. 6 3 Nevada also requires a public interest review of
water rights applications. 64 Additionally, in a few cases in the northwest, courts have considered
the public welfare in evaluating water
65
rights applications.

153. Id.; seealsoALAsKASTAT. § 46.15.080(a) (4), (b) (1996).
154. AjAsKA STAT. § 46.15.080(b)(3),(4) (1996).
155. Mary Lu Harle & Christopher C. Estes, An Assessment of Instream Flow Protection in
Alaska, in INSTREAM FLOW PROTECTION IN

THE

WEST, supra note 4, at 9-5.

156. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 82a-711(a) (1997).
157. Id.
158. Id.
159. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 82a-733 (1997).
160. N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 72-5-6, -7 (1997).
161. Bokum, supra note 109, at 442; Hoffman-Dooley, supra note 109, at 107.
162. Hoffman-Dooley, supra note 109, at 119.
163. UTAH CODEANN. § 73-3-8 (1997).
164. NEv. REv. STAT. § 533.370(3) (1997).
165. Shokal v. Dunn, 707 P.2d 441 (Idaho 1985) (finding that applications for appropriation could be rejected if the proposed appropriation would conflict with the
"local public interest." "Local public interest" was defined as the affairs of the people
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California's water rights permitting scheme is far more sophisticated, and requires consideration of the state water plan and the benefit to be derived from various beneficial uses of water, including,
among other things, preservation and enhancement of fish, wildlife
and recreation, and stream flows.'66
The California state water board has broad authority to protect instream uses in the initial grant of a water permit, in the change of a
permit, and in the regulation of water rights. 167 In order to grant- a
permit, the board must consider the recommendations of the Department of Game and Fish regarding the amount of water required6
for the preservation and enhancement of fish and wildlife resources.11691
It must take such needs, as well as recreational needs, into account.
Water quality must also be considered. 70 This process can have the effect of reserving minimum stream flows because the instream requirements operate to reduce the amount of water available for appropriation. The board may also condition water permits in order "to
develop, conserve and utilize [the water] in the public interest."' 7' The
board typically issues permits with terms and conditions intended to
protect both stream flows and instream uses. 72 Permits may also be
modified to address these issues.' 73
Assessment of the public interest in adjudication of water rights
can be a powerful tool for instream flow protection. However, it is a
problematic tool if adequate criteria for evaluating the public interest
or welfare have not been defined. Administrative officials and even
water judges may be reluctant to establish such criteria on their own.
Public welfare assessments may therefore end up being made on a
case-by-case basis, may be inconsistent, and may not address all appropriate public welfare concerns. Without legislative direction, the
public interest and welfare criteria are likely to emerge from the courts
through the litigation process, rather than through public debate.

in the area directly affected by the proposed use. Id. at 448, citing IDAHO CODE § 421501); Stemple v. Department of Water Resources, 508 P.2d 166 (Wash. 1973) (concluding that water quality should be considered under water resources act policy of
preserving and enhancing natural resources, aesthetic values and public health).
166. CAL. WATER CODE §§ 1256-1258 (West 1997 and West Supp. 1998); see Gregory
A. Thomas, Conserving Aquatic Biodiversity: A Critical Comparison of Legal Tools for AugmentingStreamflows in California,15 STAN. ENV. L.J. 3, 15-18 (1996).
167. Brian E. Gray, A Reconsideration of Instream Appropriation Water Rights in California, in INSTREAM FLOW PROTECTION IN THE WEST, supra note 4.
168. CAL. WATER CODE § 1243 (West Supp. 1998).
169. Id.
170. CAL. WATER CODE § 1258 (West 1997).
171. Id. § 1253.
172. Brian E. Gray, A Reconsideration of Instream Appropriation Water Rights in California, in INSTREAM FLOW PROTECTION IN THE WEST, supra note 4, at 11-4 to 11-5.
173. Id.
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OTHER STATE STATUTES AND INTERSTATE COMPACTS

Other state statutes assist in the protection of instream flows as
well. For example, Idaho's Protected River Act allows for the designation of river segments as "natural" or "recreational" which cannot be
dammed or impounded.'7 4 The California Wild and Scenic Rivers Act
requires that designated reaches of certain rivers "be preserved in their
free-flowing state, together with their immediate environments....""'
implemented by prohibiting
As in Idaho, the California 176statute isrcnllaeddt
nld
It was recently amended to include a
damming or impoundment.
provision designed to protect Chinook salmon."
Montana enacted a broad water leasing program7 8 which allows
the Department of Natural Resources and Conservation to acquire water rights to be leased for "any beneficial use."'79 The Department may
appropriate such rights or acquire them from another water rights
holder.'80 While water rights reserved under the instream flow program may not be leased,' the leasing program may apparently be used
to enhance instream flows if the Department acquires other water
rights and leases them for an authorized beneficial use, such as fish
and wildlife or recreation."' Furthermore, a water leasing study, designed to provide data concerning critical stream flows and volumes
needed to preserve fisheries, 83 allows the Department of Fish, Wildlife
and Parks to lease existing water rights for the purpose of maintaining
and enhancing stream flows for the benefit of fisheries in certain eligible stream reaches. 84 Water rights changes to allow leases for instream
flow uses for the benefit of fisheries in the Upper Clark Fork River BaHowever, this statute
sin are also authorized on a temporary basis.
makes clear that sale of an appropriative right to maintain or enhance
stream flows in the Upper Clark basin is not allowed.'8 6
The western states are also parties to interstate compacts which determine the amount of water that must flow from a river's upper basin
state into a lower basin state or states. 87 Generally, the compacts re174. IDAHO CODE § 42-1734A (1997).
175. CAL. PUB. REs. CODE § 5093.50 (1997).
176. CAL. PUB. REs. CODE. § 5093.55(a) (Supp. 1998).
177. Id. § 5093.70(a)(1).
178. MONT. CODEANN. § 85-2-141 (1997).
179. Id. § 85-2141(1), (4).
180. Id. § 85-2-141(2).
181. Id. § 85-2-316.
182. Id. § 85-2-102(2) (a).
183. Id. § 85-2-436(1)(a) (ii).
184. Id. § 85-2-436(2)(b).
185. Id. § 85-2-439(1).
186. Id. § 85-2-439(10).
187. See, e.g., the Kansas-Nebraska Big Blue River Compact, KAN. STAT. ANN. § 82a529 (1997); the California-Nevada Interstate Compact regarding the Truckee, Carson
and Walker Rivers, NEV. REv. STAT. § 538.600 (1995); the Costilla Creek Compact between New Mexico and Colorado, N.M. STAT. ANN. § 72-15-10 (1997); the Rio Grande
Compact between Colorado, New Mexico and Texas, N.M. STAT. ANN. § 72-15-23
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quire measurement of stream flows at particular locations from which
it is determined how much water must be allowed to flow into the
lower basin state or states. These compacts have the effect of regulating instream flows to some extent, although use of reservoirs to assure
proper downstream deliveries can permit stream reaches to be significantly depleted within an upper basin state.
THE PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE
An alternative to legislative efforts to protect instream flows is the
public trust doctrine. This doctrine traces its origins to the English
common law, and, beyond that, to Roman law. 8 In this country, the
public trust doctrine was historically applied to require government, as
a trustee for the public, to administer tidal and submerged lands in a
manner that would neither cause the loss of the resource nor substantially impair trust purposes.'8 9 The doctrine was applied to diversions
of water in the landmark California case, National Audubon Society v.
Superior Court.! In this case, commonly known as Mono Lake, the California Supreme Court "revolutionized western water law"'' by concluding that the state holds title to water in trust for the public. 92 Therefore, the California Supreme Court concluded that the state has broad
power to regulate private water rights to protect the public trust.'93
The decision "potentially allowed the state to reallocate
water from
'' 94
private consumptive uses to public instream uses. )
Mono Lake, located 300 miles north of Los Angeles, is a termination point for surface runoff and ground water seepage in a closed hydrologic basin in eastern California.'
A highly saline lake, it was host
to unique ecosystems. 9"' However, the tributaries feeding it were important sources of water for Los Angeles. Over time, the city's massive
diversions caused a significant decline in the lake level.'97 In turn, this
decline increased the salinity of the lake and turned an island into a
peninsula, thus endangering an important gull breeding habitat. 9
This prompted the initial lawsuit.'9

(1997); and the Colorado River Compact among Wyoming, Colorado, Utah, New Mexico, Arizona, Nevada and California, COLO. REV. STAT. § 37-61-101 (1997).
188. Michael C. Blumm & Thea Schwartz, Mono Lake and the Evolving Public Trust
Doctrine in Western Water, 37 ARIz. L. REv. 701, 713 (1995).
189. See Thomas, supra note 166, at 33-37.
190. National Audubon Soc'y v. Department of Water and Power, 658 P.2d 709 (Cal.
1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 977 (1983).
191. Gregory S. Weber, Articulating the Public Trust: Text, Near-Text, and Context, 27
ARIz. ST. L.J. 1155 (1995).
192. Id.
193. Id. at 1155.
194. Id.
195. Blumm & Schwartz, supra note 188, at 704.
196. Id.
197. Id. at 705.
198. Id. at 706.
199. Id.
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The Supreme Court of California, finding that the public trust
doctrine applied to water diversions, held that the state did
not have
.
200
authority to convey vested rights that were harmful to trust resources.
In other words, the state acted outside its authority by issuing water
permits allowing so much water to be taken by the Los Angeles Department of Water and Power. 1 The court authorized the state to
grant non-vested rights inconsistent with the public trust, but only after an appropriate benefit analysis. 2 A non-vested right, of course, is
subject to loss, reduction, or modification without compensation."3
Mono Lake required the state water board to reconsider water allocation in the Mono Lake basin and to undertake a study to enable the
board to establish a balance between the needs of the diverters and the
public trust obligations. 4 The effects of this significant decision have
been felt in the state water board's application of the public trust doctrine to specific diversions. °5 The board has taken a broad view of its
power to regulate under the doctrine,0 0 and subsequent California decisions have been generally supportive, though not as daring as Mono
Lake.2 °7 California's water rights system, as noted earlier, considers instream flow values in a number of ways in the adjudication, transfer
and administration of water rights.2 00 Perhaps this integration of instream flow values is the reason California
has declined to allow origi2 9
nal appropriation of instream flows.

The public trust doctrine has found less acceptance in other western states' water rights systems.1 0 Idaho has flirted with the doctrine in
the water rights context. Idaho's local public interest criterion for
evaluating water rights applications was held to be part of the larger
doctrine of the public trust. 21 ' However, Idaho recently held that the
doctrine does not apply to an adjudication of an entire river system. 212
Montana's public trust cases have dealt with access issues, but it has
been argued that these cases recognize the public's right not just to
pass over the water that it owns, but to use it for recreation.
Although commentators have noted that many western states have

200. Id. at 707.
201. Id.
202. Id. at 708.
203. SeeWeber, supra note 191, at 1155.
204. Blumm & Schwartz, supra note 188, at 708.
205. Weber, supra note 191, at 1155.
206. Id. at 1155; 1173-99; 1227-31.
207. Id. at 1164-72; Blumm & Schwartz, supra note 188, at 721-25.
208. SeeThomas, supra note 166.
209. Some commentators, however, feel that California law contains "a number of
imperfect and largely insufficient, mechanisms to protect the freshwater environment
from excessive water diversions." Id. at 15.
210. Weber, supra note 191, at 1172; Blumm & Schwartz, supranote 188, at 726-35.
211. Shokal v. Dunn, 707 P.2d 441, 447 n.2 (Idaho 1985).
212. Idaho Conservation League, Inc. v. Idaho, 911 P.2d 748 (Idaho 1995).
213. Matt Clifford, PreservingStream Flows in Montana through the ConstitutionalPublic
Trust Doctrine:An UnderratedSolution, 16 PUB. LAND L. REv. 117, 128 (1995).
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constitutional and statutory grounding for the public trust doctrine (as
well as the common law basis found in Mono Lake) and that those states
have in fact applied the doctrine to traditional state interests in submerged lands, whether the doctrine will be extended to appropriation, administration and transfer of water rights is far from clear. The
western states have historically taken a "hands off' view of government,
and the courts are likely "to view recognition of the trust doctrine in
'
western water law [as] ...unwarranted judicial activism."215

Washington and Colorado are cases in point. The courts of both
states have specifically limited application of the public trust doctrine
in the water rights context. The Washington court, in Rettkowski v. Department of Ecology,2 16 declined to allow regulation of water under the
authority of the public trust doctrine.217 In Colorado, the public trust
issue arose when the Colorado Water Conservation Board ("CWCB")
sought to make a downward modification of a previously-decreed instream flow. 2 8

The Aspen Wilderness Workshop case arose from the

CWCB's decision not to enforce its entire instream flow right on
Snowmass Creek, in the vicinity of the Aspen and Snowmass ski areas. 2'9 This decision had resulted from pressure applied by increasing
development in the area, and the possibility of a computational error
in the data on which the original appropriation was based. 22' The
CWCB was sued by Aspen Wilderness Workshop, which claimed that
the CWCB's decision would result in a permanent relinquishment of
the public's instream flow rights, and that22 1 this could not be done
through an informal administrative process.
The Colorado Supreme Court originally issued an opinion largely
supporting Aspen Wilderness Workshop's position. The opinion included several references to the public trust with which the CWCB's
authority was imbued.22.

However, the final opinion was revised to de-

Instead, the court concluded that "[t] he Conlete these references.
servation Board has a unique statutory fiduciary duty to protect the
public in the administration of its water rights decreed to preserve the
natural environment., 224 This fiduciary duty is derived from Colorado's statutory scheme as a whole for the appropriation of water
rights, and from the CWCB's statutory duty to hold water rights "on

214. Blumm & Schwartz, supra note 188, at 731-35.
215. Id. at 713.
216. Rettkowski v. Department of Ecology, 858 P.2d 232 (Wash. 1993).

217. Id. at 237, 240; seeBlumm & Schwartz, supra note 188, at 730.
218. Aspen Wilderness Workshop v. Colorado Water Conservation Bd., 901 P.2d
1251 (Colo. 1995).
219. Id.
220. Id.
221.

Id.; seeJane E. Lein, Protection of Instream Flows: The Aspen Wilderness Workshop De-

cision, 24 COLO.LAW. 2577 (1995).
222.
in 24
223.
224.

Aspen Wilderness Workshop v. Colorado Water Conservation. Bd., as published

COLO. LAw. 2006 at 2009-10 (1995).
Aspen Wilderness Workshop, 901 P.2d at 1259.
Id. at 1260.
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behalf of the people" and "for the benefit and enjoyment of future
generations. '' 2 The supreme court further held that the CWCB cannot decrease an already decreed instream flow right or enforce less
than all of its appropriation without water court approval. 6 Although
the Colorado Supreme Court was willing to assign "unique statutory
responsibilities" and fiduciary duties to the CWCB, it was clearly unwilling to recognize the public trust doctrine in the water rights context.
While application of the public trust doctrine has allowed extensive protection of instream and riparian values in California, its application in other western states remains uncertain. Imposition of the
public trust doctrine on the appropriation, use, and transfer of water
rights is a high-stakes undertaking, and one that other states may simply not be willing to pursue.
MARKET REALLOCATION

While many western states may be reluctant to allow the public
trust doctrine to dictate water use, market forces may be able to accomplish some protection of instream uses instead. Tourism, including fishing, skiing and water-based recreation activities, is a burgeoning industry in much of the west. Assuring continuous, reliable and
clean water for the tourism industry makes economic sense.
In states like California and Utah, where appropriative rights may
be transferred to instream uses, the economic incentives to do so may
well provide a boost to instream water uses.22 7 As one commentator has
noted, a market-based system has the following "virtue":
[O]f capturing water where it is needed for flow augmentation, instead of wherever in the hydrologic system the regulatory apparatus
intervenes to salvage wasted water (for example, by invoking the pub-

lic trust, by establishing minimum streamflows, or by appropriating
available water for the stream.)

No constitutional issues of uncom-

pensated taking can arise. No political issues regarding the appropriamong competing interests or constituencies will
ate balance
emerge. 228
By contrast, in a state like Colorado, where only the Colorado Water
Conservation Board may hold instream flow rights, it is more difficult
to protect instream uses via the market. Although the CWCB can accept water rights for instream flow purposes, it is rarely in a position
to pay for them. Those engaged in activities which require stream
flows must go through the cumbersome process of donating a senior
water right to the CWCB, overseeing its change to instream flow uses,
225. Id.; COLO. REv. STAT. §§ 37-92-102(3), -103(4) (1997).
226. Aspen Wilderness Workshop, 901 P.2d at 1258.
227. Thomas, supra note 166, at 45-48 (noting that a "market-based water transfer
system would be an improvement over existing regulatory programs because the transfers would be voluntary and remunerated instead of imposed and uncompensated").
228. Id. at 46.
229. COLO. REv. STAT. § 37-92-102(3) (1997).

Volume I

WATER LAWREVIEW

and then assuring that the right is administered to protect the in situ
use.230 Moreover, the CWCB may only hold instream water rights "to
protect the natural environment to a reasonable degree. 231 Whether it
can hold such rights for purely recreational uses is not clear.
WATER USE PRACTICES: ELIMINATING WASTE

It has been argued that the elimination of wasteful water use practices would make water available to protect instream flows. 2

12

Most

states' appropriation doctrines require that water be beneficially used
without waste.
However, it is important to determine what wasteful
practices should be curtailed to make more water available. Lining of
ditches or increasing irrigation efficiency can actually affect streamflows adversely if the excess water had historically found its way slowly
back to the stream, with a portion of the return flows occurring late in
the season. Reduction of this waste might make more water available
in the stream during the irrigation season, but might result in less water later in the year, when flows are often at their lowest. Elimination
of waste, in short, is more complicated than it seems. If this approach
is used as a method of protecting instream flows, the precise waste to
be eliminated should be carefully evaluated to determine if the consequences of waste elimination are as anticipated.
FEDERAL STATUTES

While the impact of federal legislation on state instream flows is
significant, it will be mentioned here only briefly.
The Federal Clean Water Act is designed to protect and restore water quality.13 4 The Act requires each state to institute comprehensive

water quality standards establishing water quality goals for all state waters 3 Water quality goals can include water quantity regulation since
"a characteristic of water that is vitally important to the health of
aquatic ecosystems is the adequacy of available stream flows.

' 3

Those

wishing to discharge into the nation's waterways or to construct diversions or dams must typically obtain permits and approvals, which require assurances that water quality will be maintained notwithstanding
230. The City of Boulder, at great cost to its taxpayers, has taken just this approach
to assure a continuous stream flow in Boulder Creek as it passes through the City.
231. COLO. REv. STAT. § 37-92-102(3) (1997).
232. K.A. Russell, Wasting Water in the Northwest: Eliminating Waste as a Way of Restoring
Stream Flows, 27 ENVr'L LAw. 151 (1997); Thomas, supra note 166, at 45-47.
233. In California, for example, the comparable doctrine of reasonable use provides
a tool for maintaining instream flows by enabling the state water board to eliminate
wasteful practices and encourage water conservation. This tool has not been widely
used in California, in part, because it has been narrowly interpreted to avoid requiring
undue expenses. See Thomas, supra note 166, at 25-32.
234. 33 U.S.C. § 1251 (1994 & Supp. 11995).
235. 33 U.S.C. § 1313 (1994); seeJan Laitos, Water Right and Water Quality: Recent Developments, 23 COLO. LAw. 2343 (1994).
236. Public Util. Dist. No. 1 v. Washington Dep't of Ecology, 511 U.S. 700 (1994),
cited in Thomas, supra note 166, at 17-18.
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the proposed change." 7 To maintain this quality, minimum stream
flow requirements are often imposed to assure proper dilution.238
The Endangered Species Act prohibits any person or entity from
"taking" any species designated as endangered or threatened.23 9 Habitat destruction constitutes a taking. 40 The Act also requires designation and protection of habitat critical to the conservation of threatened or endangered species. 41 Finally, recovery plans, which are often
complex, must be developed and implemented to conserve endanspecies.2 2 These plans often include water flow
gered or threatened
43
requirements.2
In addition, other federal statutes require dams to release water to
benefit downstream fisheries.24 The Federal Power Act requires the
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission to consider wildlife conservation before issuing a license to non-federal hydropower dams and faof particular
cilities. This licensing may require the maintenance
245
stream flows to protect fish and wildlife habitats.
Special use permits issued by the Forest Service for such activities
as the operation of ski areas may also contain conditions requiring instream flow maintenance.
Federal legislation imposes requirements above and beyond those
of state instream flow programs. As a practical matter, the states and
the federal government must find ways to integrate their respective instream flow requirements in order to permit both water resource development and protection of instream flow values to proceed.
CONCLUSION
State instream flow programs are surprisingly diverse. They have
evolved to meet the specific instream flow needs perceived in each
state, as constrained by the state's other water use values. Although
some programs have been in existence for over forty years, most are
still new. The full impact of these programs on the protection of rivers, aquatic and riparian habitat, recreation and other instream values,
as well as on the development of consumptive water resources, is not
fully known. As the population in the west continues to grow and water use shifts to new purposes, state instream flow programs will continue to be an important factor shaping future decision making.

237. Laitos, supra note 235.
238. Id.
239. 16 U.S.C. § 1531 (1994 & Supp. 11995).
240. Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Communities for a Greater Oregon, 515 U.S.
687 (1995).
241. 16U.S.C. § 1533(a) (3) (A) (1994).
242. Id.§ 1533(f).
243. Thomas, supra note 166, at 20-21.
244. Id. at 19-20.
245. Udall v. Federal Power Comm'n, 387 U.S. 428, 444 (1967).
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INTRODUCTION
The exchange is one of the most important tools through which
water is used efficiently in Colorado. However, it is also one of the
more misunderstood concepts in Colorado water law. This article begins with the basics - the what, who, where, when, why, and how of
exchanges; the Colorado law governing exchanges; and the respective
roles of the State Engineer and the water courts in administering and
adjudicating exchanges. The latter third of the article then moves beyond the basics to address one of the more pressing exchange issues
being raised in Colorado water courts today: the issue of water quality
The authors are both attorneys for the Denver Water Board. However,
the
views expressed in this article are solely the authors' and do not reflect the position or
opinion of the Board of Water Commissioners.

Issue 2

BASIC EXCHANGE 101

in exchanges. It is the authors' position that water quality standards
applied to the substitute supply should be those promulgated by the
Colorado Water Quality Control Commission rather than those standards created by the water courts or downstream senior appropriators.
However, this discussion comes later - first, the basics.
THE BASICS
THE WHAT

An exchange is a trade of water between structures or users. Accomplished by diverting water upstream and then introducing an
equivalent amount of water from a different source to the downstream
water user, an exchange allows a junior water right to divert out-ofpriority when a substitute supply is introduced to the senior water
right. There are four critical elements to an exchange: (1) the source
of substitute supply must be above the calling water right; (2) the
substitute supply must be equivalent in amount and of suitable quality
to the downstream senior appropriator; (3) there must be available
natural flow' at the point of upstream diversion; and (4) the rights of
others cannot be injured when implementing the exchange. The"
source of substitute supply can include a storage release,' or reusable
return flows."
THE WHO

Any water user can exchange water if there is a source of substitute
supply and they comply with the directives and requirements of Colorado Revised Statutes section 37-80-120.' Notable in this statutory section are the following provisions: an exchange of water can be made to
another entity;6 it is not necessary to decree an exchange; 7 and, the
State Engineer administers the operation of exchanges."

1. Natural flow includes water that is legally available to be diverted.
2. Interview with Hal Simpson, State Engineer, in Denver, Colo. (Feb. 24, 1998).
3. COLO. REv. STAT. § 37-83-104 (1997).
4. Reusable return flows include return flows from foreign water, which is water
introduced into a stream system such as transmountain sources; developed water such
as nontributary groundwater; consumed water from a transfer proceeding; or water
specifically appropriated for reuse. City of Thornton v. Bijou Irrigation Co., 926 P.2d
1, 66 (Colo. 1996).
5. COLO. REV. STAT. § 37-80-120 (1997).
6. Id. §§ 37-80-120(2), 37-83-105.
7. Id. § 37-80-120(1).
8. Id.
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THE WHERE

The reach of an exchange extends from the point of introduction
of the substitute supply to the upstream point of withdrawal. 9
THE WHEN

Although the release of substitute supply should be coordinated
with the state water officials, an exchange does not require that the introduction of the substitute supply be simultaneous with a withdrawal.'
An exchange is normally operated when a downstream water right
places a call," but an exchange or transfer can be made without a
call. 2
THE WHY

Exchanges promote the flexible and efficient use of water including foreign water.' 3 Thus, exchanges are encouraged under the doctrine of maximum utilization. 4
THE HOW

The easiest way to explain exchanges is through illustration (see
pages 209-211). Start with the premise that a water user has water
stored in Reservoir B but his principal diversion facility is ten miles upstream at Reservoir A.'5 Assuming river conditions are amenable, he
can divert a certain portion of out-of-priority river water at Reservoir
A's Intake provided that he supplies an equivalent amount of water to
the downstream senior calling right - such as an 1871 irrigation priority. This water user has no intake at Reservoir B, so he maximizes
the storage pool in Reservoir B by exchanging water upstream to Reservoir A's Intake where he can divert this water to beneficial use. Now,
given this background, look at the following examples:

9. COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 37-83-101,-102 (1997).
10. City & County of Denver v. Englewood, 826 P.2d 1266, 1273 (Colo. 1992).
However, a non-simultaneous release and diversion may only effectuate an exchange
when proper notification has been given to the state or division engineer and water is
available for the release; and that prior notification is necessary to protect the rights of
downstream appropriators by ensuring that water will be available to downstream priorities.
11. "A call is placed on a river when a senior appropriator forces upstream juniors
to let sufficient water flow to meet the requirements of the senior priority." USI Properties East Inc. v. Simpson, 938 P.2d 168, 171 n.2 (Colo. 1997).
12. See COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 37-83-101, -104 (1997) (asserting that there is no requirement for a downstream call).
13. COLO. REV. STAT. § 37-82-106(1) (1997); City of Florence v. Board of Waterworks, 793 P.2d 148, 154 (Colo. 1990).
14. Fellhauer v. People, 447 P.2d 986, 994 (Colo. 1968) (stating that a diverter
must establish some reasonable means of effectuating a diversion and that the right to
use water does not include the right to waste it).
15. At Reservoir A and Intake, Water User 1 diverts water to its treatment plant.
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Figure 1: No Exchange
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- 250 cfs
Upstream
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Without an exchange, Water User 1 can only divert River water in
6
decreed amounts and in priority. For example, when 250 cfs' is flowing in the River at Reservoir A and Water User l's water rights are in
priority to divert 100 cfs, Water User 1 can divert 100 cfs, but must bypass the remaining 150 cfs.
Figure 2: Simple Exchange
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16. Cubic feet per second (cfs) is a rate of flow of water passing a given point that
amounts to one cubic foot for each second of time. One cfs diverted for twenty-four
hours correlates to approximately two acre feet. GEORGE A. GOULD & DOUGLAS L.
GRANT, CASES AND MATERIALS ON WATER LAW 14 (5th ed. 1995).
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By operating an exchange, Water User 1 can divert more than the
100 cfs. In this situation, Water User 1 diverts by exchange 130 cfs,
even though only 100 cfs is in priority. The 30 cfs diverted out of priority is allowed if Water User 1 performs an exchange. Water User 1
can take credit for 30 cfs of reusable effluent discharging from a
Wastewater Treatment Plant X ("WWTP-X"), release 30 cfs from Reservoir B, or use some combination of both. The exchange is administered by state water officials. Now, let's get more complicated.
Figure 3: Complex Exchange
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The controlling downstream call is for irrigation under a priority
of 1871. All water rights junior to 1871 are curtailed by the state water
officials. Water User 1 can still divert 100 cfs under its rights senior to
1871, but the additional 50 cfs must be covered by an exchange using a
source of substitute supply upstream of the 1871 calling right, including effluent from upstream wastewater treatment plants. In Figure 3,
Water User 1 stores 15 cfs in Reservoir B and then performs an exchange to Reservoir B using 15 cfs of reusable effluent being discharged from Wastewater Treatment Facility Y ("WWTF-Y'). Water
User 1 also exchanges 50 cfs of reusable effluent being discharged
from WWTP-X to Reservoir A. Thus, Water User 1 diverted by exchange a total of 65 cfs. Water User 1, however, can use only effluent
from a reusable source. To do so, Water User 1 must distinguish reusable return flows 1 7 from native return flows (which cannot be reused)

18

17. See City & County of Denver v. Fulton Irrigating Ditch Co., 506 P.2d 144, 149
(Colo. 1972) (stating in dicta that Denver must demonstrate dominion and control).
18. See Pulaski Irrigating Ditch Co. v. City of Trinidad, 203 P. 681, 682 (Colo. 1922);
see also Water Supply & Storage Co. v. Curtis, 733 P.2d 682, 683-84 (Colo. 1987) (holding that return flow is not subject to further appropriation independent of the priority
system unless a non-speculative intent is demonstrated to appropriate by reuse).
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The next day the call is from a more junior 1880 irrigation and
municipal priority located upstream from the WWTR-X outfall. Here,
effluent from WWTF-X cannot be used as a source of substitute supply. Water User 1 must now provide a replacement source for any out
of priority diversions with a substitute supply located upstream of the
1880 calling priority. Water User 1 may choose to increase the release
from Reservoir B and take credit for Water User l's reusable effluent
discharging from WWTF-Y.'9
Figure 4: Intervening Water Right
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An intervening water right is a water right that diverts within the
exchange reach (i.e., between the point of withdrawal and the point
where the substitute supply is introduced). If the intervening right is
junior to the calling priority, it is not affected by the exchange; it is
called out by the senior downstream priority. The source, amount,
and quality of the substitute supply for Water User l's exchange
should not be a factor. If the intervening water right is senior to the
calling right, the division engineer will curtail the exchange or reduce
the amount exchanged in order to satisfy the senior intervening water
right.
The intervening right, whether senior or junior, has no recourse if
the exchange impacts water quality. Colorado law does not recognize
water quality injury to an intervening right because the intervening water right does not receive the substitute supply. 0
19. Water User 1 may exchange upon any wastewater which is reusable and which it
can distinguish from other sources. See Fulton IrrigatingDitch Co., 506 P.2d at 149.
20. City of Thornton v. Bijou Irrigation Co., 926 P.2d 1, 91 (Colo. 1996) (stating in
dicta that the court is explicitly required to consider water quality issues only in the
case of an exchange whereby water is being actively substituted into the stream for the
use of other appropriators).
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COLORADO LAW GOVERNING EXCHANGES
Although exchanges have been operated in Colorado for over a
hundred years, very little statutory or case law exists regarding exchanges. Indeed, the exchange statutes were first enacted in 1897,1
and remain relatively unchanged to date." However, the legal issues
involving exchanges have evolved over time. During the early part of
this century, exchange cases focused on injury to downstream seniors.
It was in 1899 that the Twelfth General Assembly promulgated a law
recognizing the lawful practice of exchanges:
It shall be lawful, however, for the owners of ditches and water rights
taking water from the same stream, to exchange with, and loan to,
each other, for a limited time, the water to which each may be entitled, for the purpose of saving crops or of using the water in a more
economical manner; Provided, that the owner or owners making such
loan or exchange, shall give notice in writing signed by all the owners
participating in said loan or exchange, stating that such loan or exchange has been made, and for what length of time the same shall
continue, whereupon said water commissioner shall recognize the
same in his distribution of water."
Pursuant to this statute, upstream seniors were loaning water by diverting it from the creek and then transporting it through ditches and lat-

erals to downstream juniors." However, removal of this loaned water
from the creek injured intervening juniors25 who were senior to the
junior water right receiving the water by lateral. These types of loans
or exchanges were disallowed because they injured downstream inter-

vening water rights which were not called out by the receiving water
right.
28
2
The early cases of Ft. Lyon Canal Co. v. Chew and Bowman v. Virdin
focused on the constitutionality of the 1899 exchange statute. These
cases held that the new exchange statutes were constitutional as long
as the exchanges were exercised in such a way, at such times, and under such circumstances that the vested rights of others were not injured." These cases also stated that a temporary exchange could be

operated without first obtaining a decree.
21. 1897 Colo. Sess. Laws 177.
22. COLO. REv. STAT. §§ 37-83-104 to -106 (1997).
23. 1899 Colo. Sess. Laws 236 (codified as amended at COLO. REv. STAT. § 37-83105 (1997)).
24. See Bowman v. Virdin, 90 P. 506 (Colo. 1907).
25. For exchange purposes, intervening juniors are those water users in between
the place where the water is diverted out of the stream and where it is replaced upstream of the calling senior. See, e.g., City of Thornton, 926 P.2d at 80.
26. See Ft. Lyon Canal Co. v. Chew, 81 P. 37, 39 (Colo. 1905).
27. Ft. Lyon Canal Co. v. Chew, 81 P. 37 (Colo. 1905).
28. Bowman v. Virdin, 90 P. 506 (Colo. 1907).
29.

Ft. Lyon Canal Co., 81 P. at 39-40; Bowman, 90 P. at 507.

30. Id.
31. Ft. Lyon Canal Co, 81 P. at 40; Bowman, 90 P. at 507.

Issue 2

BASIC EXCHANGE 101

As time passed and more water users began vying for limited quantities of water, water users saw the value of decreeing their exchanges,
both conditionally and absolutely. For example, the first exchange adjudicated in Water Division 1 was the Boulder White Rock/Panama
Exchange, adjudicated in 1926 with an appropriation date of 1904.
Despite this early adjudication date, other Water Division 1 exchanges
are administered as senior in priority to the Boulder White
Rock/Panama Exchange. Colorado Revised Statutes section 37-92305(10) states:
If an application filed under section 37-92-302 for approval of an existing exchange of water is approved, the original priority date or priority dates of the exchange shall be recognized and preserved unless
such recognition or preservation would be contrary to the manner in
which such exchange has been administered .
Therefore, the postponement doctrine34 does not apply to existing exchanges. Exchanges existing prior to the Boulder White Rock/Panama
Exchange,3but adjudicated afterwards, may be administered as senior
in priority.
Pursuant to the Adjudication Act of 1943,6 and later the Water

Right Determination and Administration Act of 1969, s7 exchanges are
adjudicated as appropriative rights. 38 This means that the holder of an
exchange right may put a specified amount of water to beneficial use
in order of the decreed priority.3" Like other appropriative water
rights, exchanges may be adjudicated as either conditional or absolute
fights. A conditional water right means "a ight to perfect a water
right with a certain priority upon the completion with reasonable diligence of the appropriation upon which such water right is to be
based."40 A conditional exchange right must make showings of reasonable diligence, just like a direct flow right. A conditional water right
matures into an absolute water right through the application of water

32. State Engineer's Tabulation of Decreed Exchanges in Water Division 1. The
appropriation date for this exchange was 1904.
33. COLO. REV. STAT. § 37-92-305(10) (1997).

34. "Priority of appropriation determines the relative priority among water rights
or conditional water rights awarded in one calendar year, but, regardless of the date of
appropriation, water rights or conditional water rights decreed in one year are necessarily junior to all priorities awarded in decrees in prior years." United States v. Bell,
724 P.2d 631, 641-42 (Colo. 1986).
35. State Engineer's Tabulation of Decreed Exchanges in Water Division 1.
36. COLO. REv. STAT. §§ 148-9-1 to -27 (1963), repealed by 1969 Colo. Sess. Laws
1223.

37. COLO. REv. STAT. §§ 37-92-101 to -602 (1997).
38. Id. § 37-80-120(4); see also, David C. Hallford, Water Reuse and Exchange Plans, 17
COLO.LAw. 1083, 1084 (1988) (discussing the adjudication of exchanges, the date of
decree, and potential effects on existing water rights).
39. COLO. REv. STAT. § 37-92-103(3) (a) (1997).
40. Id. § 37-92-103(6).
41. Id. § 37-92-301(4).
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to beneficial use.42 A conditional exchange right ripens into an absolute exchange right when the exchange is exercised in accordance
with state law.
An interesting nuance of exchange rights is the nature of the exchange priority. Although an exchange is decreed a priority just like
any other absolute or conditional water right, 4 in practice the exchange's priority applies only against other exchange decrees. Figure
5 illustrates the point:
Figure 5

WATERUSER2 1985 EXCHANGE PRIORITY

1860

WATERUSER 1 1962 EXCHANGE PRIORITY
-

RESERVOIR A
s

--------------

PRIORITY

RESERVOIR B

G200

Upstream/

IRRIGATION

I Gs

IcrArE

110PRIfs/

//Do=traI0
1

20 ds/

90 dfs

1905

1890

WWTF-X

MUNICIPAL MUNICIPAL 90 ors WU-I
20 efs WU-2
RIGHT
RIGHT
WATERUsER

1

cfs

1871
IRRIGATION
PRIORITY

110 cfs available

In this example, both Water User 1 and Water User 2 can operate exchanges from Reservoir A to WWTF-X. Because Water User l's exchange decree is senior to Water User 2's exchange decree, Water
User 1 may operate its exchange to its full decreed amount before Water User 2 can exchange any water. Even if Water User 2's decreed exchange allows it to exchange 60 cfs, it may only exchange 20 cfs in this
example because Water User 1 has already used the remainder of the
effluent for exchange.
This example also demonstrates the position of the downstream
junior direct flow rights in relation to the exchanges. If there is a senior downstream call, it calls out all upstream juniors, including juniors
that may be senior to the exchange right. Even if the exchange is junior to downstream users, the exchange may be run, so long as the calling senior is satisfied.
The important issues in operating an exchange are: (1) where the
water will be diverted; (2) how much water will be diverted; and (3)
42. Purgatoire River Water Conservancy Dist. v. Witte, 859 P.2d 825, 832 (Colo.
1993).
43. Public Serv. Co. of Colo. v. Bd. of Water Works, 831 P.2d 470, 475 (Colo. 1992).
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the priority of the calling right. Therefore, the priority of the exchange is only relevant against other exchange rights that might seek
to run an exchange at the same time in the same reach. The exchange
with the earlier priority date will be administered as senior to other exchange rights with lower priority dates.
In 1969, the Colorado Legislature added a significant piece of law
to the exchange process. Codified at Colorado Revised Statutes section 37-80-120, this statute specifies the State Engineer's duties regarding undecreed exchanges." The first cases to address this statute were
A-B Cattle Co. v. United States45 and PurgatoireRiver Water Conservancy District. v. Kuiper.46 The Purgatoire River case interpreted section 37-80120(1), which allows out-of-priority upstream storage subject to regulation by the State Engineer. The court deferred to the State Engineer
to determine if the out-of-priority storage was proper, stating: "[t]his
is the type of matter in which the water authorities and not the court
have the right to make the initial determination."4 7 This case marked
the beginning of deference to the State Engineer concerning the operation of exchanges done exercised pursuant to section 37-80-120 (1).
In A-B Cattle, the argument centered around Colorado Revised
Statutes section 37-80-120(3) which states that the substitute supply
must be of a quality and continuity to meet the requirements of use to
which the senior appropriation had normally been put."' In this case,
the Plaintiffs claimed they had been harmed by an exchange operated
by the United States. Historically, Plaintiffs received silty water, but
the United States' exchange resulted in a substitution of clear water
instead of silty water.50 Plaintiffs argued that more of the clear water
seeped from their ditch than did the silty water, and that clear water
did not spread as far as silty water when applied to the land for irrigation.5 ' The court held that the original appropriation was for water,
not silty water. 2 Therefore, the quality of the substituted water met
the requirements of section 37-80-120(3) ."
As technology improved and the need to maximize transmountain
water increased due to agreements with Colorado's Western Slope, 4
the issues concerning exchanges shifted focus to the source of substi44.
45.
46.
47.
48.

1969 Colo. Sess. Laws 1196, amended by 1989 Colo. Sess. Laws 1425.
A-B Cattle Co. v. United States, 589 P.2d 57 (Colo. 1978).
Purgatoire River Water Conservancy Dist. v. Kuiper, 593 P.2d 333 (Colo. 1979).
Kuiper, 593 P.2d at 340.
A-B Cattle, 589 P.2d at 59.

49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 62.
53. Id. at 59.
54. See, e.g., Findings of Fact, Judgment and Decree (commonly referred to as the
Blue River Decree), United States v.Northern Colo. Water Conservancy Dist., Consolidated Nos. 2782, 5016, 5017 (D. Colo. October 12, 1955) (requiring Denver to utilize return flows by exchange or otherwise so as to maximize use of Blue River water);
Congressional authorization to implement the Decree is codified at 43 U.S.C. § 6200)

(1994) (Act of April 11, 1956, ch. 203, § 12, 70 Stat. 110).
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tute supply. In 1972, the case of City and County of Denver v. Fulton Irrigating Ditch Co.55 held that, subject to contrary contractual obligations,
imported transmountain water could be reused or successively used,
and that delivery to a sewage plant did not constitute abandonment of
the water.5 6 The court held that as long as the transmountain effluent
could be identified, it could be reused. 57 Reuse of transmountain effluent by exchange became accepted practice, was approved by the
Colorado Supreme Court,58 and is used by municipalities throughout
Colorado.
The most recent exchange litigation in Colorado concerns the use
of municipal effluent as a substitute supply. Downstream seniors are
asserting that Colorado Revised Statutes sections 37-80-120(3) and 3792-305(5) require that the substitute supply meet stringent quality requirements."
THE ROLE OF THE STATE ENGINEER
AUTHORITY OVER UNDECREED EXCHANGES
Pursuant to Colorado Revised Statutes section 37-80-120, the State
Engineer has the authority to regulate undecreed exchanges and determine if the substitute supply meets "the requirements of use to
which the senior appropriation has normally been put. 6 0°

However,

this statute must be read in conjunction with section 25-8-202, which
delineates the duties of the Water Quality Control Commission
("WQCC"). The WQCC is solely responsible for the adoption of water
quality standards and classifications for state waters affected by discharges, such as effluent from wastewater treatment plants.61
Section 25-8-202 defines the State Engineer as an "implementing
agenc[y]." 2 In its role as an implementing agency, the State Engineer
is charged with implementing classifications and standards adopted by
the WQCC:
The commission shall be solely responsible for the adoption of water
quality standards and classifications for state waters affected by such
discharges. Except as set forth in paragraph (b) of this subsection

55. City and County of Denver v. Fulton Irrigating Ditch Co., 506 P.2d 144 (Colo.
1972)
56. FultonIrrigatingDitch Co., 506 P.2d at 149.
57.

Id. at 149-50.
See City and County of Denver v. City of Englewood, 826 P.2d 1266, 1272-73
(Colo. 1992); City of Florence v. Board of Waterworks of Pueblo, 793 P.2d 148, 152

58.

(Colo. 1990).
59. COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 37-80-120(3), 37-92-305(5) (1997).
60. Id. § 37-80-120(1).

61. Id. § 25-8-202(7) (a),(b) (I).
62. Id. § 25-8-202(7).
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(7), such classifications and standards shall be implemented by the
implementing agencies, after consultation with the division and the
commission, through their own programs.
shall be solely responsible for the issuance and
(b) (I) The division
of permits authorizing point source discharges to surenforcement
face waters of the state affected by suc discharges.
For undecreed exchanges, the State Engineer must first implement
the standards adopted by the WQCC, and then determine if those
standards are adequate to meet the requirements of use to which the
senior appropriation has normally been put. For exchanges using effluent as a substitute supply, the State Engineer must determine if the
effluent discharge is meeting its discharge permit and if the use of the
effluent as a substitute supply impedes the historical use of the calling
senior. To aid in these determinations, the State Engineer adopted
rules and regulations" implementing section 25-8-202 (7). These rules
apply when the State Engineer has water quality authority under a
statute other than the Colorado Water Quality Control Act, such as
section 37-80-120.65
Rule 6 of the regulations delineates the authority of the State Engineer to implement standards and classifications for nondecreed exchanges and substitute supply plans.6 This rule obligates the State
Engineer to make a determination as to the quality of the substitute
supply such that it complies with section 37-80-120(3). To make this
determination, the State Engineer may require that the applicant provide water quality data to allow for proper analysis and evaluation of
the substitute supply.6 7 However, during the analysis and evaluation,
the State Engineer must apply the following provision:
If appropriate water quality standards and/or classifications have
been established by the Water Quality Control Commission, they shall
be considered in determining water requirements of senior appropriators and the State Engineer shall consider the water quality standards for the use which is appropriate to the senior appropriator.
For example, if the senior beneficial use is agricultural in nature,
then the appropriate standards for agricultural use may be applied, if
factual correlation to the particular use of the
such criteria have some
681
senior appropriator.
The Colorado Supreme Court recently reiterated that section 37-80120 confers certain authority on the State Engineer to regulate exchanges in the absence of adjudication.6 9 The court explained:
63.

CoLo. REv. STAT. §§ 25-8-202(7) (a), -202(7) (b) (I) (1997).

64.
65.
66.
67.
68.

See2 COLO. CODEREGS. § 402-8 (1992).
Id. 13.2.
Id. 16.1 to 6.5.
Id. 6.3.
Id. 1 6.5.2.

69. City of Thornton v. Bijou Irrigation Co., 926 P.2d 1, 97 (Colo. 1996).
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[u]nder both the statute and the regulations, the mandate of the
State Engineer in reviewing the quality aspects of an exchange is
clear: the substitute supply must be of a quality to meet the requirements of use to which the senior appropriation has normally been
put. The regulations are sufficiently broad to allow the State Engineer's office to exercise its professional judgment in adopting a
method of regulation that will ensure that the statutory standard is
met, and the absence of more specific direction will not compromise
the protective goals of the statute. Accordingly, we hold that the
State Engineer is capable of ensuring compliance with these provisions without specific instructions on where to measure the quality of
the substituted water.
AUTHORITY OVER DECREED EXCHANGES
The State Engineer's authority over decreed exchanges is limited
to administration of the decreed water rights. 7' The general duties of
the State Engineer are described at Colorado Revised Statutes section
37-80-102. 72 The State Engineer determines which exchange is senior
in priority and administers exchanges in accordance with sections 3792-301(1) and (3). 7S The State Engineer must ensure that all calling
seniors are satisfied 4
The State Engineer's authority over the water quality of substitute
supply in a decreed exchange is minimal. Neither section 37-80-120
nor 2 Colorado Code of Regulations 402-8, Rule 6 is applied by the
State Engineer to a decreed exchange. Rather, 2 Colorado Code of
Regulations 402-8, Rule 7 applies. Rule 7, which addresses the implementation of standards and classifications for decreed exchanges and
plans for augmentation, limits the State Engineer's participation on
water quality issues to the filing of a Statement of Opposition, Protest to a
Referee's Ruling, or Motion to Intervene. Once the State Engineer has
filed such a pleading, the State Engineer may present evidence that
evaluates the proposed exchange.

THE ROLE OF THE WATER COURT REGARDING DECREED
EXCHANGES
APPROPRIATION OF AN EXCHANGE RIGHT
To obtain an exchange decree, an Applicationfor a Water Right must
be filed in the appropriate water court. An exchange application must
contain the following elements: the priority date, the location of the
diversion at the source of supply, and the amount of water for application to beneficial uses.7 5 The Application should also give inquiry notice
70.
71.

Id. at 97.
COLO. REv. STAT. §§ 37-92-301(3), -501, -503 (1997).

72.
73.
74.
75.

Id. § 37-80-102.
Id. § 37-92-301(1), (3).
Id. § 37-92-301(3).
Dallas Creek Water Co. v. Huey, 933 P.2d 27, 38 (Colo. 1997).
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of the source of substitute supply.76 The water clerk prepares a
monthly resume of the applications filed in each water division that is
designed to give all water users notice of applications that may affect
their water rights." "The reasonableness of the notice is judged on an
inquiry standard: whether the notice is sufficient to reveal to potential
parties the nature of the claim being made, so that they may deterand conduct further
mine whether to participate in the proceedings
78
inquiry into the full extent of those claims.
In the City and County of Denver v. City of Englewood,79 the court addressed the extent of inquiry notice required regarding the source of
substitute supply. In Englewood, Denver sought to appropriate conditional water rights to divert by exchange from the South Platte River.
The statement of claim80 and resulting decree specified the uses to include "effectuating an exchange or transfer of water by the use of any
public stream or its water ... .,8 Englewood and Thornton claimed
that the decree failed to give notice that transmountain effluent could
be used as a source of substitute supply.82 The Colorado Supreme
Court held that Denver's statement was sufficient to put interested parties on inquiry notice that sources other than the South Platte might
be introduced as a substitute supply. 3 The Colorado Supreme Court
recently reaffirmed this broad standard of inquiry notice for the
source of substitute supply in City of Thornton v. Bijou IrrigationCo.8
NEW LEGAL ISSUES REGARDING EXCHANGE
THE ISSUE: WHAT QUALITY STANDARD SHOULD BE APPLIED TO
SUBSTITUTE SUPPLY IN A DECREED EXCHANGE?

The required quality of the substitute supply in a decreed exchange has yet to be determined by either statute or case law. This issue is the basis for the new battleground of exchange litigation. Recently, municipalities downstream on the South Platte River opposed

76. City and County of Denver v. City of Englewood, 826 P.2d 1266, 1272 (Colo.
1992).
77. City of Thornton v. Bijou Irrigation Co., 926 P.2d 1, 24 (Colo. 1996).
78. Dallas Creek Water Co., 933 P.2d at 38.
79. City of Englewood, 826 P.2d 1266 (Colo. 1992).
80. This decree was adjudicated pursuant to the 1943 Adjudication Act requiring a
statement of a claim rather than an application for a water right. Adjudication Act of
1943, ch. 190, § 7, 1943 Colo. Sess. Laws, 613, 618, repealed by Water Right Determination and Administration Act of 1969, COLO. REv. STAT. §§ 37-92-101 to -602 (1997).
81. City of Englewood, 826 P.2d at 1269.

82. Id at 1272.
83. Id.
84. City of Thornton v. Bijou Irrigation Co., 926 P.2d 1, 29 (Colo. 1996) (finding
that "Thornton's statements in its application and resume ... are directly analogous to
the description used by Denver .... This description was far from detailed or specific
but.., the information provided was sufficient to alert potential objectors ... ").
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applications for exchanges and plans for augmentation, 5 as well as
diligence applications for existing conditional exchanges and plans for
augmentation on quality grounds. They claimed that Colorado Revised Statutes sections 37-80-120(3) and 37-92-305(5)86 require that the
substitute supply satisfy the "senior's water quality requirements."
These municipalities interpreted sections 37-80-120(3) and 37-92305(5) to mean that all substituted water must meet the numerical
standards developed and imposed by any downstream senior. As argued by these municipalities, the senior's requirements are subject to
no external guidance or limitation, only to the creativity of the senior.
Thus, a senior could ask for substitute water far superior in quality to
the water diverted upstream by the exchanging junior or to the water
received by the senior in the absence of an exchange. Conversely, it is
the authors' position that neither section 37-80-120 nor section 37-92305(5) applies to decreed exchanges. Instead, decreed exchanges
should be adjudicated in strict compliance with the Water Right Determination and Administration Act of 19697 and in accordance with
the common law.
THE APPLICABLE LAW

Colorado Revised Statutes section 37-92-302(1) (a) states that
"[a] ny person who desires a determination of a water right or a conditional water right and the amount and priority thereof, including.., approval of a proposed or existing exchange of water under
section 37-80-120 or 37-83-104... shall file with the water clerk in
quadruplicate a verified application...."" To adjudicate the water
right, the water court must apply certain standards delineated at sections 37-92-305. The standards applicable to exchange decrees concern priority dates," application to beneficial use,90 and antispeculation constraints." There is no applicable standard regarding
the quality of substitute supply for an exchange. The quality standard
set forth in section 37-92-305(5) 91 applies only to "plans for augmenta85. City of Florence v. Bd. of Waterworks, 793 P.2d 148, 151-52 (Colo. 1990) (citing
COLO. REV. STAT. § 37-92-103(9)(1989)) (explaining that exchanges and plans for
augmentation including exchange are not necessarily the same; that an exchange is
not part of a plan for augmentation where it is not part of a "detailed program to increase the supply of water available for beneficial use in a division.").
86. COLO. REv. STAT. § 37-92-305(5) (1997) (applying only to plans for augmentation including exchange).

87. Id. §§ 37-92-101 to -602.
88.
89.
90.
91.

Id. § 37-92-305(1)(a).
Id. § 37-92-305(1), (10).
Id. § 37-92-305(9) (a).
Id. § 37-92-305(9)(b).

92. "In the case of plans for augmentation including exchange, the supplier my
take an equivalent amount of water at his point of diversion or storage if such water is
available without impairing the rights of others. Any substituted water shall be of a
quality and quantity so as to meet the requirements for which the water of the senior
appropriator has normally been used, and such substituted water shall be accepted by
the senior appropriator in substitution for water derived by the exercise of his decreed

BASIC EXCHANGE 101

Issue 2

tion including an exchange." As discussed, supra, an exchange is distinct from a plan for augmentation including exchange.93 Therefore,
the water court has no statutory standard to apply to the substitute
supply in a decreed exchange.
The only applicable case law regarding statutory quality standards
is confusing at best. In dictum, the Colorado Supreme Court recently
stated that, "[t] he court is explicitly required to consider water quality
issues only in the case of an exchange whereby water is being actively
substituted into the stream for the use of other appropriators, see, e.g.,
§ 37-80-120(3), 15 C.R.S. (1990).,94 The court did not explain why this
standard should be applied by the water court as section 37-80-120 is
found in an Article dealing solely with the responsibilities of the State
Engineer. Furthermore, the court did not explain why the legislature
chose to give the water court a specific water quality standard for substitute supply in plans for augmentation in section 37-92-305(5), but
remained silent regarding a standard for the substitute supply of exchanges. Put simply, the Colorado Supreme Court cited the wrong
statute. However, it did so only in the context of "see, e.g.," which is
not a holding. This dictum cannot be construed to apply section 3780-120(3) to all decreed exchanges. In contrast, it has long been the
common law in Colorado that a water right does not include the right
to detrimentally affect downstream users by discharging pollutants not
normally found in a stream. 95 Therefore, an alien substitute supply
may not be introduced which detrimentally affects downstream users.
The time is ripe for a judicial decision that specifically addresses
the standard to be applied to the substitute supply in a decreed exchange. There is no question that the water court must apply some
quality standard to the substitute supply; however, this standard must
be consistent with the doctrine of prior appropriation as well as existing statutes addressing water quality. The water court's primary con96
quality.
cern is limited to aspects of appropriations unrelated to water

Conversely, "water quality regulations can and must restrict or prohibit
discharges of pollutants that impair other uses of water., 97 To make
this decision, the water court must choose between an ad hoc approach and reliance on the standards promulgated by the WQCC.

rights."
93. City of Florence v. Bd. of Waterworks, 793 P.2d 148, 152 (Colo. 1990).
94. City of Thornton v. Bijou Irrigation Co., 926 P.2d 1, 91 (Colo. 1996).
95. City of Thornton, 926 P.2d at 91 (citing Suffolk Gold Mining & Milling Co. v. San
Miguel Consol. Mining & Milling Co., 48 P. 828 (Colo. Ct. App. 1897)); Wilmore v.
Chain O'Mines, Inc., 44 P.2d 1024 (Colo. 1934).

96. Id.
97.

GregoryJ. Hobbs, Jr. & Bennett W. Raley, Water Rights Protection in Water Quality

Law, 60 U. COLO. L. REV. 841, 888 (1989).
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RELIANCE ON AN AD HOC APPROACH: A RECIPE FOR DISASTER

The ad hoc approach presented by the downstream municipalities
calls for either: (1) downstream seniors to set their own substitute supply quality "requirements," which presumably could be modified on an
exchange by exchange basis; or (2) the water court to set "requirements" for each downstream senior, which must be met before an exchange could be exercised. In either scenario, downstream seniors
could, at a minimum, change their "requirements" periodically as the
upstream water user files for diligence on conditional exchange water
rights. Because courts would have no guidelines to apply, either system would be both chaotic and unconstitutional. A court would not
be required to consider history, precedent, existing standards, or even
reasonableness.
If one appropriator were allowed to enforce his own "requirements," the effect on the stream could be disastrous. For example, before allowing an exchange in a stream segment classified for both
aquatic use and municipal drinking water, the municipality might require elevated levels of chlorine to aid in treatment. However, the addition of chlorine would most likely adversely impact the aquatic life in
the stream. The protection of a stream's water quality simply cannot
be effectuated on an ad hoc basis; rather, careful consideration of the
uses of the stream as a whole must be evaluated. Figure 6 illustrates
this point:
Figure 6
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The 1871 irrigation right might have "requirements" of increased ammonia levels and decreased chlorine levels. The 1872 municipal use
right might have "requirements" of increased chlorine and decreased
benzene. These "requirements" are mutually exclusive. Therefore, if
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both these rights are in priority and diverting, only the "requirements"
of one downstream senior can be met. Presumably, the senior priority
would take precedence. Regardless, the exchange could not be operated because the "requirements" of the other senior would be unsatisfied.
The outcome of such an ad hoc system would be the impairment
of vested water rights, in derogation of the Colorado Constitution. 98
Effluent is discharged into streams on a daily basis, regardless of the
operation of exchanges. If exchanges are halted because effluent
cannot meet the arbitrary "requirements" of a downstream user, the
only possible benefit to the downstream user is dilution from upstream
sources. Therefore, it is obvious that the downstream concern is not
the quality of the substitute supply, which would be present in the
stream regardless of the exchange, but rather the lack of dilution
flows. As the authors of one article note: "No matter how it is dressed
up, the protection of the assimilative capacity of a stream for the purpose of diluting pollutants is nothing more than the allocation of a
portion of the waters of the natural stream outside the doctrine of
prior appropriation."99
The protection of these dilution flows is unconstitutional, and was
recently disapproved by the Colorado Supreme Court: "the legislative
water quality scheme is not designed to protect against quality impacts
unrelated to discharges or substitute water and specifically prohibits
the water court from imposing the protective measures necessary to
remedy depletive impacts of upstream appropriations . . . ."" The
Thornton language concerned the situation of an intervening water
user discharging into the exchange reach. In that case, the water user
incurred additional treatment costs to continue to meet its discharge
permit standards.
Unlike the Thornton case, downstream seniors are now claiming
that the quality impacts are related to substituted water that is released
to satisfy their senior water right. However, the legislative water quality
scheme referenced by the court was not intended to protect dilution
flows in any case. Rather, the legislative scheme was intended to stop
the introduction of pollutants which would not otherwise be present in
the stream. The only entity in Colorado which can legally protect an
instream flow right is the Colorado Water Conservation Board.'0 ' The
dilution flows sought by downstream seniors are simply unconstitutional.
This ad hoc system presents other issues as well. Colorado Revised
Statutes section 37-80-120(3) states that the substitute supply must
meet the requirements of use to which the senior appropriation has
normally been put. 02 Similarly, section 37-92-305(5) states that substi98. COLO. CONST. art. XVI, § 6.
99. Hobbs and Raley, supra note 97, at 892 (citation omitted).
100. City of Thornton, 926 P.2d at 93.
101. COLO. REv. STAT. § 37-92-102(3) (1997).
102. Id. § 37-80-120(3).
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tute water must be of such a quality "to meet the requirements for
which the water of the senior appropriator has normally been used." '
For purposes of determining the quality of substitute supply, what is
the senior appropriation and who is the senior appropriator? It is
logical to assume that the senior appropriation/appropriator would be
the calling right. However, the argument has been made that all senior appropriators have the right to set water quality standards for substitute supply, regardless of whether the senior is diverting at the time
of exchange.
This cannot be. Such an interpretation is contrary to a hundred
years of established Colorado water law and the constitutional requirement of maximum beneficial use of Colorado's scarce water resources.! 4 If a downstream senior is not diverting or in priority during
the operation of an exchange, it cannot be injured. Curtailment of
the exchange simply because the substitute supply does not meet the
arbitrary "requirements" of a downstream non-diverting water user
does not promote the doctrine of prior appropriation or maximum
utilization.
How does one determine the normal use of the senior appropriation? Is the normal use fixed by the original use of the water right, or
can there be a change in the use of a water fight which then becomes
the "normal use"? Is it more appropriate to fix the "normal use" on
the date the exchange is decreed, or should the "normal use" be allowed to change on a daily and yearly basis?
A downstream senior should not be allowed to force upstream users to stop their historical exchange practices because it impedes a new
water use downstream. Upstream exchange rights are junior water
rights with a vested right in the continuance of conditions existing on
the stream at the date of their appropriation. 5 Upstream exchange
rights should be entitled to the same certainty as direct flow rights.
However, equally important is the need for substitute supplies to comply with the common law and changing water quality regulations. The
ad hoc approach does not provide a solution to these concerns; it only
raises additional questions.
RELIANCE ON THE WATER QuALITY CONTROL COMMISSION STANDARDS:
THE ONLY REASONABLE METHOD OF MEETING BOTH COMMON LAW AND
STATUTORY STANDARDS

A logical, supportable solution is found in the application of water
quality standards set by the Water Quality Control Commission
("WQCC"). The WQCC sets standards to take into account the many
uses of each river or stream.0 6 Moreover, the WQCC process is not a
103. COLO. REV. STAT. § 37-92-305(5) (1997).
104.

COLO. CONST. art. XVI, § 6; In re Hines Highlands Ltd. Partnership, 929 P.2d

718, 724 (Colo. 1996).
105.

City and County of Denver v. Colorado Land & Livestock Co., 279 P. 46, 47

(Colo. 1929).
106. COLO. REv. STAT. § 25-8-203 (1997).
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static system. Permit standards change as federal regulations change
and more information becomes available regarding water uses, hazards
and treatments.' 7 By implementing WQCC standards, the water court
ensures that downstream users of all types are protected from unreasonable discharges. This system also takes into account the changing
uses of a stream. At least every three years, classifications of waters, water quality standards and control regulations are reevaluated. 08 The
public is invited to comment and expertise is offered in the area of water quality regarding the uses of a particular stream. °9 No court or
agency in the state of Colorado is better qualified to set water quality
standards than the WQCC.
The Colorado Water Quality Control Act, enacted in 1981, delegates sole authority to the WQCC and the Colorado Department of
Public Health and Environment to protect the quality of Colorado's
waters by developing and maintaining a comprehensive program for
prevention, control and abatement of water pollution and for water
quality protection."' The General Assembly designated the WQCC to
implement the federal Clean Water Act."' Under this comprehensive
program of water quality protection, the WQCC classifies state waters
and establishes water quality standards for stream segments (based in
part on present and future beneficial uses of the stream),"2 and also
establishes standards and issues permits for discharges into streams!
The WQCC is solely responsible for these functions." 4 Water quality
standards adopted by the WQCC are designed to protect the competing uses of surface water" 5 and result from a lengthy public process6
which provides significant rights to the interested public for input,
and for judicial review. " ' The WQCC's water quality
standards are
8
promulgated pursuant to the state's police powers."
In establishing this comprehensive program, the General Assembly
was very explicit in ensuring that the exercise of water rights under the
state's appropriation system would not be adversely affected:
No provision of this article shall be interpreted so as to supersede, abrogate, or impair rights to divert water and apply water to beneficial
uses in accordance with the provisions of sections 5 and 6 of article
XVI of the [state constitution]... or the provisions of articles 80 to 93
of title 37, C. R. S ....
Nothing in this article shall be construed, en107. COLO. REv. STAT. § 25-8-204 (1997).
108. Id. § 25-8-202(f).
109. Id. §§ 25-8-202(3),-502(3),-503(8).

110. Id. §§ 25-8-202,-301.
111.
112.
113.
114.

Id. § 25-8-202(6).
Id. §§ 25-8-203(2) (c), -204(4) (f).
Id. § 25-8-205.
Id. § 25-8-202(7) (a).

115.

Id. § 25-8-203(2) (e).

116.
117.
118.

Id. § 25-8-402.
Id. § 25-8-404.
Melinda Kassen, The Burden of Maintaining Colorado's Water Quality, 18 COLO.

LAw. 23, 24 (1989).
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forced, or applied so as to cause or result in material injury to water
rights. ' 9

As the Supreme Court has said:
The legislature's primary emphasis in enacting this scheme is to
maximize beneficial use and to minimize barriers to further beneficial appropriation. The result of this policy decision is essentially to
focus water quality regulation on uses culminating in unreasonabledischarges, as such discharges
120
g are not part of any appropriative right under common law.
Thus, in protecting water quality, the General Assembly struck a careful balance so as to protect water rights as well.
In the absence of a specific statutory water quality standard for exchanges, the water court should apply the appropriate standards
adopted by the WQCC. In the case of effluent used as substitute supply, discharge permit requirements should apply. It is the function of
the WQCC to set standards pursuant to Colorado Revised Statutes sections 25-8-101 to 25-8-705. and the function of the water court to apply those standards. If effluent satisfies its discharge permit standards,
it satisfies the common law requirement regarding water quality.
CONCLUSION
An exchange is a tool used to achieve the maximum beneficial use
of water. Exchanges work only because they fit within the doctrine of
prior appropriation. Although a junior is allowed to divert out of priority, the calling senior must be satisfied so there is no injury to the
senior's water right. If a calling senior will not receive his allotted appropriation due to the exchange, the exchange cannot be operated.
Exchanges have been operated in the same manner for over a
hundred years: an upstream water user diverts under its junior priority
and then replaces the diverted water with a substitute supply at some
point upstream of the senior's place of diversion. Until recently, that
operation has gone unchallenged.
The latest legal issue regarding exchanges has the potential to
change the nature of an exchange water right, or even stop the operation of exchanges altogether. If the substitute supply must meet the
arbitrary "requirements" of every downstream senior to the exchange
right, it is likely that most exchanges will become inoperable. Mutually

119. COLO. REv. STAT. § 25-8-104(1) (1997).
120. City of Thornton v. Bijou Irrigation Co., 926 P.2d 1, 92 (Colo. 1996) (emphasis
added).
121. The Colorado Water Control Commission did, in fact, promulgate standards
for the South Platte River. See AMAX, Inc. v. Colorado Water Quality Control
Comm'n, 790 P.2d 879 (Colo. Ct. App. 1989) (upholding standards for the South
Platte River).
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227

exclusive or outrageously onerous requirements could bring all exchanges in Colorado to a halt and improperly provide dilution flows.
Such an interpretation of the Colorado statutes directly contradicts the
doctrines of prior appropriation and maximum beneficial use. Instead, water quality regulations must be read such that they are consistent with the tenets of the prior appropriation doctrine and the Constitution of Colorado.

DELPHUS EMORY CARPENTER AND THE
COLORADO RIVER COMPACT OF 1922*
DANIEL TYLER

P re fa ce ............................................................
228
Form ulating an Idea ..............................................................................
229
The Constitutional and Legal Basis ......................................................
232
The Ingredients of an Effective Compact ........................................... 236
The Washington M eetings ....................................................................
240
The Fifty-Fifty Idea ..............................................................................
243
Transmountain Diversion and River Flow Data .................................. 247
Upper Basin Obligations and Needs ....................................................
250
Th e P ower Issue ....................................................................................
256
The R atification Issue ...........................................................................
258
The M eaning and Intent .......................................................................
265
C on clu sion .............................................................................................
27 3
PREFACE

Delphus E. Carpenter was the intellectual architect of the Colorado River Compact. However, Carpenter's role in determining the
outcome of the Compact negotiations has never been fully revealed. It
was always accepted that Carpenter and Secretary of Commerce Herbert Hoover, Chairman of the Colorado River Compact Commission,
played leading roles during discussions in Washington and Santa Fe,

This paper was prepared as a final report to the Colorado Water Conservation
Board under a grant to research the life of Delphus E. Carpenter.
Daniel Tyler has been a professor at Colorado State University (CSU)
for
twenty-eight years. Professor Tyler's interest in water law and water project development began with his testimony at a trial involving Pueblo Indian rights. Thereafter,
Professor Tyler participated in litigation involving the Pecos River, the San Luis Valley,
and the City of Taos. Between 1987 and 1992 he wrote the history of the ColoradoBig Thompson Project, entitled The Last Water Hole in the West. Professor Tyler
currently teaches a class at CSU on the role of water in the development of the
American West, and is preparing a biography on the life of Delphus E. Carpenter.
The author is most indebted to Gregory Silkensen for his research in the archives, libraries, government agencies, and historical societies of Colorado River Basin
states that signed the Colorado River Compact.
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but it was only recently that Carpenter's contributions to the concept
of interstate stream compacts could be traced. Carpenter was in fact a
prolific writer who preserved copies of his writings. Moreover, he preserved the papers he received from others, including correspondence,
reports, diaries, and memoranda. When the Colorado Water Conservation Board and the Colorado Water Resources and Research Institute made it possible to evaluate these papers, Carpenter's enormous
influence on the Compact came to light.
The following is an attempt to identify Carpenter's singular contributions to the formation, ratification and interpretation of the Colorado River Compact. It is not a history of the Compact's formation,
but rather an attempt to view the making and interpretation of this
document through the eyes of Carpenter himself. Many people contributed to the success of the negotiations, but Carpenter was almost
always the purveyor of ideas, legal explanations, and compromise solutions. The objective of this paper is to describe his thoughts through
the many interchanges he had with others involved in the process.
FORMULATING AN IDEA
The Colorado River Compace ("Compact"), signed in Santa Fe,
New Mexico on November 24, 1922, and approved by Congress in the
Boulder Canyon Project Act of 1928, 3 was created by a commission

1. Most of the information in this paper is based on a collection of materials
known as the Delphus Carpenter Papers on loan to the Northern Water Colorado Water Conservancy District [hereinafter Carpenter Papers, NCWCD]. The collection is
composed of eight-five boxes of records that were preserved and maintained by the
Carpenter family in Greeley, Colorado until 1992 when a flooded basement at the
Carpenter home resulted in their request for assistance from the Northern Colorado
Water Conservancy District. District employees went to the Carpenter home and
carted off the correspondence, official documents, government reports, litigation records, minutes of meetings, newspapers, diaries, journals, pictures, and family memorabilia which Delphus Carpenter's son, Donald, has been organizing since his father's
death in 1951. There was some water damage, but most of the material was saved. Archivists at the District, assisted by Colorado State University Professor James Hansen
and two of his graduate students, prepared a preliminary finding aid for the collection. The Carpenter Papers were locked in a vault under controlled temperature and
humidity conditions. Professor Tyler obtained the exclusive right from the Carpenter
family to review the contents of the collection at the District for the purpose of preparing a biography of Delphus E. Carpenter. As of May, 1998, the collection has been
appraised by the Colorado Historical Society, but no decisions have been made in regard to the future disposition of these materials.
It should also be noted that Donald Carpenter donated some of his father's
documents to the Hoover Presidential Library in West Branch, Iowa [hereinafter Carpenter Papers, Hoover Library]. Most of what was given to the Hoover Library deals
with the Colorado River Compact. When Professor Norris Hundley, Jr. wrote Water
and the West, he had access to these materials. Although Professor Tyler also made use
of these documents, the great majority of source material used in this paper is from
the Carpenter Papers still protected at the Northern Colorado Water Conservancy District in Loveland, Colorado.
2. COLO. REv. STAT. § 37-61-101 (1997).
3. Boulder Canyon Project Act of 1928, 43 U.S.C. § 617 (1994).
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made up of representatives from the seven Colorado River basin states
under the chairmanship of Secretary of Commerce, Herbert Hoover.
Hoover represented the interests of the United States. The final
document reflected the opinions of many people. Each commissioner
employed the services of attorneys, engineers and hydrologists. Attending sessions at Bishop's Lodge in Santa Fe were volunteers from
many interested organizations, along with employees of the United
States Reclamation Service ("USRS"), soon to be called the Bureau of
Reclamation ("USBR"). Most of the seven states were represented by
their governors at one time or another. Some had just been elected,
others were lame ducks. Prior to the Santa Fe meeting, public hearings had been held at Phoenix, Los Angeles, Salt Lake City, Grand
Junction, Denver, and Cheyenne. At these meetings, commissioners
exposed their plans to the general populace, which in turn responded
with penetrating questions that revealed local concerns, prejudices,
and opinions. The signed Compact was a distillation of all these views.
Nevertheless, the direction, focus, energy, and principal ideas of
the commissioners came primarily from the leadership of Delphus E.
Carpenter, a Colorado interstate streams commissioner since 1913.
Carpenter was appointed his state's representative on the Colorado
River Compact Commission in 1921. In that same year, he was also
named Colorado's official representative on interstate commissions involving the South Platte, Arkansas, La Plata, and Laramie rivers. In
subsequent years he participated in compact discussions on the North
Platte, Little Snake, and Rio Grande rivers.
Carpenter's qualifications for the post of interstate streams commissioner date from a 1912 association with RoyceJ. Tipton, a civil engineer who was at that time preparing maps, surveys and hydrologic
studies of the San Luis Valley in connection with New Mexico's claim
to prior appropriation on the La Plata and Rio Grande rivers. 4 In that
year, Carpenter wrote to Senator Carl Hayden of Arizona, suggesting
"the settlement of interstate water controversies by the exercise of
the
treaty making powers of the states."' Having been selected in 1911 as
directing counsel for Colorado in Wyoming v. Colorado,6 Carpenter had
begun to search for a settlement with Wyoming that would produce a
negotiated agreement without litigation. Although he still hoped to
prove that Colorado had an absolute property right to the water originating within its borders, Carpenter began formulating an interstate
compact theory as he prepared his briefs for the United States Su-

4. Testimony by RoyceJ. Tipton, 1933 (transcript, on file in the Carpenter Papers,

NCWCD, supra note 1, Box 43, folder 3).

It is not clear for what purpose this testi-

mony was given, but Tipton notes that, in addition to his work in the San Luis Valley in
1912 and 1913, the report he later prepared on the Colorado River "was used by Colorado as a basis for [Clompact negotiations by the four upper Colorado basin states."
Id. at 2.
5. Letter from Delphus E. Carpenter to Senator Carl Hayden (Aug. 8, 1923) (on
file in the Carpenter Papers, NCWCD, supra note 1, Box 44, folder 6.2).

6. Wyomingv. Colorado, 259 U.S. 419 (1922).
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preme Court.7 He was opposed to interstate litigation. Negotiation
among equals, he believed, would be far more productive, durable and
cost effective.
Elected Colorado's first native-born state senator in 1908, Carpenter also developed the political instincts that served him so well in the
negotiation process. A Weld County rancher and attorney with considerable experience in irrigation litigation, he understood the complexities of water use and delivery, the business end of water development and the intricacies of the prior appropriation doctrine.
Recognized in 1911 as the "accredited Republican leader of the senate"" and a major force on the committee on agriculture and irrigation, he was asked by the Democratic leadership to chair a special
committee on irrigation investigations, "particularly in relation to interstate streams."9 Colorado had become acutely concerned about the
future of its interstate water rights following the Supreme Court decision in Kansas v. Colorado.10
After a year's work in the field, Carpenter prepared a report that
he delivered to the 18th Colorado State Assembly on December 31,
1911. It emphasized the need to preserve the prior appropriation doctrine and to reject any legislation attempting to place Colorado's waters under state control. It argued that a state water plan would "increase litigation and.., impair the stability of vested rights."'" It urged
the State Assembly to provide a "liberal appropriation of public funds,"
to resist attacks by the federal government, and to create a defense
fund sufficient to thwart the Reclamation Service's attempts to acquire
control over the state's water. In conclusion, Carpenter noted that
[t]oo serious consideration cannot be given this most important
topic. Too positive a position can hardly be taken. The motto 'millions for defense and not one cent for tribute' may well be borne
constantly in mind. Our position on the crest of the continent not
only invites attack but compels constant vigilance coupled with readiness to respond to any and all attacks. Every facility should be pro-2
vided for constant preparation and immediate action upon our part.
Although Carpenter seemed to have on occasion a siege mentality exacerbated by occasional paranoia regarding the federal government,
7. M.C. Hinderlider and R.I. Meeker, Interstate Water Problems and Their Solution (1925) (on file in the Carpenter Papers, NCWCD, supra note 1, Box 52, folder
12). State Engineer Hinderlider and Consulting Engineer Meeker presented this paper to the American Society of Civil Engineers in Salt Lake City, Utah on July 9, 1925.
The authors indicated that Carpenter's interstate treaty ideas had been "in process of
development since 1911" when he began work on the Wyoming case.
8. Delphus E. Carpenter, Autobiography (unpublished manuscript, on file in the
Carpenter Papers, NCWCD, supra note 1, Box 78, Clippings Envelope).
9. Id.
10. Kansas v. Colorado, 206 U.S. 46 (1907).

11. DELPHUS E. CARPENTER, REPORT OF COMMITTEE ON IRRIGATION INVESTIGATIONS OF
THE SENATE, S.R. NO. 16 (17th Colo. Gen. Assembly).
12.

Id.
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his goal was to preserve Colorado's sovereign right to its water. Simultaneously, he worked with the State's neighbors to negotiate acceptable agreements out of court. In the years followiAg his appointment
as Interstate Streams Commissioner, Carpenter worked on the Wyoming litigation writing the major portion of the 1916 brief and Volume
I of the 1917 brief. He presented these to the United States Supreme
Court and delivered part of the oral argument. In 1916, he also began
negotiations with Nebraska which led to the South Platte River Compact, 3 signed on April 27, 1923. It was during this period (1912 to
1923), both before and after he became engaged in Colorado River
Compact negotiations, that Carpenter perfected his theories regarding
interstate compacts.
THE CONSTITUTIONAL AND LEGAL BASIS
In a 1921 speech to the Colorado Bar Association, Carpenter noted
that the states of the United States
have been prone to forget that principles of international law apply to
interstate relations and [they] have rushed into war, through its substitute by suit in the Supreme Court, without first seeking to exercise
their inherent right and duty of friendly settlements through dlomatic channels by interstate treaties ...agreements or compacts.
Carpenter argued that because all the states entered the Union on
equal footing and because their powers of sovereignty were limited
only by what had been delegated to the federal government (pursuant
to the 10th Amendment), these states have the right under Article 1,
Section 10, Paragraph 3 of the Constitution to enter into agreements
or compacts with each other provided that they obtain the consent of
Congress. This is one of the powers specifically reserved to the states.
Citing the Court's opinion in Virginia v. Tennessee,"' Carpenter noted
that congressional consent could be obtained either before or after
compact negotiations "on any subject matter authorized by Congress."' 6 The governors of interested states, "pursuant to authority previously conferred by legislative acts" in the states, would appoint commissioners for a joint commission themselves.17 Seeking congressional
approval first, then having a joint commission draw up a compact for
the states to ratify, and then obtaining congressional approval of the
compact was, for Carpenter, the preferred modus operandi.
13. COLO. REV. STAT. § 37-65-101 (1997).
14. Delphus E. Carpenter, Application of the Reserve Treaty Powers of the States to
Interstate Water Controversies, Address Before the Colorado Bar Association (1921),
in COLO. BAR Assoc., vol. 24, 1921. This speech can also be found in COLO. WATER
CONSERVATION BD., INTERSTATE COMPAcTs, vol. I, 1946, at 111-40. Unless otherwise
noted, the ideas presented in this segment of the paper are based on this speech.
15. Virginia v. Tennessee, 148 U.S. 503, 517-28 (1892).
16. Carpenter, supra note 14.
17. Id.
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Carpenter's arguments in support of the constitutionality of interstate compacts focused on the preservation of state sovereignty. His
reasoning resulted not only from the training he received as an attorney and his interest in constitutional history, but from his frustrating
experiences with Royce Tipton in the San Luis Valley. Colorado's legitimate irrigation projects along the Rio Grande were prohibited because of the federal government's concern about meeting treaty obligations with Mexico.
In 1896, the United States and Mexico began discussions respecting the use of water of the Rio Grande at El Paso. As a result of these
conversations, the Secretary of State recommended that the Secretary
of the Interior "suspend operation of the act of 1891 known as 'the
right-of-way act,' under which easements must be secured for the
construction of irrigation works over public lands. . .. "s In harmony

with this recommendation, the Secretary of the Interior entered what
was known as 'the embargo order' whereby the Commissioner General
of the Land Office was directed to approve no more filings under the
act of 1891 until further orders. 9 As Carpenter noted in hearings before the United States Senate in 1925, "[t]he effect of that order was
just as though an army had been placed in that territory to prevent
construction activities. No building was allowed."" Following a treaty
with Mexico in 1906, the order was modified to allow reservoir construction, but all projects commenced after 1903 remained embargoed. In its "bureaucratic spirit of super caution," Carpenter concluded, the Department of the Interior declined to lift the embargo
until 1925, even though "scientific investigations" and "engineering
studies" showed that the waters of the Rio Grande were ample to supply the needs of both the United States and Mexico and that, indeed,
21
surplus water was flowing to the Gulf of Mexico.
According to Carpenter, the net effect of this policy was to severely
retard development in the San Luis Valley. Colorado, the headwaters
state of the Rio Grande, was deprived of its constitutional right to reclaim lands and develop economically. Not only was confidence in the
United States government impaired, but the "comity [courtesy] existing between the states [New Mexico and Colorado] in their common
cause for the welfare of the [R]epublic" was disturbed by Interior's
embargo policy.22

The spirit of cooperation was abrogated by the

heavy-handed tactics of the Reclamation Service.
Similarly, Carpenter noted, the Department of the Interior's 1908
construction of Pathfinder Reservoir on the North Platte River in

18. Hearings on S.R. 320 Before the Comm. on Irrigation and Reclamation, 69th Cong.
311-21, 655-712 (1925).
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Delphus Carpenter, Report (undated manuscript, on file in the Colorado State
Archives, Denver, Colorado, Colorado River Commission, Department of Natural Resources, RCC #20559, folder #10).
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Wyoming was effected prior to accomplishing any kind of water use
agreement between the two states sharing that river. In his view, the
reservoir "created a monopolistic appropriation of the river and [was]
in the hands of a power beyond the jurisdiction of either state ....
The rights of Colorado were ignored. Funds were expended, structures were built and Colorado faced a servitude on the North Platte
against its will for the benefit of Wyoming and without recourse
through its sovereign right of eminent domain.
For Carpenter, the lesson was obvious:
[B]efore any great works are constructed with Government funds on
certain of our western rivers, for generation of power or the reclamation of arid lands, compacts respecting jurisdiction and use of the waters of the river should first be made between the United States and
the [i]nterested [s]tate or [s]tates ' -

While time would be required to formulate compacts, Carpenter believed that settlement of the respective rights of the states prior to the
commencement of government construction would encourage private
development and assure the states of continued control of their own
waters.
When rivers such as the Colorado or the Rio Grande were international in nature, Carpenter believed that additional considerations for
compact negotiation were necessary, but the framework for settling
disputes was similar to the relationship between sovereign states. International problems on rivers were usually addressed first by the nations' ambassadors. Lacking success, the nations went to war. Interstate problems could be addressed by commissioners. If they failed, or
if the states preferred a fight, they would have to engage in the equivalent of war by entering a suit in the Supreme Court.
Carpenter's studies of case law26 convinced him that international
precedents would help justify the argument for interstate compacts.
The authority he most frequently cited was the 1895 opinion of Attorney General Judson Harmon "respecting the claims of the Republic of
Mexico to a preferred right, by prior appropriation, to the uses of the

23. Letter from Delphus E. Carpenter to Charles E. Winter (May 14, 1927) (on file
in the Carpenter Papers, Hoover Library, supra note 1).
24. In 1934, the Wyoming State Engineer stated that even though Pathfinder was
accorded a 1904 priority, "water rights on the North Platte River, above Pathfinder,

have been permitted to use water with no regard for the priority claim of Pathfinder."

See mimeographed bulleting signed by Edwin W. Burritt, Wyoming State Engineer,
Oct. 9, 1934 (on file in the Carpenter Papers, NCWCD, supra note 1, Box 53, folder
10).

25. Letter, supra note 23.
26. For a look at Carpenter's review of case law, see Memorandum Brief Submitted in
Behalf of Federal Legislation to Authorize the Colorado River Compact: Hearings in re H.R.

6821 Before the House Judiciay Comm., 67th Cong. (1921) (brief written by Delphus E.
Carpenter, COLO. WATER CONSERVATION BD., INTERSTATE COMPACTS, vol. II, 1946, at 1-

10.)
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water of the Rio Grande River."27 Harmon argued that "a claim of international servitude upon a stream by a lower nation upon the principle of a preferred right to the use of the water ... need not be respected by the upper nation.... 8 The upper nation could legally
develop its territory and make all needful use of the waters emanating
from within its boundaries irrespective of any claims from the lower
nation. The upper nation did not have to yield any of its water until
such time as it saw fit to make some concession by treaty, and then "as
a matter of policy and not of international law."2 However, in his conclusion Harmon left open the possibility of a sharing agreement by
of comity."90
means of a treaty with Mexico based on the "consideration
It was this consideration of comity that Carpenter applied to Colorado's situation as a headwaters state, constantly under attack in the
courts by downstream states. For him, an interstate compact was the
equivalent of an international treaty which would avoid the pain and
discomfort of a long drawn out "war" in the Supreme Court. While
Colorado and the other sovereign states in the upper basin of the
Colorado River had every legal right to unlimited use of the water
emanating from within each states' territory, the consideration of comity would free Colorado from litigation with its neighbors by providing
these neighbors with an equitable distribution of water permanently
apportioned in an interstate compact. Just as the principle of proprietary ownership by upper basin states or nations needed to be replaced
by the principle of comity, so, too, the doctrines of prior appropriation
and foreign servitudes by lower basin states or nations had to be replaced by the principle of equitable apportionment.
Equitable apportionment, as Carpenter understood it, was not a
legally precise method of water distribution. Rather, it was a general
policy of cooperation and compromise designed to avoid costly litigation and to establish harmony between two or more sovereign states. A
compact on the Colorado River based on equitable apportionment
would have to assure the lower basin states some benefits from the
stream "while at the same time preserving to the [s] tate or [s] tates of
origin, in so far as possible, their sovereign rights of use and consumption, according to their future conditions and necessities, and the exercise of eminent domain within their respective territories free from
servitudes beyond their control."3' A student of the 1907 Kansas v.
3 2 decision, Carpenter affirmed the views of Justice David J.
Colorado
Brewer that either the Supreme Court or a compact commission would
have to make an "equitable apportionment of the benefits be-

27. 21 Op. Att'ys Gen. 274, 280-83 (1895) (quoted in Carpenter, supra note 26, at
124-26).
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32.

Kansas v. Colorado, 206 U.S. 46, 117 (1907).

Volume I

WATER LAW REVIEW

tween ... states resulting from the flow of the river.
Such a determination would have to be based on a consideration of all the facts
and not just past or present uses by citizens "whose rights at most are
merely usufructuary and temporary and must always yield to the superior and sovereign power of the [s]tates to adapt the uses or consumption of the waters to future conditions and necessities. 3 4 In Carpenter's scheme of things, an interstate compact commission would be in
a "better position to arrive at an 'equitable- apportionment of the benefits between... states from the flow of the river' than would 'any court
however constituted.'5

THE INGREDIENTS OF AN EFFECTIVE COMPACT
Carpenter was not the originator of interstate compacts. States
had been settling various grievances in this manner since the eighteenth century. However, he was the first to fully develop the concept
of compacts on interstate river systems, and when he was publicly credited with this contribution to constitutional law, he did feel appreciated.36 Writing to Herbert Hoover in 1934, he stated that he had advanced his compact views to representatives of the League of the
Southwest in a 1920 Denver meeting as a way "to protect and preserve
the autonomy of the [s] tates and to open the way to orderly construction of the [Colorado River] project...."37 As legal advisor for Colorado Governor Oliver H. Shoup on the League's Resolutions Committee, whose full support for Carpenter was shared by New Mexico's
State Engineer, L. A. Gilette, he introduced his compact plan as a solution to the impasse at which the League had arrived in its discussions
on the need for flood control on the lower Colorado River. His ideas
were accepted, included in the report of the Committee to the full
body of the League, and approved without debate. However, even the
newspapers covering the Denver meeting failed to note the significance of Carpenter's pioneering suggestion.
In addition to the reasons he gave Hoover, Carpenter believed that
a compact on the Colorado River was necessary because the federal

33.
34.
35.
36.

Id.
Id.
Id.
In a diary entry for May 15, 1923, Carpenter wrote "Director Arthur P. Davis

[Reclamation Service] and Assistant Secretary [Stephen B.] Davis were both there [a
banquet sponsored by the Denver Civic and Commercial Association] -

gave me full

credit for originating river compact plan." On file in the Carpenter Papers, NCWCD,
supra note 1, Box 78, Diaries. Several months earlier he was praised by Colorado's
Governor Oliver H. Shoup for "his pioneer suggestion of the application of the treaty
powers of the states to the solution of interstate river problems ....

" Governor Oliver

H. Shoup, Address to the 24th General Assembly of the State of Colorado (Jan. 5,
1923) (transcript, on file in the Carpenter Papers, NCWCD, supra note 1, Box 5, folder
6).
37. Letter from Delphus E. Carpenter to Herbert Hoover (Jan. 5, 1934) (on file in
the Carpenter Papers, NCWCD, Box 79, supra note 1, Hoover Letters).
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government was persisting in its claim to the unappropriated waters of
non-navigable streams in the western states. Not only was such an objective contrary to the constitutional guarantee of state sovereignty, but
if carried into effect, "it would generally weaken the strength of each
state and thereby effectively undermine the foundations of our Federal
structure., 38 A compact, on the other hand, would encourage unanimity of support for federal reclamation by the states and would "promote the recognition of the sovereignty of each state, thereby
...the several units which compose the national
[strengthening]
39
structure.
A compact would also provide protection to basin-of-origin states,
such as Colorado, Utah, Wyoming and New Mexico. Although Justice
Van Devanter's opinion in Wyoming v. Colorado" was subject to differing
interpretations, there were those who were convinced that the rule of
priority would now prevail on interstate streams where two states followed the same legal system of water rights adjudication. But even before the Van Devanter decision, Carpenter feared that if the lower basin states (Arizona, California and Nevada) managed to utilize
additional water from the Colorado River as a result of works built by
the federal government, they would try to claim a legal priority, effectively forcing a servitude on the Upper Basin that would require a certain quantity of water delivered annually from the source to the faster
growing states in the south. Without a compact to protect their right
to develop at a pace consistent with their own needs, the upper basin
states could grow only at the mercy of the Lower Basin. This possibility
stuck in Carpenter's craw. It conflicted with his deeply rooted belief
that the states had entered the Union on equal footing. The Upper
Basin's right to equality required protection and a compact was the
only way to achieve this security.
Protection of basin-of-origin states had to include both present
and future needs. Carpenter was as vocal on this issue in regard to the
Arkansas, La Plata, and South Platte rivers as he was in regard to the
Colorado River.4 ' A compact would prevent a free-for-all race to see
who could develop the fastest because it would assure each participant
state that its rights were permanently protected no matter how long it
might take to get its economic engines running efficiently.
In sum, Carpenter was convinced that a compact would preserve
state sovereignty, allow for healthy growth, encourage private devel38. Letter from Delphus E. Carpenter to F.H. Newell (Aug. 2, 1923) (on file in the
Carpenter Papers, NCWCD, supra note 1, Box 1, folder 21).
39. Id.
40. Wyoming v. Colorado, 259 U.S. 419 (1922).
41. See, e.g., Letter from Delphus E. Carpenter to Oliver H. Shoup, Governor of
Colorado (August 12, 1921) (on file in the Colorado State Archives, Colorado Governor Appointments and Applications, RCC #8801); In Re the La Plata River Compact:
Hearings in re H.R. 6821 Before the HouseJudiciary Comm., 67th Cong. (1921) (report of
Delphus E. Carpenter, on file in the Carpenter Papers, NCWCD, supra note 1, Box
37). For the South Platte, see Daniel Tyler, Delph E. Carpenter: Father of Interstate Water
Compacts, The Evolution of an Innovative Concept, 1 COLORADO HIsToRY 87 (1997).
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opment of both diversion works and irrigation projects, avoid costly
litigation, assure the supremacy of equitable apportionment instead of
prior appropriation across state lines, eliminate future embargoes by
the Reclamation Service, and settle title to water rights on the river before the construction of dams and reservoirs. Underlying Carpenter's
sanguine outlook was his belief that there was sufficient water in the
Colorado River for the needs of all seven states and Mexico. Even so,
he recognized that entering into a compact was a delicate process
which could only be accomplished with the greatest of tact, patience,
and diplomacy. Unless the steps taken by compact participants were
precise and articulated with ample forethought, compact negotiations
would probably fail.
Following congressional consent, and after organization of a compact commission, it was essential to have accurate and sufficient hydrographic data on river flow; facts that would have to be acquired
"through systematic study covering several years. 42 Through their own
hands-on recognizance, commissioners would also have to be familiar
with the physical nature of the river, the agricultural possibilities of
surrounding lands, and future reclamation possibilities.43 Once this
information was available, commissioners could meet under certain
guidelines: (1) their verbal agreements should be tentative and not finalized until the entire compact was readied for acceptance; (2) suggestions made by each and every participant should be carefully considered and should be taken under advisement for deliberation at
subsequent meetings so as to avoid polarization and conflict; (3) each
part of the compact should be evaluated in terms of the whole compact; (4) negotiation should not take place under the pressure of time
constraints and participants should feel free to deliberate extensively
in order to convert complex concepts into simple language; and (5)
the focus of discussion should be on major points, such as water allocation and construction of works, leaving details to those in charge of the
compact's final phrasing. 4
Carpenter's extensive studies and experience on many compact
commissions led him to frequently reiterate that compacts were
agreements between states, not between individual appropriators. Individual water rights already vested might be subject to modification by
the authority of the state signing such a document.4' He urged com42. Letter from Delphus E. Carpenter to George E. Baker, North Dakota Assistant
State Engineer (Jan. 23, 1923) (on file in the Carpenter Papers, Hoover Library, supra
note 1, Colorado River Commission Correspondence).
43. Id.
44. Delphus E. Carpenter, Suggestions (on file in the Carpenter Papers, Hoover
Library, supra note 1, North Platte River Compact, Correspondence). This undated
document was in mimeograph form and written out in anticipation of a compact
commission being formed for the North Platte River.
45. Writing to Ray Lyman Wilbur, Acting Chairman of the Federal Power Commission in 1930, Carpenter stated, "the rights of a permittee or licensee to the use of water can be no greater than the rights of the state in which his project is located and the
rights of his state, with respect to those of other states, always are subject to future
definition by interstate compact or by decision of the Supreme Court in a case be-
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missioners to draw up compacts which would be self-executing so as to
prevent the need for an enforcement authority. 46 To succeed in this
goal, he recommended that their discussion groups remain small and
intimate. Commissioners should not allow "speechfests" and they
should meet in executive session to avoid the danger of misinforma47
tion and hyperbole appearing in poorly researched press accounts.
In 1929, when Carpenter was working on a compact for the four
upper basin states, he urged commissioners to take the time for public
hearings before meeting to discuss specific issues.48 As with the 1922
Colorado River experience, he believed that hearings were necessary
to avoid the potential for well-orchestrated criticism when compacts
were presented to state legislatures for ratification. In reality, he argued, a compact was at best an offer to the legislatures of interested
states. 9 Legislatures ratified what interstate commissions proposed. If
parties signing a compact felt they had been treated with equal dignity,
not coercion, if they were convinced that no state gained an advantage
in negotiations, and if the public had sufficient opportunity to make
suggestions during negotiations, the legislatures could proceed with
the assurance that the commission had done its job.
For Carpenter, the process was similar to protocols associated with
drawing up an international treaty. The same caution and deliberation were required. Commissioners also needed to remember that
without proper state leadership, federal bureaucrats could easily take
over negotiations. ° Of course, if an effective compact were to result, it
would still have to be satisfactory to the various federal agencies. All
United States treaty obligations had to be respected, as well as the superior jurisdiction of Congress over navigation if navigable rivers were
involved. Additionally, the final document should be capable of being
understood by lay people. Finally, "[i] t should be definite, certain and
manifestly just in all its provisions and so appealing in its simplicity as
to meet the understanding and to receive the approval of fair minded
critics."'" As such, a compact would become the law of the river.
tween the interested states." Letter from Delphus E. Carpenter to Ray Lyman Wilbur,
Acting Chairman of the Federal Power Commission (July 19, 1930) (on file in the Wilson Papers, New Mexico State Archives, Santa Fe, New Mexico [hereinafter Wilson Papers]).
46. Letter from Delphus E. Carpenter to S.G. Hopkins, Commissioner from Wyoming, and R.H. Willis, Commissioner from Nebraska (Jan. 25, 1927) (this letter accompanied a draft compact for the North Platte River, on file in the Carpenter Papers,
NCWCD, supra note 1, Box 81, folder 4).
47. Letter from Delphus E. Carpenter to George H. Dern, Governor of Utah (Aug.
8, 1929) (on file in the Dern Papers, Utah State Archives, Salt Lake City, Utah [hereinafter Dern Papers]).
48. Letter from Delphus E. Carpenter to Francis C. Wilson, Commissioner from
New Mexico (July 15, 1929) (on file in the Wilson Papers, supra note 45).
49. See Delphus E. Carpenter's notes on the first meeting of Rio Grande Compact
Commission held at the Broadmoor Hotel, Colorado Springs, Colo. (Oct. 26, 1924)
(on file in the Carpenter Papers, NCWCD, supra note 1, Box 29).
50. Letter from Delphus E. Carpenter to Francis C. Wilson, Commissioner from
New Mexico (Sept. 20, 1932) (on file in the Wilson Papers, supra note 45).
51. Delphus E. Carpenter, The Proposals (an undated typescript copy of his sug-
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THE WASHINGTON MEETINGS

When Carpenter represented Colorado Governor Oliver Shoup on
the Resolutions Committee at the League of the' Southwest's 1920
meeting in Denver, he carried a request from the governor to "formulate some method by which the rights of the states of origin of the
[Colorado] river could be protected in their future development without interfering with the early construction of the large reservoirs on
the lower river., 2 The urgent need for flood control in the Lower Basin was matched by a desire for protection in the Upper Basin. A
stalemate had developed amongst League members. Carpenter saw a
window of opportunity that inspired him to suggest a solution with
which he had already been working as Colorado's Interstate Streams
Commissioner on the South Platte and La Plata rivers. As finally accepted by League members, this resolution stated:
Resolved, That it is the sense of this conference that the present and
future rights of the several States whose territory is in whole or in part
included within the drainage area of the Colorado River, and the
rights of the United States, to the use and benefit of the waters of said
stream and its tributaries, should be settled and determined by compact or agreement between said States and the United States, with
consent of Congress, and that the legislatures of said States be requested to authorize the appointment of commissioners for each of
said States for the purpose of entering into such compact or agreement for subsequent ratification and approval by the legislatures
of
3
each [of] said States and the Congress of the United States.5
Carpenter did not design this plan without previous experience. Since
1916, he had been working on an interstate compact plan with Nebraska for the South Platte River. Even before that, "he had repeatedly
suggested the treaty method of settlement of interstate water rights
only to meet skepticism, indifference, failure of comprehension, and
open ridicule., 54 After the South Platte River Compact was signed in
1923, he recalled that "the application of the treaty powers of the states
[to interstate streams] was first begun on the South Platte River. .. ."
The Colorado River treaty," he added, "[was] a subsequent under55
standing growing out of the preliminary work upon the South Platte.
gestions for a Rio Grande Compact, on file in the Carpenter Papers, NCWCD, supra
note 1, Box 26).
52. Delphus E. Carpenter, Historical Sketch of the Colorado River Commission
(undated typescript copy, on file in the Carpenter Papers, NCWCD, supra note 1, Box
51, brown folder).
53. Delphus E. Carpenter, History of Proceedings By Colorado River States Leading to Interstate Compact Negotiations, Appendix (typescript essay, on file in the Carpenter Papers, NCWCD, supra note 1, Box 51, brown folder).
54. Delphus E. Carpenter, The Colorado River Compact: Sketch of Events and
Causes Leading to Creation of the Colorado River Compact Commission (typescript
paper, on file in the Carpenter Papers, NCWCD, supra note 1, Box 7).
55. Letter from Delphus E. Carpenter to Ralph G. Lindstrom, Chairman Executive
Committee of the Law Club of Denver (June 28, 1923) (on file in the Carpenter Papers, NCWCD, supra note 1, Box 44, folder 6.2).
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He also noted that his work with New Mexico's Stephen B. Davis
on La Plata River since 1918 had further prepared him for "better consideration of the greater problem of the Colorado River.0 6 He knew
that a La Plata compact would be precedent setting. Although it was
actually signed three days after the Colorado River Compact, what he
gained from his association with Davis was not only the chance to think
through some of the thorny issues with which he would have to deal in
Santa Fe, but a feeling of confidence and respect for someone who
would be an important member of the Colorado River Commission.
One concern determining the direction of much of Carpenter's
thinking was what he viewed as suspicious activities of the federal government. Colorado State Engineer Addison J. McCune had already
warned of the Imperial Valley's plan to ask the federal government to
"shut off all development in the upper country until the whole scheme
[of development on the Colorado River] is thrashed out, which might
take years. 57 What Carpenter saw was a rivalry developing between the
Southern California Edison Company and the Reclamation Service
over which entity would occupy and develop power sites on the Colorado River, "all of which adds importance to the problem of setting up
the rights of the states in advance of construction.,

58

He was afraid

that such a rivalry could easily lead to the construction of a power producing dam at Boulder Canyon before the Upper Basin could get an
agreement protecting its own rights at the headwaters.59 Litigation
would surely follow such a course of events.
Therefore, at the first meeting of the Colorado River Commission
in Washington in January of 1922, Carpenter stated that the "prime
objective of the creation of this Commission was to avoid future litigation among the states interested in the Colorado River and [to plan]
60
the utilization of the benefits to be obtained from its water supply.
His hope was to "settle in advance those matters which would otherwise be brought into court;" in other words, "to 61settle the title to the
river before structures [were] placed thereupon.,
But the Washington discussions were not well focused. They centered on how many new acres each state planned to place under pro56. Letter from Delphus E. Carpenter to Thomas E. Campbell, Governor of Arizona (Oct. 14, 1921) (on file in the Colorado State Archives, Denver, Colorado, Colorado River Commission, Department of Natural Resources, RCC #20559, folder #7).
57. Letter from A.J. McCune, Colorado State Engineer, to George Anderson, Los
Angeles Consulting Engineer (July 22, 1920) (on file in the Colorado State Archives,
Shoup Papers, RCC #26796).
58. Letter from Delphus E. Carpenter to Oliver H. Shoup, Governor of Colorado
(June 20, 1921) (on file in the Colorado State Archives, Denver, Colorado, Department of Natural Resources, Colorado River Commission, RCC #20559, folder #5).
59. Letter from Delphus E. Carpenter to Sims Ely (Sept. 28, 1921) (on file in the
Colorado State Archives, Denver, Colorado, Department of Natural Resources, Colorado River Commission, RCC #20559, folder #7).
60. Minutes, first meeting of the Colorado River Compact Commission, Dept. of
Commerce, Washington, D.C. (Jan. 26, 1922) (on file in the Carpenter Papers, Hoover
Library, supra note 1, Printed Minutes, Meetings 1-7, Colorado River Project File).
61. Id.
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duction. Even with an estimated average annual flow at Yuma of
17,300,000 acre-feet, a figure based on recorded flows between 1899
and 1920, Commission Chairman Herbert Hoover knew that the river
would be bankrupt if each state were apportioned water sufficient to
irrigate the acreages they claimed for future development.62 None of
the states wanted to accept limitations. A compact based on the acreage limitation principle would not and could not succeed.
Understanding this, Carpenter chose to illuminate his colleagues
with information and theories gained from ten years of thinking about
interstate compacts. He pointed out that the Upper Basin could never
beneficially use even an "equitable part" of the waters rising in and
flowing within each state due to the unique topography of this area.
Whatever water could be used in the Upper Basin belonged to the
states of origin. By law, these states did not have to relinquish it to the
Lower Basin, but an unreasonable exercise of state sovereignty by the
Upper Basin would not only violate the spirit of comity, but might also
result in the intervention of the Supreme Court. Likewise, if the
Lower Basin established a claim to large amounts of water from the
Upper Basin based on prior appropriation, this would amount to a
"taking" or "involuntary extraterritorial servitude" frowned upon by international and interstate law. When asked by Hoover if he denied the
whole theory of priority of utilization as between states, Carpenter replied, "Emphatically! 6 Construction of works in the Lower Basin,
based on a claim of priority would bring about extensive litigation, and
if the government built the works, further development by the Upper
River would be prevented. In Carpenter's view, this was proven by the
government's Pathfinder Dam in Wyoming on the North Platte River.
What Carpenter wanted in a compact was a quid pro quo. Because
the upper basin states furnished "the greater part" of water used by all
seven states and Mexico, and because he was convinced that by national and international law they had a property right to this water, the
Lower Basin should guarantee a "freedom from attack" if the Upper
Basin was willing to assure the Lower Basin a reasonable limitation on
"wholly consumptive use." Carpenter insisted the Upper Basin would
stand firm on the principle that
"the construction of any works shall in no manner interfere with the
development of the territory of any of the Upper States, or the use of
the water therein, and said works shall not have any preferred right of
title to the use of water of said stream as against Upper States."64
62. Carpenter was as guilty of exaggeration as everyone else. He stated that Colorado was presently irrigating 1,515,000 acres and that 310,000 new acres located on
Colorado's East Slope would require 310,000 acre-feet of Colorado River water which

would be used consumptively. Furthermore, Carpenter said, Colorado could not
compromise this amount. Minutes, sixth and seventh meetings of the Colorado River

Compact Commission (Jan. 30, 1922) (on file in the Carpenter Papers, Hoover Library, supra note 1, Colorado River Commission).
63. Id.
64. Id.
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Carpenter believed that if the Upper Basin were guaranteed
proper protection in the form of non-interference for fifty to one
hundred years, it did not matter how many reservoirs were built in the
Lower Basin. "[W]e realize that development on the lower river is
imminent," he said, "and to a degree [we] are willing to forego demands that we might justly make in order to bring that about." 5
However, when commissioners failed to accept acreage or water
limitations as a basis for the compact, Hoover doubted they would ever
be able to agree on a "general single idea for a compact."6 6 He questioned the wisdom of calling another meeting, wondering whether the
commissioners might be "so hopelessly far apart that there [was] no
use in proceeding., 67 But Carpenter was not ready to quit.
We are here with a pretty sacred trust and it should not be treated
lightly. I really believe that in the months and weeks to come many
small matters of difference can be argued out ....[T] his to me has
been a very profitable conference and there is more nearly an approach to a common accord here than I... expected when I arrived
in Washington ....I think it would be the height of crime to the
people who sent us here to adjourn permanently now.
That said, the Washington meetings ended. Hoover agreed that the
commissioners should organize and attend public hearings in their respective states. Nevada's J. G. Scrugham offered to host a trip down
the Colorado River to the proposed Boulder Canyon dam site. All
agreed that the Commission's next meeting should take place in the
Southwest. Over the next few months, while hearings were being held
in Phoenix, Los Angeles, Salt Lake City, Grand Junction, Denver, and
Cheyenne, Carpenter devised a plan to divide the Colorado River on a
fifty-fifty basis. Thus was born the nucleus of the Colorado River
Compact, the "general single idea" on which Hoover thought the
Commissioners would never agree.
THE FLF1'Y-FLFTY IDEA
Carpenter has been given credit for originating the fifty-fifty
plan. In simplest terms, it called for a division of the Colorado River
at Lee's Ferry into two basins. The Upper Basin would include the

65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. In a letter from Clarence C. Stetson, Secretary of the Colorado River Compact
Commission, to L. Ward Bannister (Dec. 12, 1922), Stetson wrote that the idea of dividing the Colorado River into two drainage basins belonged to Carpenter "or some
other person from Colorado who first gave the idea concrete form." On file in the
Carpenter Papers, Hoover Library, supra note 1, Box 11, Colorado River Commission
Records (Aug.-Dec. 1922), folder labeled "L. Ward Bannister"). This letter was found
and presented to the author by Professor Donald Pisani, University of Oklahoma.
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states of Wyoming, Colorado, Utah, and New Mexico. The Lower Basin would be represented by California, Arizona, and Nevada. Lee's
Ferry, located in Arizona just below the Pariah River, was situated
above the Grand Canyon. All of the water delivered to the Colorado
River by the Upper Basin entered the stream above Lee's Ferry. The
Canyon served as a natural separation point between the Upper and
Lower Basins. Carpenter's plan was to divide the river between the two
basins rather than among the seven states, apportioning half of the
flow to each basin, thus eliminating fights between the states over the
amount of water needed in the future for irrigated agriculture.
Moved by "considerations of interstate comity, 7 ° he had already
generated a similar plan in negotiations with Nebraska over the South
Platte River. On that stream, he had seen that irrigated agriculture
upstream was actually increasing the consistency of flow downstream
where the South Platte River crossed the Colorado border. Consequently, he separated the river into two segments, divided at the west
boundary of Washington County in Colorado. Nebraska would have
the right to divert water out of the lower section of the river for the
Perkins Canal, heading in Colorado, while Colorado would be able to
store water in the upper section for downstream delivery between April
and October. The agreement eliminated concern thatjunior rights on
the Cache la Poudre River would be called out by Nebraska at some future date. Furthermore, it ended the threat of litigation and encouraged new development to proceed with the assurance of title to water
in both states. In Carpenter's words, it was also significant as "probably
the first effort to use the treaty power of the states in the settlement
of
7
interstate controversies respecting the waters of western streams. '
With his efforts on the South Platte nearing success, Carpenter began working with R. I. Meeker's Colorado River hydrology data to devise a similar plan acceptable to the seven states. During the public
hearings, A. P. Davis, Director of the Reclamation Service, had already
suggested dividing the Colorado River into two segments. He favored
the San Juan River as the separation point. 72 But Davis, himself, knew
that Carpenter had a better fifty-fifty plan. 7' Like Carpenter, he also
knew that if commissioners tried to revive the Washington discussions
in which they had heatedly disputed dividing the river on an acre-foot
or irrigated acreage basis, they would indeed fail in their task. He was
therefore delighted with Carpenter's innovative proposal and hoped
70. South Platte River Compact, ch. 179, 1925 Colo. Sess. Laws 529 (codified at
COLO. REv. STAT.

§ 37-65-101 (1997)).

71. Memorandum, Delphus E. Carpenter (Jan. 7, 1925) in South Platte River Compact, Colorado Proceedings printed by G.A.S.P. ("Groundwater Appropriators of the
South Platte") (1989).
72. Minutes, Colorado River Compact Commission, Los Angeles, California (March
20, 1922) (on file in the Carpenter Papers, Hoover Library, supra note 1, Box 46,
Colorado River Commission, Executive Hearings).
73.

Letter from A.P. Davis, Director of the Reclamation Service, to Delphus E. Car-

penter (Oct. 24, 1922) (on file in the Carpenter Papers, NCWCD, supra note 1, Box
48, folder 16).
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that "something of this kind" would be presented at Santa Fe.
Hoover also gained confidence in Carpenter during the public
hearings and asked him to write up a draft compact based on the fiftyfifty idea. 4 Pleased to oblige, Carpenter sent Hoover his first attempt
at a Colorado River Compact based on a fifty-fifty division of the water
measured at Yuma, Arizona. In a long cover letter, he explained to
Hoover that this plan "provide [d] a permanent basis of allocation and
automatically takes care of all questions of tunnel diversions [to Colorado's East Slope], intrastate uses and regulations, local interstate controversies (present and future), extensions of the duty of water.., and
other vexing questions. 05 Additionally he noted that
[t]he [Colorado] river basin is similar to a natural hourglass .... [N] ature formed the two divisions. By conforming to these
natural divisions we arrive at a basis for permanent settlement of all
grounds of controversy. All water from the upper division naturally
passes Lee's Ferry. All waters not diverted through intermountain
tunnels or consumed by plant life and evaporation must inevitably arrive at the funnel mouth at Lee's Ferry .... By fixing a minimum av-

erage annual flow past Lee's Ferry the upper country is left to develop
as time, conditions and opportunities will permit. If the theory of
some be true, that one-half of all water diverted and applied to lands
automatically returns to the stream, the upper states could make a
first use of the entire flow of the river above Lee's Ferry and still deliver nearly the required minimum at that point ....
[A]ll human
factors and prejudices respecting the protection of an unlimited development within the States of origin are at once completely satisfied
and silenced by the method suggested. There need be no interference from below. There need be no contest of speed giving rise to
foolhardy rivalry to result in disaster and financial disappointment.
The upper country is left to its natural and normal development. 7

The Lower Basin would be assured a definite, perpetual minimum
average flow at Lee's Ferry. Any excess could be used for power and
then proceed to the sea. Dam and reservoir construction could begin
immediately with confidence that "a certain quantity of water would
always be available." The Mexican situation would be left entirely for
the future, knowing that "[w]hatever burden is placed upon the river
[will be] equally distributed and the lower country will obtain the
benefit of all power returns from the excess water passing Lee's Ferry
to satisfy one-half of the international burden."07 The benefits to be

gained from power generation would more than offset losses by evaporation between Lee's Ferry and Yuma and in the reservoirs to be con-

74. Letter from Delphus E. Carpenter to Clarence Stetson, Secretary of the Colorado River Compact Commission (July 7, 1922) (on file in the Carpenter Papers,
NCWCD, supra note 1, Box 48, folder 13).
75. Letter from Delphus E. Carpenter to Herbert Hoover (Aug. 25, 1922) (on file
in the Carpenter Papers, NCWCD, supra note 1, Box 20, folder 8).
76.
77.

Id.
Id.
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structed in the Lower Basin.78
Central to Carpenter's thinking was the belief that the Upper Basin
"could never use even an equitable part of the waters rising and flowing within the respective territory of each." "I have steadily refused to
fix any acreage limitation upon [Colorado's] development," he reasoned, "but have insisted that our [state's] maximum development will
never consume more than an equitable part of the water which arises
within our own border. 80 Fifty percent of the natural flow originating
in Colorado would be ample."
All of the commissioners had heard at one time or another that
the Colorado River had enough water to serve the present and future
needs of all seven states. Under Director Davis' leadership, the Reclamation Service produced a 326 page report entitled, 'Problems of the
Imperial Valley and Vicinity.'8 2 Based on that study, Davis told League
of the Southwest representatives that "the waters of the Colorado River
system always would be sufficient to supply all demands of both the
upper and the lower states if used within the drainage area of the
83 As
Colorado River system ....
Carpenter noted, Davis was considered "an ultraconservative in reclamation matters and his statement
carried great weight.""
For Carpenter it made no sense to restrict Upper Basin use of
Colorado River water because the natural conditions of the land along
the river automatically controlled its use. The canyons were too deep
and much of the land was unsuitable for irrigation. When Lower Basin
representatives challenged him on this, he responded that "we could
not take all the water if we might so wish [because] nature has so
shaped that country that while there are bound to be low and high
years... nevertheless we will never be able to wholly deplete the
river...."8 5 Moreover, Carpenter contended, even if the Upper Basin
could take all of the water, from forty to sixty percent of any diversion
in the Upper Basin returns to the river basin. 6 The basin is like a giant
sponge. The only water which would be one hundred percent consumptively used would be the transmountain diversions going through
tunnels to the East Slope.
78.

Id.

79. Minutes, sixth and seventh meetings of the Colorado River Compact Commis-

sion, Washington, D.C. (Jan. 30, 1922) (on file in the Carpenter Papers, NCWCD, su-

pra note 1, Box 7).
80. Letter from Delphus E. Carpenter to Charles E. Hall (Apr. 8, 1922) (on file in
the Carpenter Papers, NCWCD, supra note 1, Box 7).
81. Letter from Delphus E. Carpenter to Senator Lawrence C. Phipps (July 6, 1922)
(on file in the Carpenter Papers, NCWCD, supra note 1, Box 7).

82. FALL-DAVIS REPORT, S. Doc. No. 67-142, vol. II(2nd Sess. 1922).
83. Carpenter, supra note 52.
84. Id.

85. Minutes, eleventh meeting of the Colorado River Compact Commission, Santa
Fe, New Mexico (Nov. 11, 1922) (on file in the Carpenter Papers, Hoover Library, supra note 1, Colorado River Commission, Executive Hearings,).
86. Letter from Delphus E. Carpenter to Mrs. Bettie Olhausen (Aug. 9, 1923) (on
file in the Carpenter Papers, NCWCD, supra note 1, Box 1, folder 21).
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TRANSMOUNTAIN DIVERSION AND RIVER FLOW DATA
At the public hearings in Grand Junction on March, 1922, W. F. R.
Mills, General Manager of the Board of Water Commissioners for the
City and County of Denver, estimated that Denver's population would
increase from 275,000 to 500,000 "within the span of the present generation. 87 R. I. Meeker, Special Deputy State Engineer, testified that
there was no more water available from the South Platte River and that
the only available supplies for Denver would have to come to the East
Slope by way of tunnels near the headwaters of the Fraser, Blue, and
Williams Fork rivers. 8 He assured West Slope representatives, as well
as Lower Basin commissioners in attendance, that a study of possible
diversions from the Colorado River basin to the East Slope indicated a
feasibility of "less than 500,000 acre-feet per year, about 5% of the unused waters of the Western Slope and 3% of lower river flow at
Yuma." 9 Because of the pyramidal shape of mountains along the Continental Divide, the East Slope would be limited to the amount of water that could be brought through tunnels at an altitude of 9,000 feet
or higher. Any lower than that and tunnel length would increase exponentially. Meeker was therefore comfortable forecasting a maximum
transmountain diversion of 500,000 to 600,000 acre-feet from the
Colorado River for domestic and agricultural uses on the East Slope. 0
Carpenter agreed, although he saw "remarkable progress" being
made in tunnel construction which would make feasible projects which
seemed idle dreams a few years earlier. He noted that the Southern
California Edison Company had built a fourteen-mile tunnel "with a
bigger bore than the Laramie-Poudre Tunnel" to divert water for
power purposes alone. He predicted similar developments in northern Colorado, thus anticipating the Colorado-Big Thompson Project
of the 1930s.9 Although estimates of transmountain diversion capability varied from A. P. Davis' 255,000 acre-feet given in 1920 to Carpenter's 600,000 acre-feet in 1923,92 Upper Basin representatives remained convinced that Colorado's transmountain diversion
possibilities were limited by nature. The Lower Basin really did not
87. Minutes, Colorado River Compact Commission Hearings, Grand Junction,
Colorado (March 29, 1922) (Colorado State Archives, Denver, Colorado, Folder 21).
88. Id.
89. Colorado Data-Colorado River Basin (prepared March 25, 1922), Minutes, supra note 87.
90. As of May 1995, approximately 510,000 acre-feet were being delivered annually
out of the Colorado River to the Front Range, 380,000 acre-feet to the South Platte
River, and 130,000 acre-feet to other rivers. Letter from Eric Wilkinson, General
Manager, Northern Colorado Water Conservancy District to the author (May 21, 1995)
(on file with the author).
91. GREELEYTRIBUNE, Nov. 9,1923 (on file in the Carpenter Papers, NCWCD, supra
note 1).
92. An August 28, 1920 article in The Denver Post quoted A.P. Davis as stating that
future transmountain tunnel diversion could never exceed 1.5% of the water supply of
the Colorado River drainage and not more than 3% of the water supply of the rivers of
the western slope of Colorado. THE DENVER POST, Aug. 28, 1920 (on file in the Carpenter Papers, NCWCD, supra note 1).
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have to worry about the consumptive loss of a significant amount of
water out of the Colorado River basin. But Arizona and California
needed more assurance. At the Phoenix hearings, interested participants from these states expressed a general concern that transmountain diversions in the Upper Basin might be larger, resulting in a considerable loss of power revenue to the Lower Basin. In their view, this
was "the biggest question" before the Commission."3 Carpenter responded with characteristic patience in a letter to Arizona Commissioner W. S. Norviel.
No one is going to deny that California has a right to [divert the
Colorado River into the Imperial Valley and into the Salton Sea] even
though she furnishes no part of the water, so long as she does not unreasonably call upon the territorial waters of Arizona or the other
states in order to furnish her this water which she thus devours. If
[Colorado] could take from the drainage of the Colorado River a
greater or considerable part of its flow and by tunneling apply this
water upon territory from which no water would ever return to the
parent stream, we would be in all respects similar to the Imperial Valey use in so far as such diversions being wholly consumptive. But the
peculiar part of the whole situation is that we cannot take a considerable part of the water of the stream away from this drainage. For us
to wholly consume 5% of the water arising in Colorado ought not to
seem objectionable, yet 5% of the water arising in Colorado [about
600,000 acre-feet] would be ample to guarantee all possible 9tunneling for a half century, and, in my own judgment, in perpetuity. 4

Carpenter expressed appreciation for Arizona's concern, but the
amount of water Colorado could take out of the river was, in fact, "very
insignificant when compared with the tremendous volumes we annually turn down to the Lower River ....
[The whole subject] serves as
an illustration of how some small and insignificant matter may so inject itself into these proceedings as to defeat the general purpose."95 If
the Lower Basin so wished, he was willing to write into the Compact
that the Upper Basin "would never divert more than a given number
of acre-feet from the drainage area for use in the drainage area of
other streams, at least until further additional diversions were allowed

by future compact. ''

6

At the Phoenix
Davis had recommended this as a reasonable consideration:hearings,
500,000 acre-feet or more,

93. Comments of G.E.P. Smith, Irrigation Engineer and Professor at the University
of Arizona, and Lucius K. Chase, Chairman of the Reclamation and Power Committee
of the Los Angeles Chamber of Commerce (March 15-17, 1922), in Minutes, Phoenix
Public Hearings, Colorado River Compact Commission (on file in the Carpenter Papers, Hoover Library, supra note 1, Colorado River Commission, Executive Hearings).
94. Letter from Delphus E. Carpenter to W.S. Norviel, Commissioner from Arizona
(March 7, 1922) (on file in the Carpenter Papers, NCWCD, supra note 1, Box 5, folder
5).
95. Letter from Delphus E. Carpenter to R.E. Caldwell, Commissioner from Utah
(July 5, 1922) (on file in the Carpenter Papers, NCWCD, supra note 1, Box 48, folder
15). In this letter, Carpenter shared his thoughts regarding a first draft of the compact based on a fifty-fifty distribution of Colorado River water.
96. Id.
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because he recognized that uses outside the basin might be superior to
those inside the basin and because, compared to the Imperial Valley
situation, return flows would be available for additional uses when diverted to the East Slope.
Closely related to Lower Basin fears about transmountain diversions was the general apprehension in both basins regarding the actual
amount of water in the river. In his report to Governor Oliver Shoup
immediately following the Santa Fe meeting of the Colorado River
Commissioners, Carpenter credited R. I. Meeker, Colorado's Deputy
State Engineer, "whose comprehensive knowledge of the entire Colorado River basin commanded the attention of the Commission and facilitated its labors."9' Meeker estimated the Colorado River's average
annual water supply at 20.5 million acre-feet ("maf'). He logged total
consumption at 7 maf in 1921, leaving a surplus in the river of 13.5
maf. He calculated the Upper Basin water supply at 17.5 maf and the
Lower Basin's contribution at 3 maf and he estimated that the Upper
Basin's additional requirements to meet future needs would be 5 maf,
the Lower Basin's future requirements at 4 maf.99 Subtracting the total
future requirements in both basins of 9 maf from the then extant surplus of 13.5 maf, Meeker arrived at the conclusion that in 1922 the
Colorado River had a surplus of 4.5 maf.
Using these figures, Carpenter drafted a Colorado River Compact
on a fifty-fifty basis, allocating 7.5 maf to each basin plus an extra 1
maf to the Lower Basin, because the water in the Gila River (approximately 1 maf) had already been allocated. He concluded that the unreconstructed flow of the river passing Lee's Ferry was approximately
16 maf. The reconstructed flow was 12 maf (taking irrigation uses into
account) and even in drought years when the flow dropped to 10 maf
at Lee's Ferry there would be enough water to meet Lower Basin
needs."°

Carpenter had total confidence in Meeker, but as time passed, he
began reworking Meeker's figures. Several months before the Santa
Fe meeting he proposed a compact
based wholly upon the principle of the upper states guaranteeing to
the territory below Lee's Ferry an average annual flow sufficient,
when added to the average flow between Lee's Ferry and Yuma, to
make a delivery of an amount equivalent to one-half of the average

flow at Yuma computed from the twenty-year record at that point.

97. Minutes, supra note 93.
98. Letter from Delphus E. Carpenter to Oliver H. Shoup, Governor of Colorado
(Dec. 15, 1922) (on file in the Carpenter Papers, NCWCD, supra note 1, Box 1, folder

20).
99. Id. This amount would include 650,000 acre-feet of additional water for the
East Slope based on a per acre water duty of 1.3 acre-feet.
100. Minutes, fifteenth meeting of the Colorado River Compact Commission (Nov.
14, 1922) (on file in the Carpenter Papers, NCWCD, supra note 1, Box 7).
101. Letter from Delphus E. Carpenter to W.F. McClure, Commissioner from California (Sept. 28, 1922) (on file in the Carpenter Papers, NCWCD, supra note 1, Box
50, brown folder).
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The minimum flow Carpenter was willing to guarantee was now based
on a mean average annual flow of 17.4 maf at Yuma. Because A. P.
Davis had informed him that the Upper Basin produced on the average 86% of the water in the river,' or 14.9 maf passing Lee's Ferry
(note that this amount was lowered from previous estimates of 16
maf), Carpenter argued that if the Lower Basin was entitled to a 50%
split in the river, the upper basin states would have to guarantee no
more than 36% of the agreed average flow at Yuma, approximately
6.264 maf (36% x 17.4 maf).0 3 Article II of the draft compact which
Carpenter sent to Hoover and the commissioners in the summer of
1922 was essentially unchanged when everyone gathered at Santa Fe in
November. Paragraph 2 read in part:
The States of Colorado, New Mexico, Utah and Wyoming jointly and
severally agree with the remainder of the High Contracting Parties
that the diversions from the Colorado River and its tributaries and
the uses and consumption of water within the Upper Division shall
never reduce the mean or average annual flow of the Colorado River
at Lee's Ferry over any period of ten (10) consecutive years, below a
flow equivalent to thirty-six per cent [sic] (36%) of the agreed established average annual flow of the river at Yuma, Arizona, as defined in
paragraph one (1) of this Article, to wit, below a flow of six million
two hundred and sixty-four thousand (6, 264,000) acre-feet .... 104
Discussions of this article led to Carpenter's articulation of the Upper
Basin's obligation to Mexico, how the ten-year average would be calculated, how much time the Upper Basin needed to develop, and why
the Gila River had to be included in negotiations on the Colorado
River system.
UPPER BASIN OBLIGATIONS AND NEEDS
The "Mexican burden" was the subject of extensive debate, but because Hoover was concerned that some arguments presented in Santa
Fe might be used against the United States when the time came to
make a treaty with Mexico, he successfully suggested that all discussion
vis-a-vis Mexico be expunged from the record.'0 5 Still, it is apparent
102.

Letter from A.P. Davis, Director of the Reclamation Service, to Delphus E. Car-

penter (July 18, 1922) (on file in the Carpenter Papers, NCWCD, supra note 1, Box 5,

folder 10).
103. Delphus E. Carpenter, Colorado River Compact (Aug. 1922) (undated confidential, preliminary draft sent to Hoover and all other Commissioners) (on file in the
Carpenter Papers, NCWCD, supra note 1, Box 1, folder 1).

104. Minutes, eleventh meeting of the Colorado River Compact Commission, Santa

Fe, New Mexico (Nov. 11, 1922) (on file in the Carpenter Papers, Hoover Library, su-

pra note 1, Colorado River Commission).
105. Minutes, twenty-second meeting of the Colorado Commission, Santa Fe, New
Mexico (Nov. 22, 1922) (on file in the Carpenter Papers, Hoover Library, supra note 1,
Colorado River Commission). See also Memorandum from Northcutt Ely to Ray Lyman
Wilbur (March 29, 1947) (on file in the Carpenter Papers, Hoover Library, supra note
1, Post-Presidential Papers, Individuals File Series, Container 254, Ray Lyman Wilbur
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from extant documentation that Carpenter believed that Mexico
should be treated fairly and that so long as a surplus existed in the
river, the Lower Basin should be responsible for delivering the water
agreed to by treaty.
This was not his initial position. The draft compact sent out to
commissioners in August 1922 stated that
the duty and burden of supplying any waters from the flow of the
Colorado River within the United States of America to the Republic
of Mexico .. .in fulfillment of any obligation .. .by treaty between

the two nations, shall be equally apportioned between and equally
borne by the Upper Division and the Lower Division of the Colorado
106
River ....
This was the same position he defended in Santa Fe in November.
Nothing was said about surplus water. Half of the Mexican burden
would be contributed by each basin and the Lower Basin would make
up its contribution to Mexico from waters originating in its own geographical area and from waters passed through Lee's Ferry by the Upper Basin. The responsibility of making the actual delivery to Mexico,
according to the terms of the treaty, would fall to the Lower Basin.
As discussions advanced in Santa Fe regarding the quantity of water the Upper Basin could guarantee to the Lower Basin on an annual
basis, the subject of the Mexican burden resurfaced as a possible negotiating point. Carpenter made it clear that the Upper Basin could not
alone accept the responsibility of satisfying treaty obligations to Mexico.' ° As stated in the signed Compact, he finally persuaded the
Commission to agree that if "as a matter of international comity" the
United States were to recognize Mexico's right to any Colorado River
water, that burden would be satisfied from surplus waters.0 8 Should
this source prove insufficient, the burden would then be borne equally
by both basins.1 9
After the Compact was signed and after Los Angeles had announced its intention of building an aqueduct from the Colorado
River to the city, Carpenter criticized California's behavior. In 1926,
he argued that the Mexican burden "naturally [fell] upon the three
lower states" and that "one million acre-feet of water pumped over the
hill to Los Angeles is a serious burden upon the river in view of the fact
that any international burden must first be satisfied ....""
A few years later, Carpenter insisted that the Mexican burden was
Correspondence, 1946-1947).
106. Carpenter, supra note 103.

107. Minutes, seventeenth meeting of the Colorado River Compact Commission
(Nov. 15, 1922) (on file in the Carpenter Papers, Hoover Library, supra note 1, Colorado River Commission).

108.
109.
110.
1926)

Id.
Colorado River Compact, COLO. REV. STAT. § 37-61-101 (1997).
Letter from Delphus E. Carpenter to G.H. Dern, Governor of Utah (Nov. 6,
(on file in the Dern Papers, supra note 47).
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supposed to come entirely from the Lower Basin supply composed of
the 8.5 maf provided by the Upper Basin and the sources already existing below Lee's Ferry. "This is the plain meaning of the simple language of the [C]ompact," he wrote, "and any shifting of burdens or
agreements respecting sources of supply within the Lower Basin are
purely local to that Basin and in no wise affect the rights of the Upper
Basin under the Compact." In other words, the Gila River was not exempted from the Mexican Burden. " ' Additionally, Carpenter asserted
that
[i]t is interesting to note that the proposed gigantic aqueduct for
Southern California cities was not in contemplation at the time of the
[C]ompact negotiations and was not included in the Lower Basin
setup. In fact, the records show that [at the GrandJunction meeting]
California openly opposed all diversions from the watershed."'
The amount of water Carpenter was willing to assure the Lower Basin
for the Mexican Burden and other purposes gradually evolved from
his early opposition to annual minimum flow guarantees to a plan for
ten-year averaging.
The Lower Basin fought for a guaranteed minimum annual flow.
Arizona Commissioner W. S. Norviel urged Carpenter to accept a
commitment calling for delivery of 4.5 maf annually and a ten-year average of 82 maf or 4 maf with a five-year average of 41 maf," 3 but Carpenter squirmed over this proposal. After consultation with Meeker,
he told the commissioners:
Whenever [the] minimum is considered it must be realized, - and I
want to reiterate it, -

that the .

.

. necessity for a minimum results

from the penalty visited upon the source. It comes from a drought
that strikes at the root of agriculture in the upper section. The result

111. In 1929, Carpenter sent a memorandum to Governor William H. Adams of
Colorado titled, Disposition of the Waters of the Colorado River Under the Colorado
River Compact. In it, he stated that the states of the Lower Basin should enter into a
compact of their own in which there should be "provision for supplying the entire international burden, if, when and for the amount by treaty determined .... " He also
stated that "it should be remembered that the Lee Ferry guaranty of annual delivery
includes the Upper Basin contribution to and share of the international burden and
that if this contribution by the upper states is allocated between the lower states for
local uses, the international burden must then be applied from Lower Basin supplies."
Memorandum from Delphus E. Carpenter to Governor William H. Adams (May 1,
1929) (on file in the Adams Papers, Colorado State Archives, RCC #26829, CRC file
#35). In a 1934 telegram to Harold Ickes, Carpenter noted that the water of the Gila
River "plus the water of the main stream at Lee Ferry under Compact constitute [the]
water fund for [supplying] the international burden and [the] states of the lower
Colorado River basin." Telegram from Delphus E. Carpenter to Harold Ickes (Aug.
25, 1934) (on file in the Carpenter Papers, NCWCD, supra note 1, Box 50, folder 6).
112. Letter from Delphus E. Carpenter to Northcutt Ely (Dec. 5, 1930) (on file in
the Carpenter Papers, NCWCD, supra note 1, Box 52, folder 1).
113. Minutes, sixteenth and seventeenth meetings of the Colorado River Compact
Commission (Nov. 14-15, 1922) (on file in the Carpenter Papers, Hoover Library, supra note 1, Colorado River Commission).
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of that drought afflicting that section is what produces the reduction
in the stream. Therefore, the minimum should be of such a quantity
that the penalty of the drought will be equally distributed over the
whole river system.114

It would be unfair, he argued, to insist that the Upper Basin fix a
minimum that would apply to the Upper Basin during drought years.
The drought's impact should be allocated among the people of1 15the
entire basin, "much the same as we allocate the waters in fat years.,
Carpenter did not want a compact to which the states could not
reasonably adhere. "If you crowd us on the minimum," he said, "we
will have to have a protecting clause on precipitation, because we can't
control that. Nature will force us into a violation, any possibility of
which we should strenuously avoid in our compact, because that would
provoke turmoil and strife."" 6 The engineers had told him that it
would take at least fifty years of records to know what the probable future maximum and minimum flows of the river would be.
The "minimum" which Carpenter believed would be fair for both
'' 7
basins was an "aggregate minimum delivery in a ten-year period."
The annual flow, Carpenter explained, would rise and fall with the circumstances of precipitation, but over a ten-year period, using a running average, the Lower Basin would receive a guaranteed 75 maf.
Carpenter described the ten-year calculation as follows: "Suppose you
were on the twelfth year. You take that year and include the nine preceeding [sic] years .... Each year would have nine years behind it.

Any one year
along with nine preceeding [sic] years makes a ten-year
8
period.""
Norviel's objections to Carpenter's suggestion were based on a presumption that the Upper Basin might physically withhold all the water
from the Lower Basin in a lean year. In truth, Carpenter argued, the
Upper Basin could not take all the water from the river in any year because of the deep canyons and non-irrigable land surrounding much
of the river in the basin of origin. Furthermore, he argued, the Lower
Basin should encourage development in the Upper Basin, because experience had shown, to him at least, that the more development occurred in the upper reaches of a river, the more stable would be the
return flows downstream during drought years." 9
114. Minutes, fourteenth meeting of the Colorado River Compact Commission,
Santa Fe, New Mexico (Nov. 13, 1922) (on file in the Carpenter Papers, Hoover Library, supra note 1, Colorado River Commission).
115. Id.
116. Minutes, seventeenth meeting of the Colorado River Compact Commission,
Santa Fe, New Mexico (Nov. 14, 1922) (on file in the Carpenter Papers, Hoover Library, supra note 1, Colorado River Commission).
117. Minutes, supra note 100.
118. Minutes, twelfth meeting of the Colorado River Compact Commission, Santa
Fe, New Mexico (Nov. 12, 1922) (on file in the Carpenter Papers, Hoover Library, supra note 1, Colorado River Commission).
119. On several occasions, Carpenter noted that development by the Upper Basin
would ensure less erratic flows in the Colorado River. He was applying lessons learned
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Storage would go hand in hand with development, but he was in
agreement with the Court in Wyoming v. Colorado that it should be incumbent on each division to provide its own dams and reservoirs. 20 As
with the South Platte River, Carpenter had gained experience during
his travels on the Arkansas River in 1921 with the interstate streams
commissioner from Kansas. He had recognized that enlarged storage
facilities in Colorado would stabilize the Arkansas River, improve return flows for Kansas and enable Colorado to continue its growth and
development. As stated in his report to Governor Shoup, Carpenter
pointed out that
it is not only possible but may be probable that some general plan of
storage of water in Colorado for temporary relief of Kansas, may be
worked out without injury to the present or future development of
the Colorado area, such storage to be availed of until such time as the

increasing return waters across the interstate line relieve the situation.

The same logic applied to the Colorado River. The best possible safeguard for the Lower Basin, one that would assure them of the required
amount of water delivered at Lee's Ferry from year to year, would be
the immediate development of reservoir storage in the upper area.
To do it all at once [said Carpenter] might shock the stream flow at
first, and probably the word 'immediate' is too drastic, but the early

development of that upper area, the withholding of the water at the
source, the releasing of these waters gradually in the very season
when the return flows and waste runoff would turn back to the stream
their various excess, would supply the stream below. If you presuppose an adjustment upon reservoir construction below... you should
presuppose reservoir construction above, so that the reservoir construction below may work in coordination with that above.'

Central to Carpenter's desire to protect the Upper Basin was his conviction that reservoir development, full economic prosperity, and the
Upper Basin's ability to utilize its allotment of 7.5 maf per year would
depend on a Compact that recognized the importance of time. He
knew that the Upper Basin needed a lot of time to grow. He wanted to
give the Lower Basin "absolute free unbridled" rights to build their
works in return for a "declaration of non-interference with the development over the next 50-100 years of the upper territory."'22 When the
on the South Platte River. See Minutes, thirteenth meeting of the Colorado River
Compact Commission, Santa Fe, New Mexico (Nov. 13, 1922) (on file in the Carpenter Papers, Hoover Library, supra note 1, Colorado River Commission).
120. Minutes, supra note 100.
121. Letter from Delphus E. Carpenter to Oliver H. Shoup, Governor of Colorado,
and Victor E. Keyes, Attorney General (Aug. 21, 1922) (on file in the Colorado State
Archives, Colorado Governor Appointments and Applications, Arkansas River Compact Commission, RCC #8801).
122. Minutes, supra note 118.
123. Minutes, sixth meeting of the Colorado River Compact Commission, Washing-
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Wyoming v. Colorado decision was announced, he felt even greater urgency for a time limit in the Compact that would protect the Upper
Basin.
Now, the doors are thrown wide open and Wyoming, Colorado, Utah,
and New Mexico are facing the situation that they must use every
means within their power to prevent the construction of any enormous works upon the lower Colorado River until the right of the upper states to use such water as they need in the future has been assured to them by interstate treaty.

A. P. Davis supported him, but he did not want the Compact to tie up
the seven states for more than fifty years. At the end of this period, he
counseled, a new allocation should be made "which would still protect
the development in the Upper Basin, so long as it did not interfere
with 12the
development that had already taken place in the Lower Ba5
sin.

,

In theory, Carpenter agreed with Davis. Their principal difference
was over the length of time the Upper Basin would need.
The time limit must be so broad [said Carpenter] and so long that it
will not force any unnecessary development in any section in order to
keep pace, and if that is provided, and adequate time is given, then
the Compact might run for a certain term of years, and continue
thereafter until a call for revision should be made by a majority of the
states ....
I see no objection to a time limit, but that time limit
should not be short. 126

During testimony before the Senate Committee on Irrigation and Reclamation in October 1925, Carpenter increased his estimate of the
time needed to 150 years and when Senator Hiram Johnson asked him
if that estimate might reach 200 years, he responded that it would depend, on
"the press of population and the improvement of transporta7
12
tion.
The Upper Basin also needed assurance that lower basin states understood that the Gila River was included as part of the Colorado River
system and was subject to the terms of the Compact. Many Arizonans
believed that the Gila River belonged exclusively to Arizonans and
should be exempt from the Compact, but Carpenter pointed out that
Colorado could use the same reasoning to exempt the San Juan,
8 FortuDolores, White, Yampa, and Grand rivers from the Compact.Y1
ton, D.C. (Jan. 30, 1922) (on file in the Carpenter Papers, NCWCD, supra note 1, Box

7).
124. THE DENVER POST, July 18, 1922 (on file in the Carpenter Papers, NCWCD, supra note 1).
125. Minutes, supra note 72.
126. Minutes, supra note 114.
127. ColoradoRiver Basin: Hearings Pursuantto S. Res. 320 Before the Comm. On Irrigation
and Reclamation,69th Cong. 706 (1925).
128. Letter from Delphus E. Carpenter to A.T. Kilcrease (Jan. 5, 1924) (on file in

WATER LAW RE VIEW

Volume 1

nately, Arizona Senator Carl Hayden agreed with Carpenter. Although
very suspicious at first, Hayden came to the conclusion that the Compact could not possibly interfere with Arizona's utilization of the Gila
River, while Arizona's ratification of the Compact would be a positive
9
step in getting the government to build useful storage reservoirs.
Unable to influence a majority of the state's legislators, however,
Hayden had to admit defeat; Carpenter continued to press his case
long after the Compact went into effect in 1929. In consideration of a
tentative contract between Arizona, California, and the Department of
the Interior in 1935, Carpenter noted that all rights of Arizona were
subject to the Compact and that "[t]he Compact include[d] the Gila
River as part of the Colorado River system and provide[d] for further
allocation of the surplus waters by Article III.'"' He was sympathetic to
Arizona's needs on most occasions, as will be seen in the following section, but he was insistent that the Gila River not be excluded from the
Colorado River Compact.
THE POWER ISSUE
Carpenter's views about power distribution originated from the
same philosophical base as those he held respecting the equitable distribution of water of interstate streams. He believed that water for
power should be subservient to agricultural and domestic uses; that
power rights should not attach to any surplus, unappropriated waters
in the river; 3 ' that the states owned the bed and channel of the Colorado River lying below high water line and should, therefore, have
some say in how power was to be distributed once works were constructed;132 that the federal government should respond to the wishes
of all the states and not just to the demands of California;33 and that
the success of "this great regional enterprise" [hydropower on the
the Carpenter Papers, NCWCD, supra note 1, Box 44, folder 6.2).
129. Letter from Carl Hayden, Senator from Arizona, to Delphus E. Carpenter (June
22, 1923) (on file in the Carpenter Papers, NCWCD, supra note 1, Box 44, folder 6.1).
Senator Hayden enclosed a speech he gave to residents of Casa Grande supporting the
Compact.
130. Letter from Delphus E. Carpenter to Shrader P. Howell, Colorado Assistant Attorney General (March 13, 1935) (on file in the Carpenter Papers, NCWCD, supra
note 1, Box 18, folder 7).
131. Minutes, twenty-third meeting of the Colorado River Compact Commission,
Santa Fe, New Mexico (Nov. 22, 1922) (on file in the Carpenter Papers, Hoover Library, supra note 1, Colorado River Commission).
132. Letter from Delphus E. Carpenter toJ.G. Scrugham (July 23, 1921) (on file in
the Colorado State Archives, Department of Natural Resources, Colorado River Commission, RCC #20559, folder #6).

133. Letter from Delphus E. Carpenter toJohn A. Whiting, Wyoming State Engineer
(May 9, 1930) (on file in the Wyoming State Archives, Colorado River Compact Commission, 1930 Correspondence File, State Engineer Records, RG #0037, Box 1). Carpenter was upset that Secretary of the Interior Ray Lyman Wilbur, a Californian, had
shown favoritism in allocating Boulder Dam power contracts to a California institution
still in its formative stages (Metropolitan Water District). "But why comment," he said.
"The king can do no wrong."
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Colorado River] would depend on "either voluntary allocation of
power benefits by interstate agreement or an equal allocation of benefits if made by the United States without consent of all three states
[Nevada, Arizona, California] in advance of a division of water.''34 Any
consideration of power allocation without the consent of the states
where power would be generated, said Carpenter, "is almost certain to
invite litigation and resort to measures in self defense.' 5
As with the construction of dams and reservoirs on the river, the
sine qua non of an enduring power settlement was the signing of a
compact between the states before power contracts were allocated. The
James B. Girand application to the Federal Power Commission ("FPC")
to build the Diamond Creek power plant below Grand Canyon presented Carpenter with a thorny problem. A preliminary permit had
been issued to Girand in June, 1921. Within a year, he claimed to have
done $100,000 worth of work in anticipation of a final permit.3 6 Notwithstanding Arizona's failure to ratify the Compact, Girand insisted
that the FPC provide him with a license to build. He planned to construct a masonry dam 465 feet high, 920 feet long just above the mouth
of Diamond Creek, along with a power plant that would generate
"200,000 water wheel horsepower."' Even though he stated his willingness to operate his plant subject to the terms of the Colorado River
Compact, the upper states objected based on their conclusion that a
storage dam would increase usage on the lower river leading to priority
claims against the Upper Basin.
Ultimately, the FPC denied the
permit, but Girand continued to submit the application.
Carpenter believed that the pending status of the Girand application, as well as twenty-three others which had been submitted to the
FPC by the end of 1925,139 was heating up the conflict in states which
had not yet ratified the Compact. Awarding a permit to Girand, he
contended, would work against the spirit of the Compact. The Upper
Basin felt no hostility towards Arizona, he maintained, but the rights of
all seven Colorado River basin states would be undermined by the
awarding of a license prior to the signing of a compact. Because the
Girand application was proposed for the use of water, not the occupancy of the land, a license from the FPC would be "an encroachment

134. Letter from Delphus E. Carpenter to Ray Lyman Wilbur, Secretary of the Interior (April 1, 1930) (on file in the Wyoming State Archives, Colorado River Compact
Commission, 1930 Correspondence File, State Engineer Records, RG #0037, Box 1).
135. Id.
136. Letter from D.C, Merrill, Executive Secretary of the Federal Power Commission, to Herbert Hoover (March 3, 1922) (on file in the Colorado State Archives, Department of Natural Resources, Colorado River Commission, RCC #20059, folder #1).
137. Letter from M.C. Hinderlider to Governor Clarence Morley (Nov. 22, 1925)
(on file in the Morley Papers, Colorado State Archives, RCC #26814).
138. Id. See also Letter from Delphus E. Carpenter to Karl C. Schuyler (April 12,
1926) (on file in the Carpenter Papers, Hoover Library, supra note 1, Colorado RiverCommission Correspondence, 1925-1926 (April-June)).
139. S.J. Res. 4, 69th Cong. (1925) (Carpenter Papers, NCWCD, supra note 1, Box

7).
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of federal authority upon state jurisdiction."'4 ° No license should be
issued, Carpenter concluded, until interstate relations were settled.
His commitment to this theme had a notable effect in 1930 when
the Secretary of Interior put out a six-page press release announcing
that an agreement had been reached on the allocation of power at
Boulder Dam. Immediately, Carpenter drew up a memorandum for
the FPC listing the conditions which needed to be included in power
permits and licenses. It stated that permittees would have to recognize
the controlling nature of the Colorado River Compact and "any other
compact or agreement respecting such waters hereafter entered into
by the State or States in which such project is located . . ."'
'.

Secretary

Wilbur replied to Carpenter that his suggestions had been given ample
consideration, that it was the opinion of the FPC that the permits
could reflect his concerns by stating that they were "'subject to all the
terms and conditions of the Federal Water Power Act and of the act of
December 21, 1928, known as the Boulder Canyon Project Act."' "This
language would seem to cover the purpose of your clause," wrote
Wilbur, "and would not leave room for question 4as2 to whether any
other requirement of the act had been overlooked.'
A few months later, Carpenter received word from the FPC that a
different clause would be inserted in all future permits making them
specifically dependent on the Colorado River Compact. He expressed
his appreciation for this concession and stated that after consultation
with commissioners from the other states, he could say that he approved the FPC's course on this matter. 4 3 While he had wanted the
FPC to incorporate an additional statement expressly subjecting the
rights of permitees or licensees to future compacts, he decided not to
press his request in that regard, observing that the Colorado River
Compact adequately provided for such future compacts.
THE RATIFICATION ISSUE
The controversy over power contracts and the authority of interstate stream compacts led to a decision by six of the seven basin states
to revise their ratification of the Colorado River Compact for the pur-

140. Undated typed manuscript (Delphus E. Carpenter's authorship is assumed)
explaining why Arizona should not be allowed to build works at Diamond Creek (on
file in the Carpenter Papers, NCWCD, supra note 1, Box 28).
141. Memorandum from Delphus E. Carpenter (1930) (on file in the Colorado
State Archives, Adams Papers, RCC #26833, folder CRC).
142. Letter from Ray Lyman Wilbur, Secretary of the Interior, to Delphus E. Carpenter (June 27, 1930) (on file in the Wyoming State Archives, State Engineer Papers, RG
0037, Colorado River Commission, 1930 Correspondence File). Four months later,
Carpenter was told that permits would include a statement specifically noting their
subjection to and control by the Colorado River Compact. See Letter from M.C. Tyler,
Chief Engineer Federal Power Commission, to Delphus E. Carpenter (Oct. 1, 1930)
(on file in the New Mexico State Archives, Wilson Papers, supra note 45).
143. Letter from Delphus E. Carpenter to the Federal Power Commission (Oct. 16,
1930) (on file in the New Mexico State Archives, Wilson Papers, supra note 45).
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pose of making it operational without the participation of Arizona. As
with so many decisions related to the Compact, the primary force behind this move came from Carpenter. Although he became tentative
in his advocacy of this plan, the idea was his and acceptance by other
states followed his leadership.
Hoover credited Carpenter with the authorship of the six-state
plan. He agreed with Carpenter that it would do no harm to Arizona
while allowing California and Nevada to take comfort from the beginning of federally constructed works on the river.1" The six-state plan,
Carpenter reasoned, was necessitated
by reason of the adverse attitude of the Federal Power Commission,
as then constituted, requiring that something immediately be done to
avoid the issuing of permits for hostile appropriations and it was only
suggested by reason of the fact that the United States had retained title and control over a half-mile strip along the Colorado River in Arizona, thereby to have some (although not complete) protection
against plants which might be constructed in that region after the
United States had approved the [C]ompact .... In other words, it

was an emergency measure having a large degree (though not complete) [o1 5 protection and grew out of the necessities of a pressing
situation.

Carpenter believed that two of the three members of the FPC (Secretary of War, John W. Weeks, and Secretary of Agriculture, Henry C.
Wallace) favored granting permits for the construction of large power
works along the lower Colorado River. They saw no reason to await
ratification of the Compact, believing instead that "Arizona's delay indicated that the Compact would never be ratified and, therefore, the
Federal Power Commission would be at liberty to proceed without
awaiting further ratification by the states.' 46
Carpenter was also concerned about events in Arizona, although
he consistently stated his belief that Arizona would ratify the Compact
if left alone to do so. Arizona Governor George W. P. Hunt had been
elected to a second term in the fall of 1924. Hunt was an outspoken
opponent of the Compact and had "insisted that the Compact should
not be in effect until the three lower states had entered into a separate
agreement among themselves, requesting the use of the water allo147
cated to those states in block by the Colorado River Compact."
Hunt's opposition and the apparent lack of pro-Compact leadership

144. Telegram from Herbert Hoover to Delphus E. Carpenter (Jan. 23, 1925) (on
file in the Carpenter Papers, NCWCD, supra note 1, Box 37, brown folder).
145. Letter from Delphus E. Carpenter to Charles E. Winter (1927) (on file in the
Carpenter Papers, Hoover Library, supra note 1, Colorado River Commission Correspondence (April-Dec. 1927)).
146. Letter from Delphus E. Carpenter to Charles Springer (Jan. 20, 1927) (on file
in the Carpenter Papers, NCWCD, supra note 1, Box 52, folder 10).
147. Letter from Delphus E. Carpenter to Karl C. Schuyler (April 12, 1926) (on file
in the Carpenter Papers, Hoover Library, supra note 1, Colorado River Commission
Correspondence 1925-1926 (April-June)).
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in Arizona prompted Carpenter to suggest to Hoover and others that
"it might be well for the six states, which had already ratified, to take
legislative action, making the Compact effective when ratified by six or
more [states], thereby leaving the field open to Arizona to enter at her
leisure.""' 8
As historian Norris Hundley, Jr. has concluded, "[t]he state of
Colorado took the lead in trying to find a solution to the problem."' 4 9
Governor William E. Sweet authorized an investigation into the possibility of suing Arizona in the Supreme Court. Fred S. Caldwell, Colorado's Assistant Attorney General, enthusiastically endorsed this approach. With the assistance of Denver's own L. Ward Bannister, a man
who frequently controverted Carpenter's plans and policies, he
planned to file suit with Colorado as the lead plaintiff.'5 Carpenter
bristled. He felt that Arizona had acted neither for nor against the
Compact. That state, he claimed, was entitled to ample time to make
her own decisions. The very object of the Compact, he told Sweet, was
to avoid litigation. Caldwell was a "crusader," never satisfied unless he
was involved in a quarrel5 and someone "who has made a failure of everything he undertook.' '

Sweet accepted Carpenter's judgment and abandoned the plan for
litigation. None of the other states in the Upper Basin wanted to renegotiate the Compact. They agreed with Carpenter that
if... the [C]ompact were agreed to as binding upon the United
States and the six states which have already ratified, it would in large
measure serve the desired purposes, particularly in view of the fact
that the
entire cafion in Arizona is one great Federal Power Re152
serve.

With Hoover's approval, Carpenter drew up the draft of a six-state
compact and then, following Hoover's suggestion, he 53made plans to
discuss it personally with leaders in the other five states.
The bill which Carpenter crafted waived the provisions of the first
paragraph of the Compact's Article X, calling on the six states to ratify
the Compact again without Arizona's participation. Once approved by
six state legislatures and Congress, the Compact would be in effect.
Dam construction on the Colorado River could begin immediately.
Arizona could develop the Gila River to its fullest extent. When more
water was needed by Arizona, Carpenter surmised, Arizona could

148. Letter from Delphus E. Carpenter to Reuel L. Olson (July 30, 1925) (on file in
the Carpenter Papers, NCWCD, supra note 1, Box 7).
149. NoRms HUNDLEY, JR., WATER AND THE WEST 253 (1975).
150. Memorandum from Delphus E. Carpenter to Herbert Hoover (undated memorandum, on file in the New Mexico State Archives, A.T. Hannett Papers).

151. Id.
152. HUNDLEY, supra note 149, at 254.
153. Delphus E. Carpenter, Carpenter Diary (Dec. 6, 1924) (on file in the Carpenter
Papers, NCWCD, supra note 1).
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come in [to the Compact] or sue."15 4
On Carpenter's trip to garner support for the six-state plan, he
won immediate assurances of cooperation from Nevada and Utah, expressions of agreement from New Mexico, and prompt approval from
his own Colorado State Assembly. Wyoming showed some reluctance,
voicing concern about ratifying a compact to which Arizona would not
be a party, but officials soon agreed with Carpenter that there was no
practical alternative. By mid-March 1925, all of the upper states and
Nevada had approved the six-state arrangement, leaving California the
only state unwilling to ratify9.'
Californians Phil Swing, Mark Rose, and their supporters took advantage of the six-state proposal "to agitate once more for a reservation [in the Compact] for a high dam. 56 This time they had considerable political support, including that of California's Colorado River
Commissioner, W. F. McClure. When the state legislature reviewed
Carpenter's proposal, it approved his draft bill but added on amendments stating that it would not be binding on California unless the
President certified that Congress would also authorize construction of
a dam at or below Boulder Canyon.
Carpenter was apoplectic. California's renewed insistence on dam
construction prior to the signing of a compact undermined everything
he had been working for on the Colorado River. At a conference of
Upper Basin states in Denver, a resolution was unanimously passed
stating that any new development on the river would be opposed until
a compact in some form was signed.'57 To Carpenter, California was
playing "the baby act." The state had "turned yellow and backed out of
[the Compact] deal. Of the two states, Arizona [was] the more to be
admired, judged from the standpoint of action taken." He believed
that if California ceased its "childish tactics," Arizona would someday
recognize the need to ratify that document.'5 8
But California was only part of the problem. Utah's legislature repealed its approval of the six-state compact early in January 1927.
California Governor George Dern explained that his state did not feel
protected from Arizona. That state along with California had vast
acres of non-irrigated fertile land, he pointed out, and would be under no constraint to take Colorado River water with the objective of establishing a priority right. Dern also worried about Mexico. A dam at
Boulder Canyon without another dam below it to regulate the water
released for irrigation would be harmful to both basins unless a treaty
were first signed between upper states and lower states. Any attempt to

154. Letter from Delphus E. Carpenter to Herbert Hoover (Nov. 12, 1924) (on file
in the Carpenter Papers, NCWCD, supra note 1, Box 28, folder 10).
155. HUNDLEY, supra note 149, at 254-55. See also Letter from Deiphus E. Carpenter
to Herbert Hoover (Feb. 7, 1925) (on file in the Carpenter Papers, NCWCD, supra
note 1, Box 80).
156.

HUNDLE,,supra note 149, at 255-56.

157. Id. at 257.
158. Letter, supra note 147.
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build Boulder Dam without a seven-state compact, Dern warned,
would result in "tremendous59 interstate litigation [which] would possibly last ten to fifteen years.'

Dern also noted that Utah was hoping to establish control over the
bed of the Colorado River, not only to have jurisdiction over potentially significant power sites but to protect the value of the riverbed as
an oil producing area. If the river were declared navigable (something
denied by the Compact), Utah would not have to worry about losing
control of these resources to the federal government.
Once again, the issue of state sovereignty loomed as a major point
in Compact discussions and in the ratification process. While Californians insisted on the need to have authorization for a dam approved in
the form of a Swing-Johnson Bill before they would sign any form of
compact, the Upper Basin became increasingly hostile towards the
Swing-Johnson Bill, believing that it should be opposed until protection was provided in a signed compact. In Dern's view, the controversy
"raging over the Colorado River [was] essentially between a nationalistic viewpoint and a state viewpoint." We of the West, he stated, "are
getting sick and tired of the doctrine that everything in our states that
is worth anything belongs to Uncle Sam."'
Carpenter concurred. He lamented the fact that Arizona and California could not compose their differences, but he recognized that
with Utah's departure from the six-state plan, the Upper Basin had to
insist that the Lower Basin ratify the Compact "before we dare let them
proceed with any major improvement upon the river out of which any
adverse claims might follow." 6 With California proposing for the sake
of expediency that the Reclamation Service had authority over the
Colorado River and could build wherever it wanted regardless of the
will of the states, Carpenter believed that the Upper Basin had to present a united front in regard to state sovereignty and in opposition to
any federal construction "prior to the complete ratification of the
62
Colorado River Compact by the seven states and the United States.'
In saying this, Carpenter was indicating that he had begun to back
away from his own six-state plan, applying his energies increasingly to
defeat of the Swing-Johnson Bill. Testifying before the House Committee on Irrigation and Reclamation, and speaking in behalf of the
four upper basin states, Carpenter reiterated his insistence that the
Upper Basin required ratification of the Colorado River Compact as a
prerequisite to construction of works on any part of the river. Sevenstate ratification, he now argued, would be preferable, because it
would provide "protection against a repetition of long years of
unfortunate bureaucratic oppression and interstate strife, aggravated
159. Utah Governor George Dern, Speech in Colorado Springs, Colorado (Dec.
1926) (Carpenter Papers, NCWCD, supra note 1, Box 28, folder 9).
160. Id.
161. Letter from Delphus E. Carpenter to Charles E. Winter (May 14, 1927) (on file
in the Carpenter Papers, Hoover Library, supra note 1, Colorado River Commission,
Correspondence (April-Dec. 1927)).
162. Id.
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bureaucratic oppression and interstate strife, aggravated and encouraged by governmental agencies acting through individuals inspired by
ambition to substitute federal control for state authority over a subject
matter properly within the jurisdiction of the states." 63
Carpenter was perfectly willing to accept California's need for
flood control and the building of a dam on the river so long as "adequate measures [were] taken to protect [Upper Basin] interests by
ratification of the Colorado River Compact by the state of California
and the United States prior to any overt act upon which adverse claims
might later be predicated."1 6 The Upper Basin would assume this attitude, Carpenter concluded, from a humanitarian standpoint, "not because we believe it to be the best course. ,,165
Phil Swing was disappointed in Carpenter whose statement and
telegrams to the Committee, Swing wrote, "caused us worry and uneasiness ....You should not put any further obstacles in our way ....
[Y]ou should assist us in getting this bill through, as it is the only way
you are ever going to get your Colorado River Compact ratified." Carpenter's sympathy for Arizona, Swing continued, was misplaced and
unproductive. "Speaking frankly," Swing stated, "your telegram simply
insures Arizona continuing to assume the attitude of cock of the walk
or dog in the manger - an unreasonable attitude which has prevented and is preventing an agreement.'16
But Carpenter was unfazed by Swing's comments. California's determination to force construction on the river prior to making peace
with Arizona and prior to signing a Compact without reservations so
offended him that he rededicated himself to defeat of the Swing-Johnson Bill, politically moving against sentiment which was then building
in Congress to pass this legislation in some form.
Carpenter's tactic was to reemphasize the protection factor that
would be available to the Upper Basin only in a seven-state compact.
Shortly after hearing from Senator Swing, Carpenter admitted that the
Upper Basin had "never been satisfied with the six-state proceeding
but simply consented to it as the lesser of two evils," that is, having no
Compact at all or a Compact that allowed for minimal protection from
Arizona. Following Utah's repeal of the six-state compact, the Upper
Basin had to change its tactics, respecting Utah's sovereign right to
proceed according to its own needs and following the only course
which would fully honor the principles agreed to in Santa Fe in 1922: a
seven-state compact. To proceed on a five-state basis without Utah,
Carpenter noted, "would be ridiculous and to assume that we are not
to take Utah seriously and to proceed on the theory of an ultimate six163. Upper Colorado River States: Hearings on Swing-Johnson Bill Before the House Comm.
On Irrigation and Reclamation, (1926) (statement of Delphus E. Carpenter) (Carpenter
Papers, NCWCD, supra note 1, Box 81, folder 1).

164.
165.
166.
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Id.
Id.
Letter from Phil D. Swing, Senator from California, to Delphus E. Carpenter
27, 1926) (on file in the Carpenter Papers, NCWCD, supra note 1, Box 7).

WATER LAW RE VIEW

Volume 1

state basis is not only insulting to Utah but amounts to deluding ourselves.""'
By the end of 1927, Carpenter was urging Colorado's congressional delegation to stand firm on a seven-state compact. He told
Hoover that the Upper Basin was prepared to insist on seven-state ratification regardless of California's plea for immediate approval of the
Swing-Johnson Bill.'6
Colorado Senator Lawrence Phipps joined others in urging Carpenter to show more flexibility, but Carpenter stiffened his back.
While the Senate Committee on Irrigation and Reclamation worked
feverishly to come up with a compromise acceptable to the Upper Basin, Carpenter remained stubborn, telling Phipps that "ratification [of
the] Compact by seven states and Congress alone [could] provide
complete protection [for the] upper states ....

Even six-state ratifica-

tion [would] leave [the] upper states exposed [to] adverse claims [by]

Arizona.' ' 169 The Colorado River Compact "was drawn upon the theory

of seven-state ratification and without such ratification," said Carpenter, "it becomes a misfit unless cured by both state and congressional
legislation.' 70
Even after the Swing-Johnson Bill passed Congress as the Boulder
Canyon Project Act, signed by President Calvin Coolidge on December
21, 1928, Carpenter was still expressing his opposition to the six-state
concept. The Act stated that if seven-state ratification was not obtained in six months, the six-state option could be invoked. When
Coolidge signed the bill, only four states had endorsed both the sixand seven-state compacts without reservations. Less than three
months after the President signed, both Utah and California ratified
the six-state plan. As a parting shot at California, Carpenter submitted
a bill to the Colorado State Assembly designed to withdraw Colorado
from its six-state ratification. In a letter to L. Ward Bannister,
Carpenter stated that he had drawn the bill at the request of Colorado
Senator Waterman, but would not support it when it came up for
discussion. 7 '
In many ways, Carpenter was giving vent to his
frustrations.
167.

Letter from Delphus E. Carpenter to Charles B. Timberlake (Feb. 16, 1927)

(on file in the Carpenter Papers, Hoover Library, supra note 1, Colorado River Commission, Correspondence (Jan.-March 1927)).
168. Letter from Delphus E. Carpenter to Herbert Hoover (Dec. 31, 1927) (on file
in the Carpenter Papers, NCWCD, supra note 1, Box 79, Hoover Letters). See also

17, 1927 (on file in the Carpenter Papers, NCWCD, supra note
1).
169. Telegram from Delphus E. Carpenter to Lawrence C. Phipps, Senator from
Colorado (Dec. 31, 1927) (on file in the Carpenter Papers, NCWCD, supra note 1,Box
37, folder 10).
170. Letter from Delphus E. Carpenter to Judge S. Harrison White (April 13, 1928)
(on file in the Carpenter Papers, NCWCD, supra note 1, Box 37, folder 10).
171. Letter from L. Ward Bannister to Senator Lawrence C. Phipps (Jan. 19, 1929)
(on file in the New Mexico State Archives, Wilson Papers, supra note 45); Letter from
L. Ward Bannister to Francis C. Wilson (Jan. 17, 1929) (on file in the New Mexico
State Archives, Wilson Papers, supra note 45). Bannister surmised that Carpenter
might have agreed to submit the bill for the effect that it might have on California.
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On June 25, 1929, newly elected President Herbert Hoover, "after
waiting the six months required by the Boulder Canyon Project Act,
issued a proclamation declaring the act effective. 172 Carpenter's principal task was to interpret the meaning and intent of what had now become law.
THE MEANING AND INTENT
Immediately after the Compact had become the law of the Colorado River, Carpenter was involved in answering questions regarding
the meaning of the agreement generally and the intent of specific articles. These explanations began less than a month after the Compact
was signed in Santa Fe. They continued well into the 1930s at a time
when Carpenter was bedridden from the effects of Parkinson's disease.
"Broadly speaking," he stated in 1922, "from a Colorado viewpoint
the [C] ompact perpetually sets apart and withholds for the benefit of
Colorado a preferred right to utilize the waters of the river within this
State to the extent of our present and future necessities. '
It protected Colorado's development against adverse claims resulting from
construction of works on the lower river. It removed "all excuses for
embargoes upon our future development and leaves us free to develop
out territory in the manner and at the times our necessities may require.' 74 The "intent of the [C]ompact," he stated, could only be understood by considering "the entire instrument" with each clause being viewed in connection with the other clauses.
As with the South Platte River Compact, which Carpenter had been
working on since 1916, the Colorado River Compact was viewed by
Carpenter as a treaty that heralded "the triumph of interstate diplomacy and local autonomy over interstate warfare (litigation) and over
ultimate subjugation to perpetual federal supervision .

,,76

Hun-

dreds of potential suits between users would be prevented by signing
the Compact while "the fullest possible comity and cooperation" would
provide peace and security to farm, city, and other inhabitants.'77 Until
it was time to further apportion surplus water (after October 1, 1963,
according to the Compact), Carpenter said, the Compact would control and would be "the law of the land as to all rights that may vest
within each division upon the river . . . .,,T It fixed a "permanent
172. HUNDLEY, supra note 149, at 281.
173. Memorandum from Delphus E. Carpenter to Governor Oliver H. Shoup (on
file in the Carpenter Papers, NCWCD, supra note 1, Colorado River Compact, Box 1,
folder 20). See also Delphus E. Carpenter, Supplemental Report of Delphus E. Carpenter, Commissioner for Colorado, Colorado River Commission (Dec. 15, 1922) (Carpenter Papers, NCWCD, supra note 1, Box 56, folder 5).
174. Id.
175. Id.
176. Telegram from Delphus E. Carpenter to M.C. Hinderlider (Feb. 25, 1926) (on
file in the Carpenter Papers, NCWCD, supra note 1, Box 6, folder 5).

177. Id.
178. Letter from Delphus E. Carpenter to Herbert Hoover (Nov. 16, 1922) (on file
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status" on the river with respect to future developments so that meritorious projects could proceed "with that degree of certainty essential to
sound investment. ,17T
The general aim of the Colorado River Compact, Carpenter concluded, was to protect "primarily people who [were] yet to be
born .... " The difficulties of the present, Carpenter told Congress in
1925, "sink into insignificance compared with the problems which
[would have] otherwise confront[ed] our descendants in the passing
of centuries" if no Compact had been signed. 8 '
In reference to the future, Carpenter insisted, there was surplus
water in the river for future appropriations. The Compact specifically
allocated 16 maf plus the international burden "as designated burdens
upon the whole supply of the river, the unallocated surplus being
dedicated to future apportionments amongst all seven states." Of the
16 mai aggregate, 7.5 maf per annum (beneficial consumptive use)
was "permanently allocated" to the Upper Basin and 7.5 maf plus 1
maf per annum (beneficial consumptive use) was "permanently allocated" to the Lower Basin. "These permanent allocations," said Carpenter, "include [d] all water necessary to supply all present appropriations, wherever the same may be and whether from the main stream or
from the Green, the Gila or any other tributary."'"" Only in the event
that the international burden exceeded the surplus of the whole river
and tributaries (above 16 maf) would it become necessary "to take
some international water from that allocated to the two basins,' 82 thus
obligating each basin to contribute one-half of the deficiency. "[I]n
that event," Carpenter concluded, "there would be no unallocated
surplus.' 13 In other words, "[t]he surplus flow 8 [was]
the water in the
4
stream in excess of that allocated in perpetuity.'
"Beneficial consumptive use," Carpenter pointed out, was to be distinguished from amounts diverted from the river. It did not mean
headgate diversions. It meant that amount of water consumed and lost
to the river. Aggregate annual diversions in the Upper Basin were not

in the Carpenter Papers, NCWCD, supra note 1, Box 7). Carpenter also noted that the

Compact "controls those rights that are so vested thereafter and forever.., until a new
agreement is written."
179. Letter from Delphus E. Carpenter to John C. Greenaway (Aug. 11, 1922) (on

file in the Carpenter Papers, NCWCD, supra note 1, Box 48, folder 16).
180. Colorado River Basin HearingsBefore the Comm. on Irrigationand Reclamation Pursuant to S. Res. 320, 69th Cong. (1925) (testimony of Delphus E. Carpenter) (on file in
the Carpenter Papers, NCWCD supra note 1).

181. Memorandum from Delphus E. Carpenter to the Arizona-California Tri-State
Compact Meeting Participants (May 22, 1929) (on file in the Carpenter Papers, Hoover Library, supra note 1, Colorado River Commission Correspondence (March-April

1929)). Carpenter further stated that the unallocated surplus consisted of "that por-

tion of the water of the whole river system over and above the 16,000,000 [acre-feet]
allocated to the seven states plus the international burden."
182. Id.
183. Id.
184. SALT LAKE CITY TRIBUNE, May 1, 1927 (on file in the Carpenter Papers,
NCWCD, supra note 1)
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limited by the Compact. "The limitation appl [ied] only to the amount
consumed."'' 5 Generally speaking, Carpenter explained to Governor
Shoup, consumptive use is the difference between the aggregate diverted and the aggregate return flow. It is the net loss through beneficial use. 86
Transmountain diversion was an example of beneficial consumptive use. Carpenter testified to the Senate in 1925 that the Colorado
River had a total supply of 21.6 maf. After allotments were made to
both basins (7.5 maf and 8.5 maf to the upper and lower basins respectively), 5.6 maf of unallotted surplus remained in the river from which
a maximum of 650,000 acre-feet would be removed eventually by way
of transmountain diversion to Colorado's East Slope. But this diversion, he contended, was absolutely legal. The Court had determined
that it was "perfectly legitimate to tunnel from one drainage to another; to take for example the waters of the Atlantic and take them to
areas on the Pacific, and vice versa. There [was] nothing sacred about
"'187
a drainage area in the use of the water of a stream.
Where the meaning of the Compact became more contentious was
over the language in Article III. Almost a decade after the Compact
was signed, Northcutt Ely noted that Article III (a) apportioned to each
basin "the exclusive beneficial consumptive use of 7,500,000 acre-feet
of water per annum."'" As noted above, "consumptive use" was understood to mean not the quantity diverted but "the lesser quantity that is
in fact consumed."'8 9 Article III(d), however, obligated the Upper Basin not to delete the flow of the Colorado River at Lee's Ferry below an
aggregate of 75 maf for any period of ten consecutive years. The similarity between this number, divided by ten, and the apportionment of
7.5 maf of "annual consumptive use made by Article III(a) "was an unfortunate coincidence."'' 90 The guarantee of a flow of "wet water" at
Lee's Ferry has caused problems. As Ely pointed out, Article III(d)
"excludes the consumptive use on the Lower Basin tributaries, notably
the Gila, whereas the apportionment made by Article III(a) includes
the use of these tributaries by definition. The commissioners understood the difference between 111(a) and III(d) but some of their successors in public office did not."''
185. Delphus E. Carpenter, Supplemental Report of Delphus E. Carpenter, supra
note 173.
186. Id.
187. ColoradoRiver BasinHearings,supra note 170.
188. Northcutt Ely, Herbert Hoover and the Colorado River (unpublished and undated essay, on file in the Carpenter Papers, Hoover Library, supra note 1, Colorado
River Commission: Commerce Papers).
189. Id.
190. Id.
191. Id. In Ely's words, "The guarantee at Lee Ferry is in terms of a flow of wet water, not in terms of consumptive use, which is the measure of the apportionment made
by Article III(a). Since the III(d) guarantee is measured at the division point between
the two basins, it excludes the consumptive use on the Lower Basin tributaries, notably
the Gila, whereas the apportionment made by Article III(a) includes the use of those
tributaries, by definition."
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Carpenter felt the need to explain this confusion. The 7.5 maf in
Article 111(d), he told Ely, bore "no direct relation to the allocation of
7,500,000 acre-feet per annum to the Lower Basin under paragraph
(a)." In fact,
[p]aragraph (d) is purely in the nature of a guaranty by the Upper
Basin to the Lower Basin that the Upper Basin will never deplete the
flow below 75,000,000 acre-feet every ten years. This amount covers
the total required delivery for all purposes .... The paragraph [ (d)]
originated solely out of a fear entertained by Commissioners for California and Arizona, that the Upper States would exceed their allocation and would unduly deplete the supply to the Lower Basin in periods of extreme drought. Accordingly, our engineers calculated the
flow at Lee Ferry and ascertained that the Upper States probably
could safely guarantee delivery to the Lower States of an aggregate of
75,000,000 acre-feet in any ten-year period. This does not mean that
the Upper States guarantee to deliver 7,500,000 acre-feet in any year.
They may deliver no water at all in one year, 10,000,000 in another
year, 7,000,000 in another year, etc., so long as the aggregate for ten
years is 75,000,000 acre-fee~t." '
Article 111(d) had additional significance to Carpenter. Under its
guarantee, he noted, "the Mexican burden falls upon the Lower Basin
supply composed of waters originating in the Lower Basin tributaries
and in waters to pass Lee's Ferry. "From the aggregate supply provided by these two sources, the Lower Basin received its 8.5 maf, "the
entire Mexican burden and a considerable part of the unallocated
surplus." This is, said Carpenter,
the plain meaning of the simple language of the [C]ompact and any
shifting of burdens or agreements respecting sources of supply within
the Lower Basin are purely local to that basin and in no wise effect
[sic] the rights of the Upper basin under the Compact. In this class
would fall such proposals as exempting the Gila waters from the
Mexican burden, limitations respecting diversions from the main
stream, etc.
Consideration of the Gila River also formed part of the commissioners'
decision to draw up Article 111(b). The origins of III(b), according to
Carpenter, could be found in the lengthy discussions of the Colorado
River system as a whole, including the Gila River. In his words:
192. Letter from Delphus E. Carpenter to Northcutt Ely (Dec. 5, 1930) (on file in
the Carpenter Papers, NCWCD, supra note 1, Box 52, folder 1). A similar interpretation was reached in a May 30, 1975 resolution by five Colorado attorneys assigned to
the task of interpreting Article III(a) and III(d) for the Upper Colorado River Commission. Signed byJohn M. Sayre, Glenn G. Saunders, CharlesJ. Beise, Frank E. May-

nes, and Kenneth Balcomb, this resolution stated in part, "That Article III(d) of the
1922 Compact did not constitute an apportionment of water but was simply an operational schedule to transform the equal annual apportionment made in Article III(a)
into a ten-year running average." A copy of this resolution was provided to the author
by Jan Bird, Upper Colorado Commission, Salt Lake City, Utah.
193. Letter from Delphus E. Carpenter to Northcutt Ely (Dec. 5, 1930) (on file in
the Carpenter Papers, NCWCD, supra note 1, Box 52, folder 1).
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Negotiations [in Santa Fe] had proceeded past the point of agreeing
upon an allocation of 7,500,000 acre-feet to each [b]asin and of an
allocation of undetermined quantity to Mexico and of agreeing to
leave an unallocated surplus for distribution at the end of forty years,
when it suddenly developed that the Arizona Commissioner [W. S.
Norviel] had been laboring under an erroneous belief that the Gila
waters were not a part of the water supply of the Colorado River system. The sudden realization of the truth and of the fact that the waters of the Gila are as much a part of the common supply as are the
waters of the Green, Grand or any other of the many tributaries...
brought the Commission to a consideration of the fact that either
more water should be allocated to the Lower basin or further allocation of the unallocated surplus of4 the entire river supply must be undertaken in less than forty years.1
The commissioners agreed to add an extra 1 maf to the Lower Basin
"by reason of the new set up [sic] respecting then present Lower Basin
uses (including then present consumption of Gila River water) and future potentialities."'9 But because potential for future development, at
least in Carpenter's opinion, was greater in the Upper Basin and because the allocation of more water to the Lower Basin might appear
unfair and might cause the Compact to be rejected, "paragraph (b)
was agreed to as accomplishing the desired purpose and avoiding the
appearance of unfairness.,"19'
Carpenter's sensitivity to any misunderstanding of the Compact's
intent and meaning applied equally to statements by Herbert Hoover,
for whom he had the greatest respect. Nevertheless, when Hoover got
it wrong, Carpenter was quick to suggest clarification. Early in 1923,
Senator Carl Hayden requested that Hoover respond in writing to
twenty questions about the Compact.'9
The substance of some of
Hoover's remarks caused Carpenter to telegraph some questions and
answers of his own.
Was it not true, Carpenter queried, that
the intent of the Commission in framing the Colorado River Compact
was as follows: that paragraph (b) of [A]rticle III means that the
Lower Basin may increase its annual beneficial consumptive use of
water one million acre-feet and no more;... that [A]rticle VIII is not
intended to authorize, constitute or result in any apportionment of
water to the Lower Basin beyond that made in paragraphs (a) and
(b) of [A] rticle III? ' 9'
Hoover concurred and said that he would so advise Congress. Nothing
in the Compact, he added, would prevent the states in either basin

194. Id.
195. Id.
196. Id.
197. CONG. REc. (1923) (remarks of the Honorable Carl Hayden) (on file in the
Carpenter Papers, NCWCD, supra note .1,Box 28, folder 10).
198. Telegram from Delphus E. Carpenter to Herbert Hoover (Feb. 10, 1923) (on
file in the Carpenter Papers, NCWCD, supra note 1, Box 5, folder 5).
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from using more water than the amount apportioned in paragraphs
(a) and (b) of Article III, although such use would be subject to the
terms stated in Article III(f). For clarity's sake, he concluded, Article
VIII was not intended to "authorize, constitute or result in any apportionment of water to the [L]ower [B]asin beyond that made in paragraphs (a) and (b) of [A]rticle III."' 9
Carpenter had other concerns. He took issue with Hoover's response to a question about surplus water in the river. Unapportioned
water, Hoover wrote, "could be taken and used in either basin [assuming that Compact allotments were already put to beneficial consumptive use] under the ordinary rules governing appropriations, and such
appropriations would doubtless receive formal
recognition by the
200
Commission at the end of the 40-year period.

This interpretation, Carpenter replied, was just plain wrong. By
telegram he told Hoover that
[i]f [the] [L]ower [B]asin by building large reservoirs and canals of

sufficient capacity can claim in advance and finally appropriate and
take as against the [U]pper [B]asin the unapportioned waters while
[the] [U]pper [B]asin is developing towards.., full consumption of
its present apportionment under paragraph (a) of [Ajrticle III, then
paragraph (f) of [A]rticle III and [the] preamble of [the] pact become misleading and ineffective. Under [the] terms and spirit of the
[Clompactclaims of appropriation by one basin to the unapportioned
waters cannot be made, such matters being expressly deferred for the
supplemental appropriation. °'
Were Hoover's interpretation accepted as correct, "the reservation of
rights for upper basin states in accordance with the spirit of the
[C]ompact would need to be imposed upon any reservoir construction
allowed., 2 2 As he understood the Compact, Carpenter told Governor
Shoup, "the unapportioned waters are reserved for 'further equitable
apportionment' between the two [b]asins" thus negating any suggestion that excess uses in either [b]asin [would] be regarded as legal
appropriations.
Such excess uses would have to be "by sufferance

199. Telegram from Herbert Hoover to Delphus E. Carpenter (Feb. 12, 1923) (on
file in the Carpenter Papers, Hoover Library, supra note 1, Hoover Papers, Colorado
River Commission, container 12).
200. Herbert Hoover's Response to Question 10, CONG. REc. (1923) (remarks of the

Honorable Carl Hayden) (on file in the Carpenter Papers, NCWCD, supra note 1, Box
28, folder 10).

201. Telegram from Delphus E. Carpenter to Herbert Hoover (emphasis added)
(Feb. 14, 1923) (on file in the Carpenter Papers, NCWCD, supra note 1, Box 5, folder
5 and on file in the Carpenter Papers, Hoover Library, supra note 1, Colorado River
Commission: Commerce Papers).
202. Id.
203. Delphus E. Carpenter, Supplemental Report of Delphus E. Carpenter, Commissioner for Colorado, Colorado River Commission (Dec. 15, 1922) reprinted in
SENATEJOURNAL, IN RE SECOND READING OF

S.B. 410-A

COLORADO RIVER COMPAcT, at 75-86 (1923).
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and without legal foundation .... "20 4 All excess diversions would be
made "at the peril of the users" and "[t]his applies to the excess uses
made either before or after the expiration of the forty-year period."° 5
Carpenter also objected to Hoover's interpretation of the specific
water lower basin states could expect to pass Lee's Ferry. Hoover had
told Senator Hayden that the Lower Basin would get the entire flow of
the river "less only the amount consumptively used in the upper
[s]tates for agricultural purposes."' 6 Again, Carpenter disagreed.
"Paragraph (e) of [A] rticle III is reciprocal," he pointed out."7
[The] Upper Basin is not required to deliver and the Lower basin is
not required to demand ....

Your interpretation indicates that the

Upper Basin must allow all waters not consumptively used in agriculture to flow down to [the] Lower Basin for power purposes
there .... That would nullify paragraph (b) of [A] rticle IV which allows impounding of water for power in both basins ....

From [a]

practical standpoint impounding of water for power in [the] Upper
Basin would tend to equalize the flow for similar power projects in
the Lower Basin."'
It was hoped, Carpenter said, that the Secretary would consider these
points in his final report to Congress.
As much as Carpenter urged simplicity in the Compact, Article VIII
also proved problematic. Critics argued that it gave the Lower Basin
an additional appropriation of water. But Carpenter explained that it
was not intended to authorize
an apportionment of water beyond that
9
authorized in Article

111.20

By reason of a fear that further development might temporarily deplete the low flow of the river in autumn and early winter of dry years
it is provided by Article [VIII] that present perfected appropriation
upon the lower river shall not be precluded from [protection] from
encroachments upon their supplies until reservoirs have been constructed to store a° definite part of the water apportioned to the
2
[L]ower [B]asin.

The storage of water under Article VIII, however, had to be in harmony with Article III(f) and (a). "Taking the [C]ompact as a whole
and construing its provisions together," Carpenter wrote in 1922, "Article VIII does not authorize, constitute or result in any apportionment
204. Id.
205. Id.

206. Herbert Hoover's Response (d) to Question 20, CONG. REc. (1923) (remarks of
the Honorable Carl Hayden) (on file in the Carpenter Papers, NCWCD, supra note 1,
Box 28, folder 10).
207. Telegram from Delphus E. Carpenter to Herbert Hoover (Feb. 14, 1923) (on
file in the Carpenter Papers, NCWCD, supra note 1, Box 5, folder 5).
208. Id.
209. Telegram from Delphus E. Carpenter to Herbert Hoover (Feb. 12, 1923) (on
file in the Carpenter Papers, NCWCD, supra note 1, Box 5, folder 5).
210. SALT LAKE CITYTRIBUNE, supra note 184.
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of water to the Lower Basin beyond that made in paragraphs (a) and
(b) of Article III......
Present perfected claims of the Lower Basin were
"neither acknowledged nor denied and their legal status, whatever it
[might] be, [was] temporarily left as it was at the time of the
[C]ompact. But when the reservoir was constructed, any claims
against the Upper Basin by such 'present perfected rights' are thereafter cut off."2 2
Testifying before the Senate in 1925, Carpenter told congressmen
that the language of Article VIII emerged "when men were tired and
worn." 213 Representatives from the Imperial Valley had made a plea for
storage or regulation of Colorado River water so they could count on a
supply for their 500,000 acres of very valuable land during periods of
low water. Article VIII was drawn at the last session of the meetings in
Santa Fe. The 5,000,000 acre-feet of storage mentioned in Article VIII
was intended to be a minimum. The capacity of a reservoir could be as
high as 20,000,000 acre-feet, depending on the advice of engineers
and the point selected for a dam. Carpenter told the Senators that
the point I wish to press to your attention is that not one right.., of
the Imperial Valley is injured by this [C]ompact and [the Valley] is
fully protected by the specific provisions of Article [VIII]. These
lower river rights are left without impairment and we of the north are
exposed to attack until the reservoir has been provided. So the
statement that the [C]ompact gave way certain rights that the lower
country had is evidently based upon a misconstruction214of the terms
and provisions of the very [C] ompact under discussion.
Of the many themes in the Compact which bear Carpenter's mark,
none is as persistent as the idea that states control their own water
supply. In Article IV, the commissioners addressed the issue of state
sovereignty by stating that the Colorado River was no longer navigable
for commerce and therefore not subject to federal regulation. Paragraph (c) clearly stated that states were responsible for the "appropriation, use and distribution of water" within their own boundaries.
In other words, the constitution and laws of Colorado control the details of appropriation, use and distribution of water within the state.
The [C] ompact does not attempt to invade such matters of local concern ....It deals wholly with interstate relations .... Whatever the
intrastate regulation and control may be [the Compact] cannot effect
[sic] the interstate relations. No law of any state can have extraterritorial effect 216
or interfere with the operation of the [C]ompact as between states.

211.
212.
213.
214.
215.
216.

Carpenter, supra note 203.
Id.
ColoradoRiver Basin Hearings,supra note 180.
Id.
Carpenter, supra note 203.
Id.
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When Utah expressed concern regarding the issue of navigability of
the Colorado River in 1927, Carpenter telegraphed Governor Dern,
stating that Article IV did not affect Utah's title to the bed of the river.
The Compact
merely makes navigation subservient to other more important uses of
water. This provision [was] necessary to protect [the] upper states

against claims by lower states and Mexico that diversions in [the] upper states [might] impair navigability [on the] lower river. That ti tie
to [the] bed [of a] navigable river passes to [a] state on admission
and remains in [the] state until conveyed .... [The] [C]ompact in
title to [the] riverbed and strengthno manner relinquishes Utah['s]
2 7
1
ens her title in [the] waters.

CONCLUSION
Carpenter was the intellectual architect of the Colorado River
Compact. From his early years in law school, his experience as a state
senator, his appointment as Interstate Streams Commissioner of Colorado, his work on Wyoming v. Colorado, and his development of the interstate treaty process with Nebraska and New Mexico, he became almost singularly obsessed with the efficacy of solving interstate stream
problems through negotiation resulting in compacts. He recommended this solution to the seven states of the Colorado River basin in
1920 and he carried discussions forward until a Compact was finally
signed in Santa Fe in 1922. His understanding of constitutional law,
the nuances of political life, and the hydrology of rivers gave him
credibility in discussions with experts at the federal, state, and local
levels. Patient and willing, for the most part, to understand viewpoints
of others, he gradually assumed the leadership of the Colorado River
Commission, gaining the respect and confidence of its chairman, Herbert Hoover. The accolades he received in the years following 1922
are testimony to the respect which both friends and adversaries accorded him after the Compact had become the law of the river.
With understated pride, Carpenter told the commissioners in
Santa Fe, New Mexico that the signed Compact represented
the first exemplification of interstate diplomacy in the history of the
United States on so large a scale. Each member may take home with
him and reserve unto himself all the credit that is due, and a large
of the credit is due to each of the members of this Commismeasure
211
sion.

They had achieved their objective of fixing a "permanent status" with

217.
1927)
218.
Santa
brary,

Telegram from Delphus E. Carpenter to Utah Governor George Dern (Feb. 14,
(Dern Papers, supra note 47).
Minutes, twenty-seventh meeting of the Colorado River Compact Commission,
Fe, New Mexico (Nov. 24, 1922) (on file in the Carpenter Papers, Hoover Lisupra note 1, Box 39, Colorado River Commission).
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respect to the future development of the Colorado River. The treaty
signed in the Governor's Palace ultimately became the law of the river
"and every appropriation and use of water will be subject to its governing provisions."" 9
As Northcutt Ely noted sixty years later, the Compact's most direct
result was that it made possible the Boulder Canyon Project Act. The
Compact was
the first and great[est] instance in which Congress adopted the terms
of a Compact as part of a Federal statute, and, indeed, subjected the
exercise of Federal powers to the control of an interstate compact.
The genius of the [C]ompact was its isolation and solution of the issues between the two basins which had to be disposed of before storage could be built in either with safety to the other, while avoiding local issues whose solution was not essential in advance of the
construction of Hoover Dam.
No statement could have summed up any better Carpenter's contribution to the Colorado River Compact.

219. Delphus E. Carpenter, Speech to the Colorado Stockgrowers' Association (June
16, 1927) (transcript available in the Carpenter Papers, Hoover Library, supra note 1,
Colorado River Commission Correspondence (April-Dec. 1927)). See also Letter from
Delphus E. Carpenter to Mr. Greenaway (Aug. 11, 1922) (on file in the Carpenter Papers, NCWCD, supra note 1, Box 48, folder 16).
220. Northcutt Ely, Herbert Hoover and the Colorado River (on file in the Carpenter Papers, Hoover Library, supra note 1, General Accession 646).
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I. COLORADO GROUND WATER MANAGEMENT ACT
The first major comprehensive Colorado statute to deal exclusively
with groundwater was the 1965 Colorado Ground Water Management Act ("1965 Act").' The 1965 Act established a procedure for
"designating" ground water within the state. It also created the Colorado Ground Water Commission to regulate and administer designated ground water. There are currently eight designated ground
water basins, all of which are located in eastern Colorado.
When it was originally adopted, the 1965 Act contained thirty-eight
subsections. Only one of the subsections was applicable to non-designated ground water. The 1965 Act has since been amended, most
notably in 1985 by Senate Bill 5. However, it still contains only a few
subsections that are applicable to both designated and non-designated ground water within Colorado.
II. DESIGNATED GROUND WATER
A. Classification
If ground water satisfies either of two statutory definitions, the
Ground Water Commission can designate it, thereby removing it
from both the administrative jurisdiction of the State Engineer
and the judicial jurisdiction of the Water Courts.
1. Definitions
In order for ground water to be subject to designation, it
must meet either of two statutory definitions:

1. Colorado Ground Water Management Act, ch. 319, 1965 Colo. Sess. Laws 1246
(codified at COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 37-90-101 to -143 (1997)).
2. Those eight basins are as follows: Upper Crow Creek, Lost Creek, Kiowa-Bjou,
Upper Black Squirrel, Upper Big Sandy, Northern High Plains, Southern High Plains and
Camp Creek (seediscussion infra at I. 1.a.i.).
3. COLO. REV. STAT. § 37-90-103(6) (a) (1997).
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a. Definition 1
"'Designated ground water' means ground water which
in its natural course would not be available to and required for the fulfillment of decreed surface rights ..
Example
That part of the Ogallala Formation remote from discharge areas, as in the Southern High Plains.
DefinitionalProblems
i. Can any so-called "connate" water ever qualify under this test? After the passage of sufficient time
(e.g., millennia) most ground water eventually contributes to surface flows.
Colorado Revised Statutes section 37-90-10.5 provides
that the statutory definition of "nontributary ground
water" (see discussion infra at III.A.2.) applies to post1984 basins. One post-1984 basin, Upper Crow
Creek, has been designated to date. Pursuant to Rule
4.2.19 of the Designated Basin Rules,4 (see discussion
infra at II.B.2.), the statutory definition of nontributary ground water now also applies to those designated basins established before January 1, 1985 (Lost
Creek, Kiowa-Bijou, Upper Black Squirrel, Upper Big
Sandy, Northern High Plains, Southern High Plains
and Camp Creek).
ii. If ground water which satisfied this test at the time
of basin designation subsequently becomes necessary for the fulfillment of decreed surface rights because of man-altered conditions, does it then fail to
qualify?
Example
The depletion of Ogallala discharge to live streams
in Northeastern Colorado (e.g., North Fork of the
Republican River).
b. Definition 2
"'Designated ground water' means ... ground water in

areas not adjacent to a continuously flowing natural
stream wherein ground water withdrawals have constituted the principal water usage for at least fifteen years

4.

2 COLO.CODE REG. § 410-1 (effective May 1, 1992).
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preceding the date of the first hearing on proposed
designation of the basin ......
Examples
The Upper Black Squirrel Creek, the Kiowa and Bijou Creeks, and the Upper Big Sandy Creek.
Definitional Problems
i. Does "adjacent" mean something less inclusive than
"hydraulically connected to"? If so, what is the legal
standard of adjacency?
ii. How is the "principal water usage" to be documented - by annual or cumulative diversions, by
numbers of diversion structures (i.e., ditches and
wells), or by relative amounts of irrigated acreage?
2. Significance of Designation
a. Physical Significance
Ground water that is either physically tributary to, or nontributary to, surface streams can qualify for designation;
designated ground water basins are essentially legal-political boundaries, and not necessarily coincident with
hydrologic boundaries.' For example, Colorado Revised
Statutes section 37-90-106(4) prohibits any further designation of any portions of the Dawson-Arkose, Denver
and Arapahoe aquifers and most of the Laramie-Fox
Hills aquifer. For the foreseeable future, the rural eastern 47% of these aquifers will remain within previously
formed designated basins while the urbanized western
53% will remain undesignated.6
b. Administrative Significance
Upon the creation of a designated basin, the initiation,
protection and transfer of ground water rights comes
5. Note that the Ground Water Commission must alter the boundaries of designated basins when new information supporting such alteration becomes available.
COLO. REv. STAT. § 37-90-106 (1997). Furthermore, the Commission is typically entitled to make the decision as to whether a particular well is producing designated
ground water (thereby subjecting it to the administrative jurisdiction of the Commission), rather than non-designated ground water (water which is instead within the
administrative authority of the State Engineer). See Pioneer Irrigation Dists. v. Danielson, 658 P.2d 842, 843-44 (Colo. 1983); State ex rel. Danielson v. Vickroy, 627 P.2d 752,
756 (Colo. 1981); but see Ground Water Comm'n v. Shanks, 658 P.2d 847 (Colo. 1983).
6. There is a special statutory exception under which a specific, remote portion of
the Laramie-Fox Hills Aquifer might be designated as part of the Upper Crow Creek
Designated Ground Water Basin. COLO. REV. STAT. § 37-90-106(4) (b) (1997).
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under the jurisdiction of the Ground Water Commission,
a twelve-member board appointed by the Governor pursuant to a statutory formula weighted heavily towards agricultural interests. The Ground Water Commission
meets at least quarterly. The Commissioners are unpaid,
but do receive compensation for their expenses. The
bulk of the Commission's day-to-day work is carried out
by the State Engineer who acts ex-officio as its Executive
Director. The State Engineer is in turn assisted by a small
professional staff.
Once a designated basin is formed, resident taxpaying
electors have the option to petition the Ground Water
.Commission to conduct an election on whether to form a
ground water management district in any part of the basin. A management district is a quasi-municipal corporation akin to a water and sanitation district. Management
districts have taxation powers (including the authority to
impose limited ad valorem and well capacity levies), regulation powers (including the doubtful authority to prohibit the exportation of designated ground water to
points outside the ground water management district),
research capability, and rather vague, untested powers
concerning the administration of designated ground water aquifers that allow administration in a manner that is
other than by strict adherence to the priority system. To
date, the management districts that have been formed
cover most of the eight existing designated basins. They
act principally as the Commission's local enforcement
arms and enforce the Commission policies and orders.
They also promulgate local technical rules that govern
the use and transfer of ground water. The management
districts have become involved in a variety of technical
enforcement disputes (including attempts to prohibit
exportation) They have also acted in cooperation with
Ground Water Commission and United States Geological
Survey research projects. To date, management districts
have not attempted to promulgate curtailment regulations directed at existing wells that would preserve or extend declining ground water resources. The reasons for
this are primarily twofold: 1) their staffs and budgets are
wholly inadequate for the task, and 2) it is politically unpopular to promote such programs at the local level.
7. No attempt is made here to canvass the numerous legal problems that can crop
up in the formation, alteration, or dissolution of ground water management districts,
nor to inventory the scope of their statutory powers. However, Senate Bill 69, enacted
on June 7, 1979, significantly strengthened the potential authority of management districts by delegating to them certain of the Ground Water Commission's powers upon
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c. Judicial Significance
Once a ground water basin is designated, any legal disputes with the Ground Water Commission and/or the
ground water management districts are heard in the district court of the county in which the dispute arose, not in
the Water Courts. In the case of an appeal from a rule
adopted by the Ground Water Commission, the case is
heard in Denver District Court.8 A single district judge is
appointed annually as "designated ground water judge"
for each designated basin 9 (just as a single water judge
has presided over all non-designated water matters in
each water division since the passage of the Water Right
Determination and Adjudication Act of 196910).
B. Initiation, Allocation and Protection of Designated Ground
Water Rights.
1. Small Capacity Wells
Subject to those rules in the Colorado Code of Regulations,"
and further subject to ground water management district
rules and regulations, 12 the State Engineer can approve permits for certain types of wells that do not exceed 50 gallons
per minute (gpm) and 5 acre-feet (at) per year without meeting the substantive test enumerated for each designated basin
in the Designated Basin Rules (see discussion infra at II.B.2).
Ground water management districts now have authority to
enforce the condition in small capacity well permits.13
2. Large Capacity Wells
Numerous questions concerning the initiation and allocation
of ground water rights for wells in designated basins (other
than small capacity wells) were comprehensively addressed by
the Ground Water Commission's adoption of the Rules and
Regulations for Management and Control of Designated
Ground Water ("Designated Basin Rules"). 4
the issuance of final permits. S. 69, 52nd Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. (Colo. 1979). See COLO.
REv. STAT. § 37-90-130(2) (1997). However, the actual exercise of this enlarged
authority has been slow to follow.
8. CoLO. REv. STAT. § 37-90-115(1)(a), (2) (1997).
9. Id. § 37-90-115(1)(b)(V).
10. Id. § 37-92-203(2).
11. 2 COLO. CODE REG. 402-4 (effective November 1, 1991).
12. COLO. REV. STAT. § 37-90-105 (1997) (as amended by H.R. 98-1151, 61st Leg.,
2nd Reg. Sess. (Colo. 1998), enacted onJune 1, 1998).
13. COLO. REv. STAT. § 37-90-130(4) (adopted in 1998 as part of H.R. 98-1151, 61st
Leg., 2nd Reg. Sess. (Colo. 1998), enacted on June 1, 1998).
14. 2 COLO. CODE REG. 410-1 (effective May 1, 1992). Certain provisions of the Designated Basin Rules were incorporated into the 1965 Colorado Ground Water Management
Act by the Legislature in H.B. 98-1151, 61st Leg., 2nd Reg. Sess. (Colo. 1998), enacted
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a. Application of the Designated Basin Rules
The Designated Basin Rules apply to all designated
ground water (including designated ground water in
the Denver Basin bedrock aquifers), but not to designated ground water that is permitted to be withdrawn
through small capacity wells.
b. Summary of the Designated Basin Rules
1) Definitions (Rule 4).
2) New appropriations from all aquifers except Denver
Basin and other bedrock aquifers (Rule 5.2).
i.

Northern High Plains - new appropriations limited to 40% of the water in storage within the
saturated materials over a 100 year period (Rule
5.2.2.2).

ii. Southern High Plains- new appropriation permitted if does not unreasonably impair any existing
water rights (Rule 5.2.3.2).
iii. Kiozia-Bijou - overappropriated, no new appropriation allowed unless accompanied by an approved replacement plan (Rule 5.2.4.2).
iv. Lost Creek - some areas overappropriated, no
new appropriation allowed in those areas unless
accompanied by an approved replacement plan;
in other areas, new appropriation permitted if
does not unreasonably impair any existing water
rights (Rule 5.2.5.2).
v.

Upper Black Squirrel - overappropriated, no new
appropriation allowed unless accompanied by an
approved replacement plan (Rule 5.2.6.2).

vi. UpperBig Sandy - new appropriation permitted if
does not unreasonably impair any existing water
rights (Rule 5.2.7.2).
vii. Camp Creek - new appropriation permitted if
does not unreasonably impair any existing water
rights (Rule 5.2.8.2).
on June 1, 1998.
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viii. Upper Crow Creek - some areas are overappropriated, no new appropriation allowed in those areas
unless accompanied by an approved replacement
plan; in other areas, new appropriation permitted
if does not unreasonably impair any existing water rights (Rule 5.2.9.2).
3) New appropriations from the Denver Basin bedrock
aquifers (Rule 5.3) - designated ground water in the
Dawson, Denver, Arapahoe and Laramie-Fox Hills
aquifers must be allocated by the Ground Water
Commission on the basis of the ownership of the
overlying land. 5 The rules adopted by the Commission for allocation of designated Denver Basin
ground water are substantively the same as the rules
adopted by the State Engineer for allocation of Denver Basin ground water outside designated basins (see
discussion infra at III.B.1.).
4) New appropriations from bedrock aquifers other
than the Denver Basin aquifers (Rule 5.4).
5) Water quantity requirements for issuance of new
permits for irrigation use - 2.5 af per acre for all aquifers in designated basins except the Southern High
Plains, where the amount is 3.5 af per acre (Rule 5.5).
6) Replacement plan provisions (Rule 5.6).
7) Specific yield values (Rule 5.7).
8) Recapture of artificial recharge (Rule 5.8).
9) Replacement well permits - replacement wells must
be constructed within 200 feet of the original site for
bedrock aquifer wells and within 300 feet of the
original site for wells in all other aquifers, unless a
lesser distance is specified by the management district
rules (Rule 6).
10) Change of rights to designated ground water (Rule 7)
(see discussion infra at II.D.).

15. COLO. REV. STAT. § 37-90-111(5) (1997); COLO. REv. STAT. § 37-90-107(7) (a)
(adopted as part of H.B. 98-1151, 61st Leg., 2nd Reg. Sess. (Colo. 1998) and enacted

onJune 1, 1998).
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3. Well Permits
Well permits in designated ground water basins require
completion of the well within one year and application of the
resulting ground water to beneficial use within two additional
years. The completion deadline may not be extended beyond six months, and the beneficial use deadline apparently
may not be extended at all. These initial permits are termed
"conditional." Despite long Commission practice to the contrary, the Colorado Supreme Court held in Thompson v.
Ground Water Commissionr6 that conditional permits do not indefinitely reserve an allocation of ground water to the permittee. Shortly thereafter, in Kui ter v. Warren and Berens v.
Colorado Ground Water Commission, the court held that the
amount of ground water constituting a protectable appropriative water right is only that amount which was actually put
to beneficial use during the life of the conditional permit.
The court required the Commission to issue final permits
quantifying actual beneficial use, and to use such quantifications to determine whether there is unappropriated water
available for new wells, rather than the Commission's typically more generous conditional permit allocations. Final
permits issued by the Commission thus serve a function
analogous to that of absolute decrees issued by the Water
Court. Under certain conditions, final permits are no longer
required for wells in the Dawson,
Denver, Araphahoe and
18
Laramie-Fox Hills aquifers.
C. Administration of Designated Ground Water Rights
1. As Against Surface Rights
As indicated supra at II.A.l.b., the definition of designated
ground water encompasses some ground water which would
otherwise satisfy the legal test of tributariness. Controversy
has arisen over whether the pumping of wells in designated
basins can be curtailed to satisfy downstream senior surface
rights and, if so, whether they are subject to curtailment by
the Ground Water Commission or instead by the State Engineer. In either event, if curtailment is ever ordered, some
sprinkler-irrigated farmland in the eastern High Plains may
have to revert to dryland unless replacement plans are devised to protect the calling seniors.

16. Thompson v. Colorado Ground Water Comm'n, 575 P.2d 372 (Colo. 1978).
17. Kuiper v Warren, 580 P.2d 32, 35 (Colo. 1978); Berens v. Colorado Ground
Water Comm'n, 614 P.2d 352, 353-54 (Colo. 1980).
18. CoLo. REv. STAT. § 37-90-108(3) (a) (II) (added by H.B. 98-1151, 61st Leg., 2nd
Reg. Sess. (Colo. 1998), enacted on June 1, 1998).
19. See, e.g., Pioneer Irrigation Dists. v. Danielson, 658 P.2d 842 (Colo. 1983).
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2. As Between Wells
Elaborate but potentially ambiguous statutory mechanisms
exist for the enforcement of priorities amongst designated
basin wells. However, the Ground Water Commission has yet
to seriously attempt any regulation of permitted junior wells
regardless of their depletive effect upon each other or upon
supplies available to senior wells.
D. Change of Designated Ground Water Rights
1. As Between Wells
Changes of well locations are now governed by Rule 7.3 of
the Designated Basin Rules. Rule 7.3.5 prohibits any change
in the location of a well that is more than 1/2 mile from the
original permitted site. Wells located in the Northern High
Plains Basin come under an exception to this rule-those
wells may not be relocated more than 300 feet from the
original permitted site pursuant to Rule 7.3.421

Changes in

location that are within one-half mile of the original site will
be approved only if the change does not cause material injury
to other water rights. The primary factor to be considered by
the Ground Water Commission in making this determination
is the historical use of the well.
2. As to Type, Place and Time of Use
In 1978, the Colorado Supreme Court held in Cherokee v.
State and in W-Y Ground Water Management District v.
Goeglein2 3 that the Ground Water Commission has exclusive
jurisdiction over such requests in the absence of an overlying
ground water management district, and has at least concurrent jurisdiction with the local management district where
one exists.
Formal standards to be applied to proposed

20. One case which initially held out the promise of resolving the issues surrounding calls between wells in designated basins was Colorado Ground Water Comm'n v. Dreiling, 606 P.2d 836 (Colo. 1980). In its initial opinion, the court held that a priority system amongst such wells does operate in the basins, but that opinion was subsequently
withdrawn, and the Court finally determined to remand the issue to the trial court
rather than deciding it sua sponte. The case was later settled out of court.
21. Appeals of these rules are pending in the following Denver District Court cases:
Eagle Peak Farms, Ltd. v. Colorado Ground Water Comm'n, No. 92CV0626, slip op. at
2 (Denver County Dist. Ct. July 16, 1997); and Eagle Peak Farms, Ltd. v. Colorado
Ground Water Comm'n., Case No. 97CV2439 (Denver County Dist. Ct. filed April 30,
1997).
22. Cherokee Water Dist. v. State of Colorado Ground Water Comm'n, 585 P.2d
586 (Colo. 1978).
23. W-Y Ground Water Mgmt. Dist. v. Goeglein, 585 P.2d 910 (Colo. 1978).
24. COLO. REV. STAT. § 3 7 -9 0-1I1(1)(g) (1997) (added in 1979, this statutory section can be read as having eliminated the management districts' concurrent jurisdiction, if it ever existed).
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transfers of type, place and time of use are now set forth in
the Designated Basin Rules:
a. Change of description of irrigated acres (no increase in
acreage) (Rule 7.4).
b. Increase in permitted acreage (Rule 7.5).
c.

Commingling of water from two or more wells (Rule 7.6).

d. Change of type of use (with or without export from a
designated basin) (Rule 7.7).
e.

Change of annual volume of appropriation (Rule 7.8).

f. Increase in pumping rate in gpm (Rule 7.6).
Generally, the primary factor to be considered by the Ground
Water Commission in determining whether requested
changes can be approved is the historical use of the well or
wells for which the change is sought. SeeRule 7.10.
3. From Surface Diversions to Wells
Occasionally, surface diverters whose lands are within designated basins seek to transfer their surface rights to new
wells, particularly as the proliferation of wells in those basins
causes a decline in surface flow available at their headgates.
Controversy remains as to their right to do so, with the
Ground Water Commission sometimes treating such requests as if they were the last in a long line of permit applications for new wells which have been denied because of an
absence of unappropriated water. On the other hand, the
surface diverters make the argument that they own vested
property rights to previously appropriated water, and are
merely seeking to do that which, in the absence of a change
of administrative jurisdiction to the Commission, clearly
would have been permissible. Changes from surface diversions to wells are not addressed in the Designated Basin
Rules.

I. NON-DESIGNATED GROUND WATER
A. Classification
Non-designated ground water remains within the administrative
jurisdiction ofthe State Engineer and within the judicial jurisdic-
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tion of the Water Court. Such ground water falls within three legal subcategories:
1. Tributary Ground Water
Ground water in outside the Dawson, Denver, Arapahoe and
Laramie-Fox Hills aquifers is considered legally "tributary" to
a natural stream if its withdrawal will deplete the flow of a
natural stream within 100 years of the time of pumping to the
extent of 0.1% of the annual rate allowed to be pumped.2 5 In
the absence of clear and convincing proof to the contrary, all
ground water in Colorado is presumed to be tributary.26
Definitional problems
What water courses qualify as "natural streams"? While
the law offers little guidance, it is clear that the stream
need not have continuously flowed in a state of nature.
However, there must be a 2hysically discrete and defined
channel or drainage way. Additionally, the fact that a
stream system may have no outlet because natural evapotranspiration exceeds recharge does not disqualify it as a
natural stream. 8
Examples
Alluvial ground water tributary to Monument Creek;
ground water stored in joints and faults in the Pikes Peak
fractured granite; Denver Basin ground water located
near the contacts of these aquifers with Monument Creek
or its alluvium where the statutory test for nontributariness is not met. Note that under the statutory definition
of nontributary ground water, it does not matter whether
the impact of a pumped well on a natural stream is "direct" (i.e., where the ground water would, in the absence
of the pumping, have flowed toward the stream) or "indirect" (i.e., where the ground water would not have flowed
toward the stream under natural conditions, but the effect of pumping is nevertheless to deplete the stream by
lowering the gradient from the aquifer toward the
stream).

25. COLO. REv. STAT. § 37-90-103(10.5) (1997) (enacted as part of Senate Bill 5, S.
5, 55th Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. (Colo. 1985)). For historic background to this statutory
definition, see District 10 Water Users Ass'n v. Barnett 599 P.2d 894 (Colo. 1979), and
Kuiperv. Lundvall 529 P.2d 1328 (Colo. 1974).
26. Safranek v. Town of Limon, 228 P.2d 975 (Colo. 1951). But see COLO. REV.
STAT. § 13-25-127(1) (1997) (stating that in all civil actions, presumably including water matters, the burden of proof shall be a simple preponderance of the evidence).
27. In reGerman Ditch & Reservoir Co., 139 P. 2 (Colo. 1913); Haver v. Matonock,
244 P. 914 (Colo. 1926).
28. COLO. REv. STAT. § 37-82-101(2) (1997).
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2. Nontributary Ground Water
Ground water is considered legally "nontributary" if its withdrawal will not deplete the flow of a natural stream within 100
years of the time of pumping to the extent of 0.1% of the annual rate allowed to be pumped.Y
Example
Ground water in the Denver Basin formations that is at
an appreciable distance from the discharge areas of those
formations.
3. Not-Nontributary Ground Water
Ground water in the Dawson, Denver, Arapahoe and
Laramie-Fox Hills aquifers that does not satisfy the legal definition of nontributary 0
4. Significance of Classification
a. Nature of Property Rights
Prior to 1963, it seemed clear that nontributary ground
water was merely one hydrologic category of "developed
water" (i.e., water which, but for specific human efforts,
would never have become part of surface flows, and
which therefore legally became the private property of
the developer free from the demands of senior tributary
rights). In 1963, the Colorado Supreme Court decided
the landmark case of Whitten v. Coit,3which purported to
hold that such ground water belonged exclusively to the
owner of the overlying surface estate, subject only to the
doctrine of reasonable use. In 1973, the legislature
amended the 1965 Act with Senate Bill 213,32 which further constrained the use of the ground water to that volume of water in storage underlying the landowner's
property, and to a rate consistent with a 100-year economic useful life. Numerous questions arose concerning
the validity, effect and interpretation of the amendment,
and their importance was underscored by the huge number of claims filed with all seven Water Courts on the last
business day of 1978 by several small groups of individuals. Many of these claims contended that Senate Bill 213
unconstitutionally required land ownership or control as
a qualification on use, and that only a prior appropria29. COLO. REv. STAT. § 37-90-103(10.5) (1997).
30. Id. § 37-90-103(10.7).
31. Whitten v. Coit, 385 P.2d 131 (Colo. 1963).
32. S. 213, 49th Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. (Colo. 1973) (formerly codified at COLO. REV.
STAT. § 37-90-137(4)).
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tion system free of such constraints could satisfy that part
of the Colorado Constitution guaranteeing the right to
appropriate the waters of all "natural streams. 3 These
claims were the subject of the Colorado Supreme Court's
1983 decision in State v. Southwestern Colorado Water ConIn Huston II, the Court
servation Distric 4 ("Huston I').
principally held:
i.

Landowners do not own nontributary ground water
by virtue of their ownership and occupation of the
overlying surface estate. To the extent it indicated
otherwise, Whitten v. Coit was overruled.

ii.

Nontributary ground water is not subject to the constitutional doctrine of prior appropriation as set forth
in Article XVI, section 6, of the Colorado Constitution, but instead is subject to the "plenary control" of
the legislature in accordance with any minimally rational resource allocation scheme it might establish
from time to time.

iii. Rights to nontributary ground water cannot be adjudicated in the Water Court under the 1969 Water
Right Determination and Administration Act.
iv. As of 1983, nontributary ground water was subject
only to the provisions of Colorado Revised Statutes
section 37-90-137 including the specific criteria set
forth in subsection 137(4) (that section added by
Senate Bill 213), which was held to be a constitutional
enactment.
Huston IInecessarily reached only the most fundamental
property issues surrounding nontributary ground water.
Major questions remained unresolved, including:

33.

i.

What rate of development should be permitted in
each nontributary aquifer?

ii.

What administrative and judicial structure best promotes any desired level of use or nonuse?

COLO. CONST. art XVI,

§

6.

34. State v. Southwestern Colo. Conservation Dist., 671 P.2d 1294 (Colo. 1983) (referred to as Huston fin order to distinguish it from its procedural precursor, Southeastern Colo. Water Conservancy Dist. v. Huston, 593 P.2d 1347 (Colo. 1979)).
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iii. What amount, if any, of stream depletion resulting
from the pumping of minimally tributary aquifers
within 100 years of the time of pumping should be
disregarded as "de minimis"?
iv. What relief does a decreed or permitted rate of flow
and/or annual volume provide (in terms of the right
to drill supplemental wells or to curtail neighboring
wells) after the artesian pressure of a nontributary
aquifer inevitably is eliminated and individual well
yields (and water tables) thereafter slowly decline?
v. What different rights, if any, do pre-Senate Bill 213
wells (wells not then restricted to an annual volume
of pumpage based upon either surface ownership or
consent or a 100-year economic useful life) have visa-vis post-Senate Bill 213 wells when well yields inevitably decline?
From the Colorado Supreme Court's announcement of
its initial holding in Huston 11 (issued July 18, 1983) until
the Governor's approval of Senate Bill 5 (June 6, 1985),
all of the foregoing questions, and many more, were hotly
debated in professional and political circles. Senate Bill 5
then resolved the following major issues concerning nontributary and not-nontributary ground water:
The 100-year/0.1% depletive effect test for determining whether ground water is nontributary was
adopted.
ii. The determination of whether specific ground water
in the Dawson, Denver, Arapahoe and Laramie-Fox
Hills aquifers is nontributary shall be made assuming
the existence of water table conditions (i.e., no artesian pressure) and regardless of actual conditions.
The determination of whether ground water in any
other aquifers is nontributary shall be made using actual aquifer characteristics (i.e., including artesian
pressure to whatever extent it exists).
i.

iii. All of the ground water in the Dawson, Denver, Arapahoe and Laramie-Fox Hills aquifers and the Dakota
aquifer 5 will hereafter be allocated on the basis of a
100-year aquifer life and land ownership or consent
35. These provisions no longer apply to the Dakota aquifer after the enactment of
H.R. 96-1044, 60th Leg., 2nd Reg. Sess. (Colo. 1996) (amending COLO. REv. STAT. §
37-90-13(4) (a)).
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of the landowner, specifically including the portions
of those aquifers that may later prove to be not-nontributary (i.e., fail to meet the 100-year/0.1% depletive effect test) 36
iv. The determination by the Water Court of the amount
of augmentation water required to compensate for
the depletive effect of Dawson, Denver, Arapahoe
and Laramie-Fox Hills wells determined to3 7be notnontributary shall be based on the following:
(a) Owners of not-nontributary Dawson aquifer
wells shall be required to replace the actual depletions from pumping of the wells based upon
aquifer conditions (including artesian pressure,
if any) in existence at the time of the decree.
(b) Owners of not-nontributary Denver, Arapahoe
and Laramie-Fox Hills aquifer wells shall be required to replace depletions as follows:
(i) For wells located within one mile of the aquifer or stream contact, actual depletions
shall be replaced assuming water table conditions (even where artesian conditions may
exist).
(ii) For wells located beyond the one mile band,
the replacement amount during pumping of
the wells shall be a flat 4% of the annual
amount of withdrawal. Replacement of depletions occurring after pumping permanently
ceases is also required to the extent such depletions will be injurious; if the Water Court is
in doubt as to whether they will be injurious,
it must retain jurisdiction for an appropriate
period following the cessation of pumping

36. The nature of a landowner's rights to ground water in the Dawson, Denver,
Arapahoe and Laramie-Fox Hills aquifers prior to obtaining a Water Court decree or a
well permit was further defined by the supreme court in companion opinions issued

on September 23, 1996 in Smith v. Walker, 924 P.2d 155 (Colo. 1996), and in Bayou
Land Co. v. Talley, 924 P.2d 136 (Colo. 1996); see also Chatfield East Well Co. v. Chat-

field East Property Owners Ass'n, et al., No. 97SA52 (Colo. April 20, 1998).
37. These requirements will be replaced by more stringent requirements between
July 1, 1999 and July 1, 2002, under the provisions of S. 96-074, 60th Leg., 2nd Reg.
Sess. (Colo. 1996), enacted on June 1, 1996, as amended by S. 98-201, 61st Leg., 2nd
Reg. Sess. (Colo. 1998) (enacted on June 1, 1998); see CoLo. REv. STAT. § 37-90137(9)(c.5) (1997).
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during which specific terms of post-pumping
augmentation may be reconsidered.3
(c) Owners of tributary wells in aquifers other than
the Dawson, Denver, Arapahoe and LaramieFox Hills aquifers shall continue to replace their
depletions to whatever extent the Water Courts
determine necessary to prevent material injury
to other water rights under the ordinary standards for plans for augmentation.
v. The reduction and eventual elimination of artesian
pressure and the lowering of pumping levels thereafter do not per se constitute material injury to Denver Basin wells and other nontributary and notnontributary wells.
vi. The State Engineer may adopt rules and regulations
requiring nontributary wells in the Dawson, Denver,
Arapahoe and Laramie-Fox Hills aquifers outside designated basins to relinquish up to 2% of their pumpage to the affected stream, but only to the extent
necessary as additional protection to senior surface
rights and if adopted prior to December 31, 1985.
Such relinquishment would be a requisite of the well
permit and would not require Water Court approval
of a plan for augmentation. See infra at III.B.l.a. for
a more detailed discussion of the 1985 "Statewide
Nontributary Ground Water Rules" which, inter alia,
contain this 2% relinquishment requirement.
vii. The State Engineer may, at any time, adopt additional rules and regulations to prescribe reasonable
criteria and procedures for the application for, and
the evaluation, issuance, extension and administration of well permits for wells in the Dawson, Denver,
Arapahoe and Laramie-Fox Hills aquifers outside designated basins. These rules and regulations may, for
example, prescribe presumptive aquifer characteristics (i.e., specific yield, saturated thickness and transmissivity), criteria for permit extension, criteria for
well siting and spacing, etc. Presumptive aquifer
characteristics once promulgated will bind the Water
Court's fact-finding effort unless rebutted by any
party. See infra at III.B.l.b. for a more detailed discussion of the 1986 "Denver Basin Rules."
38. Danielson v. Castle Meadows, Inc., 791 P.2d 1106 (Colo. 1990).
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viii. Owners of permits issued pursuant to Senate Bill 5
shall be entitled to permits for any number of additional wells that may be required to maintain the
original lawful rate of withdrawal, so long as those
additional wells are on the property which is owned
by, or whose owner has given consent to, the permit
39
owner.
ix. By following certain special and complex procedures,
municipal and quasi-municipal water suppliers may
be deemed to have obtained the "implied consent" of
some or all of the landowners within their boundaries
as of January 1, 1985 to withdraw ground water from
the Dawson, Denver, Arapahoe, Laramie-Fox Hills or
Dakota aquifers underlying those lands.
Due to the lack of data, the lack of political consensus
or the lack of demand, Senate Bill 5 did not undertake
to resolve a number of other questions that can be expected to arise in future years as development proceeds, including the following:
i.

The adequacy of replacement water for depletions
by not-nontributary wells under Colorado Revised
Statutes section 37-90-137(9) (c).
(a) May nontributary ground water be used at all?
(b) If so, must applicants make advance provision for
the ultimate exhaustion of such replacement water supplies?
(c) If so, what degree of advance provision will be required?
(i) Up-front acquisition of maximum potentially
required amount of senior surface rights?
(ii) Mandatory future proposal of substitute replacement supply under retained jurisdiction 41?

39. See Willows Water Dist. v. Mission Viejo Co., 854 P.2d 1246 (Colo. 1993) (construing this provision of Senate Bill 5 in the context of a non-landowner application

for additional wells without the express consent of the landowner).
40. See COLO. REV. STAT. § 37-90-137(8) (1997).
41.

See id. § 37-92-304(6).
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(iii)Surety or other financial undertaking?
(iv) Undefined decretal obligation to continue
adequate replacement as long as depletions
continue?
ii. What is "reasonably available" water service within the
meaning of Colorado Revised Statutes section 37-90137(8)?
iii. At what point, if any, is dominion over return flow or
effluent from nontributary and not nontributary
ground water lost so42 that reuse and successive use are
no longer possible?
iv. Upon what basis (e.g., abandonment, lack of full historic use, etc.) if any, may the Water Court impose a
volumetric limit on pre-Senate Bill 213 wells which
were decreed without such a limit?
v. The validity of pre-1969 Act decrees of the District
Courts purporting to adjudicate nontributary wells in
light of Huston IIand Senate Bill 439 .

vi. The proper procedure, if any, for the determination
of nontributary surface water rights, and the effect of
prior decrees purporting to adjudicate such rights, in
light of Senate Bill 5.
vii. Under what circumstances can the Denver Basin aquifers be artificially recharged and the artificially recharged water be extracted? The State Engineer has
since adopted rules and regulations governing the extraction of water artificially recharged into the Denver Basin aquifers."
In addition, an entirely new set of factual and legal issues
have emerged from the application of fairly well set Senate Bill 5 principles to specific fact situations. The drafters of Senate Bill 5 generally agreed that any attempt to
resolve all such controversies in advance would be prema42.

See Public Service Co. v. Willows Water Dist., 856 P.2d 829 (Colo. 1993) (hold-

ing that dominion over nontributary ground water return flows from lawn irrigation
was not lost when the water was used by customers of a water district).
43. S. 439, 54th Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. (Colo. 1983) (amending COLO. REV. STAT. § 3792-203(1)).
44. 2 COLO. CODE REGS. § 402-11 (effectiveJuly 1, 1995).
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ture, futile and probably counterproductive. A special
water committee was created by the legislature to investigate Denver Basin ground water management and various South Platte River issues, and to make recommendations for legislation as part of Senate Bill 96-074, enacted
on June 1, 1996. An interim committee to study water
and land resources issues was created in 1997 by Senate
Joint Resolution 97-33. Legislation to address some of
the currently unresolved Denver Basin issues may result
from the work of these committees.
b. Judicial Jurisdiction
Tributary ground water disputes have been heard by the
seven Water Courts since their inception in 1969. The
Water Courts have now been given clear jurisdiction over
nontributary ground water disputes as well.45
B. Initiation, Allocation
Ground Water Rights

and Protection

of

Non-designated

1. Nontributary and Not-Nontributary Ground Water
Numerous technical issues surrounding the initiation and
allocation of these rights are currently controlled by the
Statewide Nontributary Ground Water Rules and the Denver Basin Rules adopted by the State Engineer pursuant to
provisions of Senate Bill 5.
a. Statewide Nontributary Ground Water Rules

46

1) Apply to all ground water from the Dawson, Denver,
Arapahoe, and Laramie-Fox Hills aquifers (except
those portions lying in existing designated ground
water basins).
2) Summary of contents:
i.

45.

Definitions (Rule 4).

In Southwestern Colorado Water Conservation District the Colorado Supreme Court

held that the Water Courts lacked such jurisdiction because they were not clearly empowered by statute to address nontributary ground water, thereby threatening the validity of hundreds of decrees previously entered by them. State v. Southwestern Colo.
Water Conservation Dist., 671 P.2d 1294 (Colo. 1983) (the court issued its opinion on

July 18, 1983). In prompt response thereto, the legislature enacted Senate Bill 439 on
October 11, 1983, which validated such decrees and expressly established the jurisdiction of the Water Courts. Senate Bill 5, enacted on June 6, 1985, ratified and continued the Water Courts' jurisdiction.
46. 2 COLO. CODE REGS. § 402-7 (effective March 2, 1986).

Issue 2

COLORADO GROUND WATER LAW

295

ii. Information required to be submitted with well
permit application (Rule 5).
iii. Processing of well permit application (Rule 6).
iv. Information required to be submitted after issuance of well permit application (Rule 7).
v.

Determination of allowed annual amount of
withdrawal (Rule 8).
(a) 100-year aquifer life and "banking" provision
(Rule 8.A.).
(b) Formula for determination of allowed annual
amount of withdrawal (Rule 8.B.).
(c) "Cylinders of appropriation" to be used to determine extent of prior reservation by preSenate Bill 213 wells (Rule 8.C.).
(d) Specific yield determination provisions (Rule
8.D.).
(e) Saturated aquifer materials determination
provisions (Rules 8.E. and 9).

vi. Geophysical log requirements (Rule 9).
vii. Well location (Rule 11).
(a) Must locate well on some part of overlying
land (Rule ll.A.).
(b) Can withdraw water underlying 2 or more
noncontiguous parcels without drilling wells
on each parcel under certain circumstances
(Rule 11.B.).
(c) Must drill within 200 feet of permitted location (Rule 11.C.).
viii. Permits for additional wells (Rule 12).
ix. Replacement permit for
completed wells (Rule 13).

existing

multiply-
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x. Well field provisions (i.e., unitization) (Rule 14).
xi. Metering and reporting requirements (Rule 15).
b. Denver Basin Rules47
1) The rules apply, in addition to Statewide Nontributary Ground Water Rules, to the Denver Basin aquifers, whether nontributary or not-nontributary (except to those portions lying in existing designated
ground water basins).
2) Summary of Contents:
i.

Maps specifying location of nontributary ground
water (Rule 5 and accompanying figures).4

ii. Table of presumptive specific yield values (Rule
6.A.).

iii. Maps specifying saturated thickness (Rule 7 and
accompanying figures).
iv. Nontributary wells limited to 98% consumption
(Rule 8).
v. Severance of Arapahoe aquifer into Upper and
Lower Arapahoe Aquifers in portions of Jefferson, Arapahoe and Adams Counties (Rules 4.A.6.,
4.A.7., 7.D., 7.E. and 10).
2. Tributary Ground Water
Prior to 1969, few wells were adjudicated, and there was no
widespread recognition thatjunior tributary wells were legally
subject to regulation (i.e., curtailment) by strict enforcement49
of the priority system at the behest of senior surface rights.
The 1969 Water Rights Determination and Administration
Act allowed wells to be filed for adjudication prior to July 1,
1972 without postponement of priority date, despite the prior

47. 2 COLO. CODE REGS. § 402-6 (effective December 30, 1985).
48. Senate Bill 96-074, enacted on June 1, 1996, effectively limited the location of
nontributary ground water to the locations shown in these maps notwithstanding the
effects of pumping after 1986.
49. For the earliest known case establishing this principle, see McClellan v. Hurdle,
33 P. 280 (Colo. Ct. App. 1893).
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failure to adjudicate them in a timely fashion. 0 Non-exempt
wells filed for adjudication since that date obtain priority
dates within the calendar year of filing.
New, relocated and supplemental wells may only be drilled
after issuance of a well permit by the State Engineer's office."
A well is statutorily defined broadly as any structure or device
used for the purpose or effect of diverting ground water for
beneficial use, thereby including within its terms many
streambed galleries, sumps, spring collection boxes, and sand
and gravel pits. Before issuing a permit, the State Engineer
must find that the pumping of the requested well will not result in material injury to existing water rights, including exempt wells. A statutory presumption that no injury will be
caused to other wells attaches to certain classes of exempt
wells. 3
a. Exempt Wells
The most significant category of exempt wells for which
permits are currently issued on a regular basis are wells
flowing 15 gpm or less for in-house use and the outside
watering of domestic animals only (i.e., no lawn watering,
car washing, etc.) outside of a platted subdivision. Exempt wells exclusively used for fire-fighting purposes are
required to be kept capped and locked until needed.
Recently, considerable controversy has arisen over the
standing of exempt well owners to protect the water
rights for their wells from injury in Water Court proceedings. The Colorado Supreme Court addressed this question in some detail in Shirola v. Turkey CaTion Ranch Limited Liability Company.5 4 The court held that the owner of
an exempt well has standing to hold an applicant for water rights to "strict proof' in a Water Court proceeding,
but that the exempt well owner cannot assert injury to his
exempt well water right until he has obtained a Water
Court decree confirming the water right for his well or
filed a Water Court application for adjudication of the
water right for his well before filing a statement of opposition to another water user's application.

50. COLO. REV. STAT. § 37-92-306 (1997).
51. Id. § 37-90-137(1).
52. Id. § 37-90-103(21).
53. See id. § 37-92-602. Note that even this presumption is rebuttable under section
37-92-602(3) (b) (1), so that there no longer are any categories of well permits which
are granted as a matter of right.
54. Shirola v. Turkey Cafion Ranch Ltd. Liab. Co., 937 P.2d 739 (Colo. 1997).
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b. Non-exempt Wells
The shortage of surface flows available to senior surface
rights throughout most of the state is such that the State
Engineer routinely denies most well permit applications
for new non-exempt wells in tributary aquifers. Permits
for relocated, alternate point and supplemental wells are
sometimes granted, but proof of the existence and historical use of a prior decreed, permitted or registered
well must be shown, and the applicant must typically
comply with strict spacing, drilling, casing, capping and
metering requirements.
In most of the tributary drainage basins of the South
Platte, Arkansas and Rio Grande river systems, the only
direct way to obtain new non-exempt well permits is to
acquire senior surface irrigation rights, permanently retire the historically irrigated lands and contribute the water thus freed up to the stream to offset future depletions55
to streamflow that will result from the new pumping.
Such projects are termed "plans for augmentation,"56 and
will generally only be approved by the Water Court after a
lengthy, complex and expensive process of hydrologic investigation and engineering, negotiation with objecting
water users and litigation with those parties unwilling to
settle. Augmentation plans, out of the innovation
sparked by necessity, are often highly sophisticated, incorporating real-time computer models requiring continuing data collection from observation wells, well meters, Parshall flumes, stream gauges, weather stations, and
55. See Fox v. Div. Engineer for Water Div. 5, 810 P.2d 644 (Colo. 1991); Bohn v.
Kuiper, 575 P.2d 402 (Colo. 1978). Another, less uniformly applicable approach,
called "over-pumping", involves the scheduled pumping of tributary ground water to
the stream at such times and in such amounts so as to satisfy all downstream senior
appropriators, but with the ensuing stream depletions accruing to the stream thereafter at times when there are no downstream calls for water by such seniors. This approach is no longer viable on the Arkansas River but is still-used on the lower South
Platte River, particularly by GASP (see infra at III.C.2.). A potentially promising augmentation approach, the reduction or elimination of naturally occurring consumptive
use resulting from artificial drainage projects or the eradication of phreatophytes, has
been specifically disapproved by both the supreme court and the legislature. See
COLO. REV. STAT. § 37-92-103(9) (1997); Giffen v. State, 690 P.2d 1244 (Colo. 1984);
R.J.A., Inc. v. Water Users Ass'n of Dist. No. 6, 690 P.2d 823 (Colo. 1984); Southeastern Colorado Water Conservancy Dist. v. Shelton Farms, Inc., 529 P.2d 1321 (Colo.
1974). Note, however, that while it also may be currently possible to obtain well permits for a limited duration after securing approval of the Division and State Engineers
to a temporary substitute supply plan under Colorado Revised Statutes section 37-80120, there is a question as to whether that authority was repealed by implication by the
1977 legislature when it enacted Senate Bill 4, a bill which expressly repealed the temporary augmentation plan approval authority of the State Engineer (formerly codified
at COLO. REv. STAT. § 37-92-307 (1977)).
56. COLO. REv. STAT. § 37-92-103(9) (1997) (construed in Kelly Ranch v. Southeastern
Colo. Water Conservancy Dist., 550 P.2d 297, 303-04 (Colo. 1976)).
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lysimeters. Under the 1977 and 1981 amendments to the
1969 Act, the Water Courts must retain continuing jurisdiction over such plans,5 although the duration and
scope of such jurisdiction is discretionary with the Water
Judges, and frequent and rather substantial monthly
(sometimes daily) reporting requirements are imposed
upon the augmentor.
C. Administration of Non-designated Ground Water Rights
1. Exempt Wells
Exempt wells are exempt from administration within the priority system.58 They are, however, subject to curtailment for
violation of permit conditions.
2. As Against Surface Rights
a. Tributary Ground Water
In the South Platte, Arkansas and Rio Grande drainages,
the depletion of surface flows historically available to senior surface rights caused by high capacity non-exempt irrigation wells (primarily wells drilled since the drought of
the early 1950's) became so substantial by the late 1960's
as to politically compel the conjunctive administration of
ground water and surface water rights under a single priority system. The State Engineer's early attempt to selectively curtail well pumping in the Lower Arkansas Valley
for the benefit of injured surface rights was rejected by
the supreme court in 1968 in Fellhauer.59 The court held
that any such curtailment must be preceded by written,
uniform rules and regulations which will result in a reasonable lessening of material injury to surface rights
while minimizing, to the extent possible, inconvenience
and economic dislocation to well owners.
Subsequent attempts by the State Engineer to curtail
well pumping have met with mixed success.
1) The South PlatteRiver Valley
In the South Platte Valley, rules and regulations requiring a multi-year phase-in of total curtailment of
57. COLO. REv. STAT. § 37-92-304(6) (1997).
58. But see Shirola v. Turkey Cafion Ranch Ltd. Liab. Co., 937 P.2d 739 (Colo.
1997) (creating some ambiguity concerning whether an exempt well continues to be
exempt from administration within the priority system after a Water Court decree is
obtained for the well).
59. Fellhauer v. People, 447 P.2d 986 (Colo. 1968).
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unaugmented pumping were imposed by consent decree in 1974 after a settlement was reached by all substantial water user interests. Many well users obtained
decrees from the Water Court approving plans for
augmentation to allow continued pumping of their
wells. Other well users, especially those on the lower
South Platte,joined the Ground Water Appropriators
of the South Platte ("GASP") and have continued to
pump their wells under the auspices of GASP's temporary substitute supply plan which has been approved annually by the State Engineer since the early
1970's. GASP has not yet filed an application with the
Water Court for approval of its well augmentation
plan and its current "temporary" plan, unlike a Water
Court-approved plan, replaces only a fraction (perhaps 20%) of the total delpletions to surface flows
caused by its member wells.
2)

The Arkansas River Valley
In the Arkansas Valley, the State Engineer's first
(1973) set of rules and regulations curtailed pumping
only four days a week and were implemented without
protest.6' However, the State Engineer's subsequent
(1974) initiative to extend the curtailment to seven
days a week was later rejected by the Colorado Supreme Court, which held that sufficient operating
experience had not yet been obtained under the
1973 partial curtailment plan to justify total curtailment.62 In December 1985, the State of Kansas commenced suit against the State of Colorado in the
United States Supreme Court alleging violations of
the 1949 Arkansas River Compact6 by Colorado, including depletions of the usable and available state
line flows by post-compact wells in Colorado. The
trial in the case was bifurcated into a liability phase
and a remedies phase. Following a lengthy trial on
the liability issues, the Special Master, in July 1994,
filed his recommendations concerning that phase of
the case with the U.S. Supreme Court. The Special
Master concluded "that post compact pumping in
Colorado has caused material depletions of the us-

60. For a comparative discussion of GASP's temporary augmentation plan and
other well augmentation plans on the lower South Platte, see LawrenceJ. MacDonnell,
Colorado's Law of "UndergroundWater": A Look at the South Platte Basin and Beyond, 59 U.
COLO. L. REv. 579 (1988).
61. These regulation were adopted after Fellhauer.
62. Kuiper v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Railway Co., 581 P.2d 293 (Colo. 1978).
63. CoLo. REv. STAT. § 37-69-101 (1997).
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able Stateline flows of the Arkansas River, in violation
of the Arkansas River Compact"' and recommended
that the Supreme Court so find. The immediate effect of the Special Master's Report was the implementation of a program by the State Engineer to measure
well pumping in the Arkansas River basin. In May,
1995, the
Supreme
Court upheld the ruling of the
•
65
Special Master. The remedies phase of the case is
now underway. In response to these developments,
the State Engineer adopted amended rules and regulations governing well pumping to replace the existing 1973 rules and regulations. The amended rules
impose a full-time augmentation requirement on all
wells in the Arkansas Valley. On appeal to the Division 2 Water Court, the rules were upheld.6
3) The San Luis Valley
In the San Luis Valley, the State Engineer originally
proposed rules and regulations to curtail well pumping in the watersheds of the Rio Grande and Conejos
Rivers so as to satisfy both downstream surface rights
and the entitlements of the states of New Mexico and
Texas under the Rio Grande River Compact.6 ' An extensive trial resulted in a decision by the Water Judge
that rejected the proposed rules en toto. On appeal,
the Colorado Supreme Court affirmed this result, including that portion of the Water Judge's decision
which held that owners of senior surface rights
should no longer be entitled to automatically compel
the curtailment of interfering junior wells where the
seniors have reasonable physical and economic capacity to drill and pump their own wells in lieu of obtaining their supplies from such curtailment."' Accordingly, after eight years of continuous litigation,
the proposed rules were remanded to the State Engineer for consideration of the reasonableness of a possible ground water development precondition on
calls by senior surface rights. Whenever the State En64. Special Master Report, July 1994, Kansas v. Colorado and United States, No.
105 Original, U.S. Supreme Court, Vol. II, p. 263.
65. Kansas v. Colorado, 514 U.S. 673 (1995).
66. Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, Judgment and Decree, In the Matter of
Amended Rule and Regulations Governing the Diversion and use of Tributary Ground
Water in the Arkansas River Basin, Colorado, (Dist. Ct. Water Div. 2, Colo. 1996) (No.
95-CW-21 1).
67. COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 37-66-101 to -102 (1997). See generally Kuiper v. Gould, 583
P.2d 910 (Colo. 1978).
68. Alamosa-LaJara Water Users Protection Ass'n v. Gould, 674 P.2d 914 (Colo.
1983), (overrulingKuiper v. Well Owners Conservation Ass'n, 490 P.2d 268 (1971)).
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gineer completes the review of the rules and proposes
any desired modifications, it is conceivable that protests to the Water Court and appeal therefrom may
consume another three to five years.
In 1988, the Colorado Supreme Court was faced with a
different, though very common conjunctive use problem.
Frequently, sand and gravel mining activities cause the
exposure of alluvial ground water to the atmosphere, and
the resulting evaporative loss depletes the stream during
periods of shortage to the detriment of downstream water rights. The court held that new sand and gravel mining activities that result in such depletions will require a
well permit.5 The statutory codification of the well permit requirement provides clarification as to which sand
and gravel pits need well permits and augmentation
plans.

Because of the limited and imperfect experience with
conjunctive use rules and regulations, and because of
the frequently shifting political and economic winds, it
is difficult to predict the long term future course of
conjunctive administration of surface water and ground
water in Colorado. Undoubtedly, it will be an intensely
fought, complex and expensive battle.
b. Nontributary and Not-Nontributary Ground Water
Withdrawal of nontributary and not-nontributary ground
water is not subject to administration in accordance with
the priority system.7"
3. As Between Wells
a. Tributary Ground Water
In 1961, the Colorado Supreme Court held in City of
Colorado Springs v. Bender 2 that a senior well is entitled to
have junior wells withdrawing from the same aquifer curtailed during times of shortage only if the senior has
made a reasonable means of effectuating his diversion
and still remains unsatisfied. Whether a means of diversion is "reasonable" is to be measured against the eco-

69. Zigan Sand & Gravel, Inc. v. Cache La Poudre Water Users Ass'n, 758 P.2d 175
(Colo. 1988); Three Bells Ranch Associs. v. Cache La Poudre Water Users Ass'n, 758
P.2d 164 (Colo. 1988).
70. COLO. REV. STAT. § 37-80-137(11) (1997) (effectiveJuly 15, 1989).
71. COLO. REV. STAT. § 37-92-305(11) (1997).
72. City of Colorado Springs v. Bender, 366 P.2d 552 (Colo. 1961).
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nomic capability of the particular senior to fully penetrate the aquifer.73
Since Bender, there has been relatively little controversy
between tributary wells, probably due to the fact that ordinary well spacing practice tends to minimize well-towell interference. This is not true of certain mountain suburban areas where increasing demands have outstripped
the poor supplies of fractured granite or tight sedimentary aquifers.
b. Nontributary and Not-Nontributary Ground Water
Notwithstanding the announcement of the long-awaited
1983 opinion in Huston /,l 4considerable legal controversy
remained until the enactment of Senate Bill 5 over the
degree of protection which must be afforded existing
nontributary wells from the unavoidably depletive effect
(in terms of pumping head and static water level) of proposed new wells in the same formations. This controversy
was particularly intense in the Denver Basin where economically beneficial artesian conditions are being diminished with the development of new wells and the continued pumpage of old wells. This was then resolved by
Senate Bill 5 (supra at III.A.4.a.).
D. Change of Non-designated Ground Water Rights
1. Tributary Ground Water
a. As Between Wells
Existing wells may be relocated or supplemented with
the permission of the State Engineer. However, the
State Engineer will typically withhold approval in cases
involving a requested move of more than 200 feet until
the Water Court first reviews and approves the proposed change of water right. Such transfers may involve the imposition of a number of physical restrictions as conditions of approval by the State Engineer of
the replacement, alternate point or supplemental well
permits.
b. From Surface Diversions to Wells, and as to Type, Place,
and Time of Use
Statutory mechanisms exist for transferring the point of

73. Bender, 366 P.2d at 556.
74. State v. Southwestern Colo. Conservation Dist., 671 P.2d 1294 (Colo. 1983).
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diversion of surface rights from existing headgates, spring
collection systems and streambed galleries to pumped
wells. 75 Permits for the proposed new wells will not ordinarily be granted by the State Engineer prior to the issuance of a Water Court decree approving the new wells as
either permanently fixed, alternate or supplemental
points of diversion. The Water Court will generally grant
such a decree only after it is satisfied that the new wells
will be operated under such protective terms and conditions as may be required to prevent material injury to any
other water rights. In the absence of such a transfer decree, a new well may not operate under the decreed priority of another structure under the guise of being a de
facto alternate point of diversion.76
2.

Nontributary and Not-Nontributary Ground Water
Few such transfers have been requested to date, and those
that have been requested have been handled on an ad hoc
basis by the State Engineer's office and the Water Courts.

75. However, it should be noted that such changes may involve the forfeiture of the
valuable right to divert water under natural gravitational head. See COLO. REV. STAT. §
37-92-502(2) (1997); but seeAlamosa-LaJara Water Users Ass'n, 674 P.2d at 914.
76. Broyles v. Ft. Lyon Canal Co., 638 P.2d 244, 250 (Colo. 1981).

Although we divide water law in this country into those states that
utilize riparian law, those states that employ the law of prior appropriation, and those states that depend on some combination of both (the
"hybrid" states), every state has its own unique system of water management. Since 1969, much of Colorado's water has been regulated
pursuant to the Water Right Determination and Administration Act of
1969. In celebration of the upcoming thirtieth anniversary of the 1969
Act, the Water Law Review plans to dedicate its 1999 Spring issue to the
topic of water regulation systems that exist throughout the country,
and welcomes article submissions that address the various state water
management systems - their birth, their implementation, and their
successes and failures to meet past, present and future needs.
In anticipation of the Spring 1999 issue, the following essay provides some history behind the passage of Colorado's 1969 Act, and
puts into context two of Colorado's more celebrated cases, and some
of its more infamous legislation.

COMMENTARY
TWO COLORADO WATER CRISES
ROBERT F. WELBORN'

INTRODUCTION
It should go without saying that water is one of our most precious
natural resources. What can not be said too many times is that, like all
resources, it is the victim of legislative procrastination, political machination, greed, and ignorance. The Colorado water crises addressed in
this commentary stem from the Legislature's treatment of underground water in Colorado. The essay begins by discussing those events
in the 1950s and 1960s that led up to the Water Right Determination
and Administration Act of 1969 ("1969 Act"). The increase in the
number of wells taking water from the alluvium of the surface stream
dramatically affected stream flow and surface water rights, putting
wells and surface interests on a collision course. The 1969 Act was a
response to this conflict. The essay then moves to address an issue of
pressing urgency - the drainage of Colorado's aquifers, particularly
the Denver Basin Aquifers. While the 1969 Act may have been a belated legislative response to a situation that had been brewing for several decades, it was a response nonetheless, and an effective one at
that, addressing the issues head-on with an eye towards the future, and
provisions that shored up the past. In remarkable juxtaposition, Colorado's legislative treatment of nontributary ground water leaves much
to be desired, the recognition of which is little comfort in the face of
the increasingly rapid depletion of the state's aquifers.

Robert F. Welborn is Of Counsel to the Denver firm of Welborn, Sullivan Meck
& Tooley, P.C. Mr. Welborn graduated from Dartmouth College in 1940, received his
law degree from the University of Denver in 1946, and is admitted to practice before
the Supreme Court of the United States. In 1969, Mr. Welborn was a significant participant in the drafting and passage of Colorado's Water Right Determination and
Administration Act.

1. Water Right Determination and Administration Act of 1969, ch. 373, 1969
Colo. Sess. Laws 1200 (codified as amended at CoLo. REv. STAT. §§ 37-92-101 to -602
(1997).
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THE WATER RIGHT DETERMINATION AND ADMINISTRATION
ACT OF 1969
In the years following World War II, major changes in irrigation
were taking place. This was particularly true in the agriculturally rich
Arkansas River and Platte River Valleys. Farmers were finding that significant volumes of water could be obtained by drilling wells directly
on their farms - wells that tapped underground sources tributary' to
streams. Some who drilled had senior water rights allowing for the direct diversion from the stream. Others had no such rights. Regardless, farmers found it profitable to use this und~rground water source
for their irrigation needs. To be sure, there was the cost of drilling the
wells, installing the pumps, and then actually running the pumps. At
the same time, here was a reliable source of water not dependent on
the vagaries of weather or river flow, nor was it subject to the regulation of ditch rights in Colorado's priority system.
During the 1950s and 1960s, the number of wells tapping water
tributary to streams rapidly increased, particularly in eastern Colorado.
It was not too long before it was discovered that these wells significantly affected stream systems. However, water officials, the State Engineer and the Division Engineers did not feel there was clear statutory
authority for the regulation of the wells within Colorado's priority system. As for the courts, they differed in their consideration of the matter. Finally, in 1965, the Legislature enacted legislation that specifically required the regulation of tributary wells in the priority system.
The statute gave the State Engineer authority to issue orders to accomplish such regulation and the ability to obtain court assistance to
enforce such orders.4 Despite this, implementation was not without its
problems, as evidenced by the case of Fellhauer.f
It was in the Arkansas Valley that one of the wells selected to be
shut down was owned by a Mr. Fellhauer, an individual who refused to

2. In this paper, tributary water is considered to be water that is either in or flowing
into natural streams as well as water underground which is so related to a natural

stream that the use of it or other affect on it ultimately affects a natural stream. Nontributay water is water in underground aquifers or other structures of containment
which are so geologically and hydrologically separate from tributary water that there is
no significant effect on the amount, flow or quality of tributary water if water is removed from such aquifers or other structures and there is no significant natural recharge from tributary sources in the event of a depletion in such aquifers or other
structures. These definitions are intended to express generally the basic considerations in determining tributary and nontributary water. For the precise statutory defini-

tions of tributary and nontributary, see Colorado Revised Statutes section 37-90103(10.5).
3. Act of May 3, 1965, ch. 318, 1965 Colo. Sess. Laws 1244 (originally codified at
COLO. REv. STAT. § 148-11-22 (1963), repealed by Water Right Determination and
Administration Act of 1969, ch. 373, 1969 Colo. Sess. Laws 1200).

4. Of course, for a variety of reasons (the distance to the stream, the time of
pumping, well depth, etc.) wells differ in their effect on stream systems. Regulation
was therefore not as simple as the regulation of surface diversions.
5.

Fellhauerv. People, 447 P.2d 986 (Colo. 1968).
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comply with the order of the Division Engineer (acting under the
authority of the State Engineer and pursuant to the 1965 legislation).
Action was instituted against Mr. Fellhauer by the Attorney General,
action that was supported by the owners of various surface water rights
on the Arkansas River. Although the district court supported the order of the Division Engineer, upon appeal, the Colorado Supreme
Court added a few words of caution, saying there should be a plan,
rules and regulations for the administration of the entire system,6 that
basis.
it was not satisfactory to simply shut down wells on a selected

Fellhauerwas decided by the supreme court in 1968. While it was
winding its way through the courts, the Colorado Legislature, by specific statute ("1967 Act"), authorized a study of the situation from the
engineering, scientific, and legal standpoints, and called for the drafting of new legislation.7 Funds were appropriated, and, under the direction of the Department of Natural Resources, work began. The
Legislature had allotted a time period of two years (until it met in
1969) for the study and for the development of legislative language.
The writer of this essay, working with a group of lawyers, was engaged
to prepare and present to the Legislature the general legislation that
would deal with water rights determination and administration and
that would bring wells into the priority system. The 1967 Act also provided that; pending the study and completion of the legislation, the
status quo should be maintained. No new well permits were to be issued and the regulation of wells was postponed.
The integration of wells into the priority system was essential if existing water rights were to be protected. But it was also essential to integrate them in such a way that well owners, dependant on this source
of water for their livelihoods, would be protected to the maximum extent legally and practically possible. It was truly a crisis situation with
both interests, surface and well, on a collision course - a collision
course because those responsible for water law and administration,
particularly the Legislature, had not taken action a decade or two earlier that would have allowed for the accommodation of tributary well
water usage within the priority system. Had it done so, it would have
been before economies were built on well usage and at a time when
coordination could have been accomplished with much less injury,
stress and strain. The crisis had been allowed to develop because no
one had confronted the problem; everyone had put off dealing with
the problem and allowed it to get worse and worse. Coloradans today
could well take heed and deal with the second crisis discussed in this
essay, the problem with respect to the treatment of nontributary underground water. But they are not doing so, as will be noted later.
In order to carry out the intent and purpose of the two year study
authorized by the 1967 Act, the Legislature planned effective action in

6. Fellhauer,447 P.2d at 986. The Division Engineer had in fact issued orders to
only a small number of the hundreds of wells in the Valley.
7. Act of April 19, 1967, ch. 175, 1967 Colo. Sess. Laws 249.
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the 1969 session to develop legislation that would be comprehensive,
effective and fair. To this end, and to show the tremendous importance that the Legislature placed on the matter, the entire membership of the State Senate was constituted as a water committee with
hearings to commence at the very start of the 1969 legislative session.
The objective was to consider the language prepared by the study
group and to take action on it. The legislation proposed was in the
form of Senate Bill 81.8 So critical was the matter, and so numerous
were those interested in the outcome, that hearings on the bill were
held several times a week over the course of several months. It is
doubtful that any bill in years before or after was more thoroughly
considered. The stakes were high, the interests conflicting, and the
need impressive. The well being of farms and ranches was at stake, as
was the integrity and viability of the priority system and the adjudicative and administrative process. Much could be written on what took
place in the first months of 1969 in considering the proposed bill and
in converting it into what became the Water Right Determination and
Administration Act of 1969. 9 Accounts of these procedures could be
very instructive to those individuals today who are responsible for water management and who are dealing (or not dealing) with the current crisis developing in the treatment of nontributary ground water.
It would be remiss not to mention the importance of the support
that came from various sources outside the Legislature. Lloyd Sommerville, President of the Colorado Farm Bureau, was representative of
these people and very much responsible in his own quiet way for the
development, final passage, and implementation of the 1969 Act. His
constituents were people in the center of the crisis, on both sides of
the crisis, and dependent upon surface water rights, well water rights,
or both. There was no question that some accommodations would
have to be made and that wisdom would have to prevail over the emotions and desires for personal benefit.
Although there were significant changes, Senate Bill 81 finally
passed (basically intact), requiring adjudication and administration of
tributary wells in the priority system. Possibly the most significant impact of the 1969 Act was a change in the procedure for the adjudication of water rights from one in which there were periodic general adjudication proceedings in the various water districts (proceedings
which could last for years as the court permitted statements of claims
to be filed), to one of individual adjudication which could be accomplished on each claim that was made. This change made sense in
terms of the general regulation of Colorado water, but it was most important for facilitating the well adjudication.
It is not the province of this essay to delineate all of the concepts of
the 1969 Act, some of which went beyond addressing the issues of the
8. S. 81, 47th Leg., 1st Reg. Sess., 1969 Colo. Sess. Laws 1200.
9. Water Right Determination and Administration Act of 1969, ch. 373 1969 Colo.
Sess. Laws 1200 (codified as amended at COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 37-92-101 to -602
(1997)).
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immediate crisis to provisions affecting general water issues within the
State. However, in addition to the adjudication procedures, one of the
most important provisions for easing the economic impact of regulation of the wells in the priority system was that of augmentation, a concept which is in general use today. The augmentation concept led to
the development of major programs that would permit the well diversions to continue. For example, in Water Division 1, inhabitants of the
Platte River Valley came together and created an organization called
the Groundwater Appropriators of the South Platte ("GASP"). GASP
acquired senior water rights, the uses of which could be converted to
make-up stream depletions caused by the pumping from wells which
had junior priorities and which would otherwise be shut down. The
conversion simply amounted to a discontinuance of the use of the senior water rights to the extent necessary to make up for the well depletions, and such that there would be no damage to the stream system.
The State Engineer and the Division Engineer cooperated in this program, and the farmers and ranchers, by joining GASP, could continue
to obtain water from wells on which the operations of their farms or
ranches depended.
A few more changes that resulted from the 1969 Act might be
mentioned as well. Prior to the Act, the state was divided in to more
than sixty water districts for water right administration and adjudication. The Act eliminated the water districts and established seven water divisions, each division comprising a water drainage area, such as
the Platte River and the Arkansas River (Water Divisions 1 and 2, respectively). All files from the water districts and courts in the districts
were consolidated in the office of the water division clerk in which the
districts were located. The position of WaterJudge was established for
each water division, and all proceedings regarding water matters (as
defined by the Act) in a particular division were to be before the Water
Judge of that division. The 1969 Act also provided that initial proceedings are to be handled by a water referee (unless immediately taken
over by the Water Judge). All changes in water rights, such as a
change in the point of diversion, can be adjudicated, not just those
specifically mentioned under the previous law. The Act then specified
particular factors that must be considered in connection with changes.
It also provided for the tabulation of water rights and the tabulation of
abandonments of water rights.
The first years of the Act's implementation were critical and difficult ones. Society had failed for too long to deal with the obvious collision course on which tributary wells and surface diversions were traveling. There were angry and frustrated people on both sides. The
State Engineer at the time, Clarence Kuiper, deserves much credit for
his courage and good sense in his handling of the situation. Although
he faced hostile crowds at meetings, he proceeded relentlessly with the
integration of the tributary wells into the priority system. The tributary
wells were adjudicated and took their proper place in the system, taking advantage of provisions under the new law that lessened or even
precluded undue hardship from the regulation.
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AQUIFER DEPLETION
The water crisis discussed in the preceding pages, the deficiencies
that led up to it, and its ultimate handling could be instructive with regard to the current developing crisis in the area of nontributary water.
But society seldom learns from the past, and seldom seems to acknowledge present problems. The developing crisis in the utilization
of nontributary ground water is due to the fact that nontributary
groundwater, for all intents and purposes, is a nonrenewable resource.
With increased growth, it is being depleted at an increasingly rapid
rate, and sufficient plans are not in place for the time when it will no
longer be available in easily obtainable amounts. Of course, what society should be doing is conserving this natural resource, using it only
when reasonable water levels and water pressures can be maintained,
and devising means of recharge adequate in both quality and quantity.
Some public awareness of the problem was in evidence in 1978
when applications under the 1969 Act were filed throughout the state
to acquire rights to use nontributary ground water pursuant to the
constitutional doctrine of appropriative rights. So numerous and so
extensive were these applications, and so important were the issues
they raised that the Colorado Supreme Court consolidated the proceedings before one special water judge. ' Among the most basic
points argued before the Water Judge and the Colorado Supreme
Court were these: 1) Is water that is not tributary to a stream, that is,
water in nontributary aquifers, subject to appropriation under Article
XVI, Sections 5 and 6 of the Colorado Constitution?, 2) Are rights to
that water subject to adjudication under the statutory procedures and
principles that apply to water in or tributary to a stream?, and 3) Is
nontributary ground water owned by the overlying land owner?
In 1983, the Colorado Supreme Court, on appeal from the decision of the WaterJudge, held as follows: 1) Nontributary ground water
cannot be appropriated under Sections 5 and 6 of Article XVI of the
Colorado Constitution or under the laws applicable to water in or
tributary to the natural streams, 2) Rights to nontributary ground water cannot be adjudicated under the 1969 Act, and 3) Nontributary water is not the property of the overlying land owner but in effect, is public property to be dealt with as such by the Colorado Legislature. The
court also noted:
Tributary waters are not subject to eventual depletion because they

are annually replenished, and the vested rights of senior appropriators can be fully protected by seasonal regulation of diversion byjunior appropriators. Nontributary ground water supplies, however, may

dwindle because water can be withdrawn from the, aquifers in excess
of the recharge rate, causing a 'mining condition.

10. Colorado v. Southwestern Colo. Water Conservation Dist., 671 P.2d 1294 (Colo.
1983).
11. Id. at 1313.
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In the first legislative opportunity after the supreme court decision,
land developers and other special interest groups prevailed upon the
Legislature to pass a law that reversed certain portions of the decision
a law providing that rights to nontributary ground water could be
adjudicated under the 1969 Act and that all decrees previously entered
would be validated even though obtained
through procedures the
12
court had held could not be followed.
In 1985, the Legislature passed what became known as Senate Bill
5. s The bill was basically promoted by land developer interests, a bill
that, instead of providing a reasonable and effective way of treating
nontributary ground water so as to satisfy the public interest, and
therefore the interest of future generations, provided for the depletion
of nontributary ground water within a period of 100 years. But then
the Legislature did not indicate when the time period would begin to
toll. The legislation also provided that nontributary ground water
would be allocated on the basis of the ownership of the overlying land.
The Legislature completely disregarded the supreme court's direction
that this water was essentially public property and that the State should
provide a system for the efficient utilization of this vital resource. Of
course, it did so in a system that desires, permits and encourages Legislatures to make such public policy decisions, but that doesn't change
the fact that the legislation was shortsighted and biased.
To further promote and facilitate the usage of nontributary
ground water and its withdrawal without regard to conservation or to
the interests of landowners who might in the future wish to use the water, the Legislature provided that lowering the water level or the water
pressure in the aquifer would not be deemed to cause injury. Yet these
two factors would of course cause injury to others by making recovery
of the water more costly and more problematical. In effect, the Legislature turned truth on its head and declared that which was clearly an
injury would now not be an injury. But this provision was essential if
land developers were going to have the ability to use this water without
restriction. They wanted free, unfettered use in the development of
the land without regard to what future owners of that land might face
as the nontributary ground water source became depleted. Moreover,
assuming that allocation was proper to begin with, this provision did
not treat all landowners equally. Those who took water first had the
advantage. Any delay in use was penalized because of the increase in
recovery cost resulting from the lowering of the water level and pressure. This created the inducement to use "now" while the taking was
relatively easy.
The fundamental concept in our water law, that one cannot use
one's water right in a manner that injures others, is violated by such
12.

Act of Oct. 11, 1983, ch. 285, 1983 Colo. Sess. Laws 2079 (codified at COLO.
§ 37-92-203(1) (1997)). However, the Legislature did not purport to reverse the holding of the supreme court decision that nontributary ground water is not
subject to the constitutional doctrine of appropriation.
13. S. 5, 1st Reg. Sess., 1985, Colo. Sess. Laws 1160.
REv. STAT.
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legislative fiat. That concept was even written into the very law on wells
which Senate Bill 5 amended. If the Legislature wanted to permit injury, as it so obviously did, then, in fairness to those injured and to the
public, it should have so specifically stated, and not resorted to this
subterfuge. This allocation of nontributary ground water on the basis
of landownership is in effect applying a riparian concept to nontribu4
tary ground water, allocating it to the adjacent (upward) land.
The legal, ethical and environmental propriety of the 1985 legislation and the practices it has encouraged should be questioned, particularly the allocation of the water, the depletion of this resource
within 100 years, and the patent misstatement that lowering the water
level and pressure does not cause injury. Assuming that the allocation
of water on the basis of the ownership of the overlying land is proper,
is it then legal constitutionally or statutorily for the water to be sold for
use separate and apart from the land? That is carrying the digression
from the 1983 Colorado Supreme Court decision one step further, and
puts this water in commercial transactions for private profit.
The nontributary ground water crisis continues. The aquifers continue to be pumped, and continue to be depleted. The "no injury"
provision of the 1985 Act sees to that. And as noted previously, the Act
contemplates full depletion in 100 years. Some jurisdictions have tried
to extend the hundred year period to a longer time, such as 300 years,
but such suggestions still work within a depletion concept. What happens when the economic end of this water becomes a reality, an event
that could very well be within the lifetime of persons living today?
What happens to the persons relying upon it? As the water levels and
water pressures are lowered and costs of recovery increase, economic
viability will become more and more questionable. What is the alternative? One would think that conservation would be first on the list.
But conservation should have been provided for in the original legislation.
CONCLUSION
The choices made by Colorado's Legislature reflect a state of mind
that prevails throughout society. That state of mind is of limited purview, reflects a remarkable indifference to the future, and emphasizes
present day greed. But crisis lurks in the background. The general
public may not be aware of what goes on beneath their feet (and perhaps it is unfair to think it should be), but the land developers know,
as do the political powers. They know the reservoirs of coal, oil, gas
and nontributary water are finite. But they put conservation out of
mind in the euphoria of economic growth, resource development,

14. Under the doctrine of riparian law, the owner of the land on the stream has the
right to use a reasonable amount of water on that land. Reasonable use of nontribu-

tary ground water might be a usage on the land to which it is allocated that is consistent with the conservation of that resource.
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more and more malls, more and more houses, more and more stadia,
more and more automobiles.
For centuries, society has promoted the belief that the development of natural resources is one of the great goods of civilization. The
mining of coal and other minerals, the taking of oil and gas, and the
depletion of our underground water aquifers all are considered to be
virtues in the business world. As the water levels decrease, the silent
crisis continues. It is the state of mind today that technology will solve
all, but can technology replenish our aquifers? Why cannot we look to
Nature's wisdom in controlling natural resources, rather than the specious wisdom of present day promoters of development who are so
shortsightedly unconcerned with the future, and are certainly not losing sleep over aquifer depletion. Instead of economic growth as the
panacea and the assurance of prosperity, why can we not, as a society,
adopt patterns of consumption based on sustainability and have "quality of life in a quality environment" as our goal? Through our legislative and judicial systems, through activists and protectors of public interest, we must review these questions of water allocation and use.
What is happening to nontributary ground water under Senate Bill 5 is
contrary to the protection of the environment, to the conservation of
natural resources, to the wisdom of the supreme court, to the considered and wise progression of our water law, and contrary to the public
interest - the interest of our children and grandchildren.
The exploitation of deep aquifer water is but a part of human exploitation of all Nature's substances and processes. The despoliation
of our natural resources

-

soil, water, minerals, vegetation

-

re-

sources that were created over millions of years, is absolute immorality
and absolute folly. If the life and beauty of this planet, upon which the
quality of human existence depends, are to be preserved, we must plan
and implement a compassionate and rational stewardship of the
planet. We must have respect for and pursue conservation of Nature,
its substances, its processes, and its living things.
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NEIL S. GRIGG, WATER RESOURCES MANAGEMENT: PRINCIPLES,
REGULATIONS AND CASES, McGraw-Hill, New York, NY (1996);
540pp; $69.95; ISBN 0-07-024782-X, hardcover.

REVIEWED BYJAMES N. CORBRIDGE, JR.:

In the introduction to his book, Water Resources Management, the
distinguished civil engineer and Colorado State University professor,
Neil Grigg, reminds us that "[d]uring the past few decades a dramatic
change has occurred in the water resources industry. Whereas the last
generation of engineers and managers focused on building projects,
tomorrow's engineers and managers will be confronted with a more
complex arena."' The new arena will require that the traditional players in the water industry - engineers, public administrators, scientists,
financial analysts, and lawyers - transcend their historical attitudes
and specific areas of expertise, and become familiar with other disciplines, cultural values, and political perspectives. This will be necessary for successful communication with clients, special interest groups,
politicians, and the public at large.
Professor Grigg's goal in writing this book was to make a contribution to the professional development of those who work in the water
industry. However, educating a group of specialists about each other's
work is a broad and ambitious task - perhaps too ambitious to be accomplished in a work of only five hundred forty pages. In some areas,
Grigg's breadth is too superficial and touches too lightly on subjects
that really should be considered in greater depth.
Water Resources Management is divided into two parts: 1) Water Management Principles, and 2) Problemsheds of Water Management: Case
Studies. Part One deals with the basic principles of nine widely differing aspects of water management. It includes chapters entitled "Hy-

Professor of Law, University of Colorado School of Law; A.B., Brown University,
1955; LL.B., Yale Law School, 1963.
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drology and the Water Environment"; "Planning and Decision-Making
Processes"; "Systems Analysis, Models, and Decision Support Systems";
and "Water and Environmental Law, Regulation, and Administration."
Of course, each of these chapters could easily command a volume of
its own. Indeed, to achieve a confident familiarity with any one topic,
the reader should begin by referring to the extensive bibliography
provided by the author. Part One then concludes with an excellent
synthesis of Grigg's coverage to that point.
I suspect that one's reaction to Grigg's treatment of these topics
will vary with one's own educational background. I confess to finding
"Systems Analysis" somewhat daunting in the absence of my own prior
training, whereas the chapter "Water and Environmental Law" seems
more superficial than I think my engineering and managerial colleagues deserve. Perhaps I was convinced by Professor Grigg's own
statement that "collaborative decision making with public involvement
should be the mechanism for water management, but realistically, law
and regulations provide the major coordinating mechanism."' Given
that the federal government, fifty state governments, and innumerable
local entities all contribute to the complex web of laws and. regulations
that face the water manager, there is perhaps no way to adequately inform the non-lawyer short of formal legal training. Indeed, the manager should be aware that the lawyer brings to the table a different
perspective on problem solving. Grigg notes that a trend in water
planning and decision-making processes has been "the increased influence of social scientists in water resources policy analysis, as opposed to engineers."' This is "due to the engineer's penchant to gain
control over uncertainty, while social scientists concentrate on analyzing uncertainty and its consequences. The result is that engineers become frustrated with longer, less certain processes, while social scientists are content to engage (and extend) the planning process."' The
study and practice of law provides one with a healthy tolerance for the
sort of ambiguity that inevitably pervades today's highly politicized water environment.
Part Two presents practical management settings and applies those
principles introduced and explored in Part One. The author's stated
goal is to illustrate each application with one or more case studies the "problemsheds" of water management.' This approach is drawn
from an established program at Colorado State University to teach
graduate students about water resource systems and interdisciplinary
problem solving. The chapters range from the specific to the general,
and the case studies from the detailed to the cursory. For instance, the
chapter entitled "Water Supply and Environment" utilizes an extensive
discussion of Denver's Two Forks Project. By contrast, Chapter nine2. Id. at 143.
3. Id. at 92, 93.
4. Id., quoting Martin Reuss, Coping with Uncertainty:Social Scientists, Engineers, and
Federal Water Resources Planning,32 NAT. RES. J. 101 (1992).
5. Id. at 233.
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teen, "River Basin Planning and Coordination," presents four case
studies on various river systems: the Platte River; the Colorado River;
the Apalachicola-Chattahoochee-Flint River in Georgia; and the
Delaware River. Each of these complex cases is accorded two or three
pages of description, enough perhaps to provide a basic familiarity
with the issues, but hardly sufficient to fuel a productive discussion in a
class of graduate water resource students. The same criticism could be
addressed to the chapter "Water Management in Estuaries and Coastal
Waters," where the illustrative cases are Chesapeake Bay, the Great
Lakes, California's Bay-Delta region, and Albemarle-Pimlico Sounds.
All are described in a total of ten pages, including maps.6 To use Water
Resources Management as a textbook, my own preference would be for
fewer case studies, each set out in greater detail. Furthermore, while
Professor Grigg should be commended for his use of examples from
outside the western United States, more emphasis on international water planning problems and solutions would provide a welcome perspective.
One curious aspect of the book is its treatment (or perhaps nontreatment) of groundwater, "the principal source for drinking water
for more than 50 percent of the American population . . . ." After a
brief discussion of groundwater hydrology and a page of groundwater
law in Part One, Grigg subsequently dispatches with the subject in a
very short chapter on groundwater management. Three case studies
Ogallala Aquifer, saltwater intrusion in the Netherlands, and
national groundwater strategy (which the author correctly describes as
moribund) - are presented with even less detail than other case
studies. Groundwater is a critical source of water supply throughout
the world. Groundwater management, as compared to surface water
management, is relatively undeveloped. In many situations, especially
those involving minimal annual recharge, managerial decisions are
inextricably tied to important considerations of public policy.
Movement of water through groundwater aquifers was little
understood by early courts and legislatures. As a result, groundwater
law lags behind its surface counterpart and is in a state of some
confusion. Surely these arenas will be of growing importance, and
demand the close regard of participants in the water industry.
Finally, Water Resources Management could devote more attention to
a much neglected aspect of water development - its cultural impact.
For example, water's cultural impact is especially poignant when agricultural water is transferred to municipal or other uses, an increasingly
familiar pattern in the West. While the owners of water rights may sell
them to their economic advantage, the changes in community life, as
farms are dried up, are enormous. Moreover, the infrastructure that
supports agriculture disappears without sharing in the windfall. As
Professor Charles Wilkinson has pointed out, whole societies may be
6. Id. at 466-75.
7. Id. at 157, quoting Roberta J. Savage, GroundwaterProtection: Working Without a
Statute, 58J. WATER POLLUTION CONTROL FED'N 340-42 (1986).
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threatened by unregulated water development.8 The law has been slow
to react to these threats, 9 but emerging legal, social, and political pressures will doubtless urge water managers to take them into consideration.
Reviewers are prone, and I plead guilty, to pick on the perceived
shortcomings of a book to the exclusion of its overriding virtues. In
fact, I would recommend this work for every water lawyer's bookshelf.
It takes a holistic approach to resources management that is very helpful in raising one's sights above the customary professional detail. The
chapters dealing with surface water law and quality management provide a thoughtful introduction to those not already conversant with
these subjects. In addition, the book introduces ideas with which the
legal practitioner may not be familiar, and provides bibliographical
references for those who wish to go farther and deeper than Professor
Grigg's discussion. Although designed primarily for use as a university
textbook, it would be equally useful for those engaged in self-study.
Perhaps most important, it allows us to share the experience and wisdom gleaned by the author from a distinguished career in natural resources management.

8. See Charles F. Wilkinson, CROSSING THE NEXT MERIDIAN: LAND, WATER, AND THE
FUTURE OF THE WEST 267-74 (Island Press 1992).
9. But see, Note, The Milagro Beanfield War Revisited in Ensenada Land & Water
Association v. Sleeper: Public Welfare Defies Transfer of Water Rights, 29 NAT. RES. J.
861 (1989).
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EDWARD H.P. BRANS, ESTHER J. DEHAAN, ANDRE NOLLKAEMEPER, AND
JAN RINZEMA, THE SCARCITY OF WATER: EMERGING LEGAL AND
POLICY RESPONSES, Kluwer Law International Ltd., London,
United Kingdom (1997); 299pp; $124.00; ISBN 90-411-0657-X,
hardcover.
The Scarcity of Water is a thorough look at the problem of water
scarcity on both the national and international levels. A collection of
papers presented in The Netherlands at a 1995 conference entitled
"Scarcity of Water: International, European and National Legal Aspects," the various essays focus on creative legal solutions that have
been used to respond to the water scarcity crisis.
Chapters One and Two analyze the current state of the water problem. They focus mainly on the global water crisis in the twenty-first
century and water scarcity challenges for the future. The conclusion is
that fresh water will rapidly become more scarce in the face of tremendous population growth, that the need for fresh water will be felt
first in developing countries where most of the population growth will
take place, and that nations must work in cooperation to implement
water conservation programs.
Chapters Three through Six look at international water law. Chapter Three examines institutional and legal responses to water supply,
urbanization, and water quality. Chapter Four discusses legal procedures applicable to interstate conflicts on water scarcity and specifically
looks at the Gabcikovo case. Chapter Five then deals with the protection of watercourses as sources of fresh water for future generations.
Finally, Chapter Six assesses the possibility of securing access to safe
drinking water through trade and international migration.
Chapters Seven through Ten detail specific water scarcity problems
in selected river basins. Included within these chapters are discussions
on the Nile, the conflicts between Israel, Jordan and the Palestinians,
the Jordan River and Middle East water problems, and law and water
scarcity in Africa. There is also a detailed discussion of specific treaties.
Similarly, Chapters Eleven through Fourteen discuss water scarcity
issues in selected regions. Chapter Eleven focuses on current trends in
United States' water law and policy, details the characteristics of riparian rights, notes the special case of Indian Tribes, and discusses future
allocation issues. Chapter Twelve focuses on tort liability associated
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with the detrimental use of fresh water resources under Dutch law in
both domestic and international cases. Chapter Thirteen focuses on
liability for damage to riverbeds in The Netherlands, and Chapter
Fourteen discusses water right disputes and water scarcity in Nepal Hill
irrigation.
The final chapters, Chapters Fifteen through Seventeen, examine
the relationship between water scarcity and economic law. Chapter
Fifteen specifically discusses balancing free trade in water and the protection of water resources in GATT, Chapter Sixteen focuses on the actual water conflicts between Mexico and the United States, and Chapter Seventeen deals with the privatization of drinking water in Europe.
The purpose of this book is best described by the editors as "an attempt to provide an overview of the various legal responses to conflicts
of water uses and to show how water law is continuously developing in
reaction to new threats of water scarcity."
Melody Divine

JOHN CRONIN AND ROBERT F. KENNEDY, JR., RiVERKEEPERS, lST ED.,

Scribner, New York, New York (1997); 302pp; $25.00; ISBN 0-68483908-3; hardcover.
In Riverkeepers, John Cronin and Robert F. Kennedy have joined
forces to chronicle the events surrounding the efforts to clean up the
polluted Hudson River so as to make it possible for "a child to cast a
line into the river and catch a fish for the family table." A powerful
story, it reveals that which lays at the heart of environmental activism,
delineates the need for grassroots' efforts, and illustrates how the fight
to combat environmental degradation at the local level can positively
affect a nation's efforts to attack widespread environmental quality issues.
The book begins by setting the stage for the river as a battleground. From the power plants to the local fisherman, Cronin and
Kennedy introduce the various actors that have been involved in the
conflict over the last century.
In Chapter Two, John Cronin tells of his own connection with the
Hudson River - from his humble upbringing in the riverside town of
Yonkers, New York, to his eventual involvement in the fight to clean up
the river. In his youth, Cronin looked at the Hudson and saw only
three things: a river that, at least from where he lived, lay beneath cliffs
known as the Palisades, a river that separated New York from New Jersey, and a river that was too polluted for swimming. As an adult, a
chance meeting with the founder of Clearwater encouraged Cronin to
become an environmental activist. He was later offered ajob with the
Hudson River Fishermen's Association ("HRFA"), a group which used
lab analysis to confront river polluters. This work eventually led to the
founding of Riverkeepers - John Cronin was one of the first members. This job entailed cruising the river in a boat looking for illegal
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polluters. During his first day on the job he found an EXXON oil
tanker illegally discharging into the Hudson. This was the beginning
of a new era on the river.
Robert Kennedy, Jr. then details how his privileged upbringing
contributed to his interest in the environment. In 1984, he volunteered for the Natural Resources Defense Counsel ("NRDC") which
served as legal counsel for the HRFA. During this time, Kennedy
helped create the Castle Rock Field Station on the Hudson, a scientific
station for field scientists that was equipped with laboratories, over.
night quarters, and office space for environmental advocacy groups.
Kennedy was also involved with the efforts to clean up one of the Hudson River tributaries, Quassaic Creek. The project's successes included
forcing twenty polluters into compliance with the Clean Water Act.
Clearly Kennedy's vision was the same as that of Cronin's - to return
the river to the people.
Chapter Four describes the nationwide spread of Riverkeepers organizations and their impact on water quality in their respective areas.
Twenty-two organizations ranging from Georgia to Alaska have been
founded since the original Hudson Riverkeepers. These organizations
are listed in the appendix.
Chapter Five shifts focus somewhat and delineates the legal history
behind today's water related environmental disputes. The chapter discusses the Magna Carta, the Public Trust Doctrine, and landmark
American environmental cases from 1821 to the present. The authors
address the concepts of navigability and takings, the use of property
and the creation of public nuisance, the various federal statutes governing environmental quality, Earth Day 1970, and the importance of
environmental standing. All of these topics are considered in relation
to environmental quality.
In Chapter Six, the authors define the role of litigation in local environmental disputes by means of illustration. The proposed Westway
construction project would have added 242 riverfront acres to the West
Side of Manhattan Island. However, local opposition to wide scale pollution and development demonstrated the concept of "not in my backyard," or NIMBY, and how empowered communities prevented the
project from moving forward.
In Chapter Seven, Cronin and Kennedy look at the enforcement of
environmental laws. The authors examine the role of environmental
legislation, and the extent to which the courts have been willing to
force both the government and private industries into compliance. In
addition to addressing the role of citizen suits, the chapter also examines the impact Supreme Court decisions have had the on the effectiveness of current legislation.
Chapter Eight shifts focus again, and examines water distribution
rules promulgated to protect the drinking water for New York City and
surrounding counties. Although by 1988 not a single organization was
found to be in violation of the regulations, Kennedy was nonetheless
able to document Putnam Hospital's discharge of raw, untreated sew-
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age into Croton Reservoir, one of New York City's drinking water
sources. Among other things, the chapter also discusses the concept
of watersheds, and the role legislation plays in protecting watersheds.
Chapter Ten discusses Congress' role since 1990 in environmental
legislation. Beginning with the "Contract with America," the chapter
describes the attempts to rewrite American environmental legislation,
the resulting effect on environmental policy, and industry's role in
politics vis a vis the environment. The authors argue that politics play
a large role in the environmental movement in the United States and
attempt to demonstrate the scope of that role.
The book concludes by describing the role of humanism in the
fight for a clean environment. Borrowing from the offerings of philosophers, religious institutions, historians, and scientists, Cronin and
Kennedy remind us of the integral human component to environmentalism. They also remind us that concern for the environment is really
concern for our civil rights, and not a radical, anti-property, hyperregulative movement.
Amy Beatie

MARK S. DENNISON, WETLAND MITIGATION: MITIGATION BANKING
AND OTHER STRATEGIES FOR DEVELOPMENT AND COMPLIANCE,

Government Institute, Rockville Maryland (1997); 2 9 9 pp; $75.00;
ISBN 0-86587-534-0, hardcover.
Wetland Mitigation: Mitigation Banking and Other Strategies for Development and Complianceis a book for anyone interested in wetland regulation. In addition to being concise, helpful, and easy to read, it is also
comprehensive, covering everything from the basic definition of a wetland, to the emergence of mitigation banking.
Dennison begins by introducing the reader to the three general
elements required for wetland designation. These include wetland
hydrology, hydric soils, and wetland vegetation. The author then provides an analysis of many current federal regulatory mechanisms affecting wetland mitigation. Possibly the most helpful segment of the book
is its step by step explanation of the requirements of the federal permitting process (the author includes a short list of acts exempt from
Section 404(a) permitting). The book also includes a thorough look
at various agreements between the EPA and the Army Corps affecting
mitigation compliance (these agreements are reproduced in the appendices of the book). In the final chapters of the book, Dennison introduces the concept of mitigation banking, discusses its advantages
and disadvantages, and then guides the reader through the mitigation
banking process. The author also supplies several case studies that
look at the creation of freshwater wetlands, the creation of tidal wetlands, payment of fee in-lieu of mitigation, and the establishment of a
wetland mitigation bank. Finally, located within the appendices are
lists of the federal EPA and Army Corps offices, as well as a list of vari-
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ous state wetland offices. Wetland Mitigation is an excellent resource
for any practitioner involved in wetland mitigation.
GreggLemkau
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MANAGEMENT AND CONFLICT RESOLUTION,

Praeger, Westport, Connecticut, London(1995); 499pp; $69.50;
ISBN 0-275-94782-3, hardcover.
Industrialization, urbanization, and population growth have led to
increasing demands on water supplies throughout the world. As the
scarcity of this natural resource continues to grow, there will be greater
danger of conflicts and disputes among suppliers and users. In response to this pressing issue, Dinar and Loehman have collected a series of essays that address improved water management, conflict resolution, and cooperation. While their approach is from an economic
perspective, the book is notjust for economists; it should be instructive
to anyone concerned with the future of water management.
Divided into two sections, the first focuses on water management
institutions and processes. Case studies from the United States and
other countries expose the reader to a variety of water management
philosophies. The essays vary from a comparison of two institutional
approaches to resolving interstate water disputes (Colorado and Delaware River basins), to the application of the Clean Water Act, to the
San Francisco Bay Estuary, to a discussion of water use and transfer in
Taiwan, to several discussions of how water disputes are handled in
countries such as India, Canada and Australia. One benefit of this
comparative approach is that it demonstrates the strengths and weaknesses of different institutions. By looking at a variety of possibilities,
one might be inspired to develop new and creative strategies for water
management.
More specifically, the articles within this first section discuss relationships between institutions, the economic principles underlying different types of institutions, and how these principles affect water allocation. For example, one article examines conflicts over water
transfers in terms of the associated social costs and suggests that a water bank might provide an alternative to the pure market system for allocating water rights. Another article considers the role of equity and
efficiency in water allocation. Overall, the articles in this section emphasize conflict resolution processes, negotiation strategies, and their
respective applications in a practical setting. The articles suggest that
conflict resolution can be improved through mediation, and that mediation will become more prominent in the future. In addition, various authors highlight the benefits of coalition formation, collective action and cooperative efforts as approaches for successful water
management.
The second part of the book presents methods of economic analy-
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sis for institutional design and conflict resolution. Among the methods discussed are empirical analysis, simulation, mathematical modeling and experimentation. Practitioners may be interested in seeing
how the different methods of economic analysis are relevant in the
evaluation and comparison of alternatives and interest group preferences.
The editors suggest that by considering the design approach to
solving water problems, we can be more proactive in responding to
problems. For example, water pricing can be a powerful management
tool for improving efficiency of water use. It is also useful for conserving water and making decisions for optimal use. For those who remain
skeptical, the Howitt and Vaux case study on the California water bank
demonstrates how economic incentives can be blended successfully
with government regulation. Thus, the editors conclude that "water
management should not be carried out solely through a market process or through a purely bureaucratic process. The ideal system would
blend economic incentives, conflict resolution processes, and government action in a democratic system."
Vicki L. Spencer

DAVID M. GILRAN AND THOMAS C. BROWN, INSTREAM FLOW
PROTECTION: SEEKING A BALANCE IN WESTERN WATER USE, Island

Press, Washington, D.C. (1997);
X, softcover.

4 1 7 pp;

$30.00; ISBN 1-55963-524-

In Instream Flow Protection, David Gillilan and Thomas Brown provide a comprehensive look at the issues that surround the concept of
instream flows. In the process, they provide an overview of western water use and explore the political, economic, legal, and scientific issues
accompanying attempts to balance the competing goals of maximum
water use and environmental protection. An invaluable resource for
anyone interested in western water policy, this book provides discussion and analyses that should benefit casual readers, also well as practitioners, technicians, and scholars alike. From an explanation of the
technical nature of quantifying necessary stream flows to discussion of
the legal and scientific principles, Instream Flow Protection is an integrative study of the interrelationships between water, the environment,
and society.
The book begins by defining what the term "instream flow" means
and why some have opined that it is "one of the region's primary water
research needs." As the authors explain the importance of providing
adequate instream flows in the rivers of the west, they point out that
"[t]he combination of scarce supplies and numerous demands has put
heavy pressure on the West's rivers and streams." In Chapter Two, the
authors set the stage for the emergence of the instream flow concept.
They explore the history of western water use and the evolution of
western water law. Looking at the circumstances surrounding the set-
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tlement of the West, this chapter explores how the law responded to
the plight of those dependent on the region's scarce water supplies.
The authors trace the role of early legislation and court decisions in
the evolution from riparian law to the doctrine of prior appropriation.
In Chapter Three, the authors return to a discussion of instream flow
issues and consider the numerous instream purposes of water. Fish
habitat, wildlife, streamside vegetation, and a variety of recreational
pursuits such as canoeing, kayaking, rafting, fishing, and aesthetic
pleasure are all cited as valuable uses that benefit from sufficient instream flows. Chapter Four then tackles some of the more technical
aspects of instream flow issues such as how much water should be left
in streams and how that amount is best quantified.
The middle chapters concentrate primarily on the different state
issues that arise from the instream flow questions. Chapter Five identifies the issues while Chapter Six provides a survey of the different
methods states have employed to address the issues. In maintaining a
balanced consideration of all water uses, Chapter Seven discusses the
interaction of instream flow protection measures with other water uses.
The latter section of the book examines the interaction between
federal and state entities with respect to instream flow protection.
Chapter Eight discusses federal authority over the management of
western water and the relationship between federal and state entities
in this area. In addition, this chapter explores the different approaches taken by federal agencies in their efforts to obtain instream
flow rights. These include federal reserved rights, federal non-reserved rights, federal use of state water rights, and federal administrative protection. In Chapter Nine, the authors discuss federal water development programs and how instream flows are affected by those
programs. Chapter Ten then discusses the overlay of federal environmental protection laws and programs on instream flow protection in
the western states.
The book concludes with Chapter Eleven. Here, the authors contemplate the prospects for reaching a balance in water allocation in
the West. Pointing out the growing population in the western states
and the transition from agrarian water uses to municipal water uses,
Gillilan and Brown recommend that policy makers balance competing
interests while noting that the solutions and methods to the problems
accompanying depleted stream flows will vary.
Jon Alby

GEORGE A. GOULD AND DOUGLAS L. GRANT, CASES AND MATERIALS ON
WATER LAw, 5TH ED., West Publishing, St. Paul, Minnesota (1995);
6 7 1 pp;

$50.00; ISBN 0-314-06774-4, hardcover.

Cases and Materialson Water Law, now in its fifth edition, retains the
basic approach and scope of prior editions. It is a traditional casebook
designed to introduce novices to technical concepts of water rights
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and environmental water laws. Like its predecessor, it continues to examine water law from the perspective of private water rights, but incorporates into the discussion the importance and impact of topics
such as public rights, water quality regulation and environmental regulation in general.
Chapter One is an introduction to water law, and covers the various private property rights in water. The authors also provide a brief
history and functional analysis of the appropriation system, introduce
the reader to new water legislation, and discuss future water policies.
The next four chapters of the book examine state water law, while the
final three chapters examine federal laws and programs.
Chapter Two is devoted to one of the two dominant water law doctrines in this country: the law of prior appropriation. Divided into six
sections, the first section of the chapter discusses the origins of the
prior appropriation doctrine. Section two addresses attributes of the
doctrine including diversion, beneficial use, priority, and geographic
restrictions on use. The third section is dedicated to regulation, and
includes discussions on the permit system and the public interest. Section four includes a brief, but comprehensive discussion of abandonment, forfeiture, and prescription. The chapter then concludes with a
discussion of water transfer and reuse. The authors finish by arguing
that prior appropriation has endured as a doctrine because it serves
the economic goal of promoting investment by giving security of use.
Chapter Three looks at the second dominant legal doctrine in U.S.
water law: the riparian system. Developed in England and the eastern
half of the United States, it is based on the assumption that if rights to
the use of water are restricted to those who have access to it through
the ownership of the banks, and those individuals restrict their water
use to reasonable use, there will be enough for all. Chapter Three is
divided into five sections. The discussion begins with the basis of
rights and concludes with the abolition and combination of those
rights. Chapter Four is dedicated to groundwater doctrines and the
problems of storage management, while Chapter Five looks at water
distribution organizations, both public and private. Chapter Six begins to look at federal regulation and control. Included in the discussion are the methods of interstate allocation including equitable apportionment, interstate compacts, and congressional appropriation.
The authors note that states have an affirmative duty under the doctrine of equitable apportionment to take reasonable steps to conserve
and even augment the natural resources within their borders for the
benefit of other states.
The final chapters are devoted to public rights, environmental protection, and federal water law. Public rights are discussed in terms of
the Public Trust Doctrine. The historic function of the Public Trust
Doctrine has been to provide a public property basis for resisting the
exercise of private property rights in natural resources deemed contrary to the public interest. Modem trends in natural resource law are
slowly eroding traditional concepts of private property rights in natural
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resources and substituting new notions of sovereign power over those
resources.
Cases and Materials on Water Law is a practical guide that provides
the reader with a solid introduction to water law and water rights. As
noted by the authors, water law consists of much more than the private
right to abstract water from its source. Nevertheless, such rights form
the basis of most water use, and looking at the impact of other laws
and uses upon private property rights is an instructive viewpoint from
which to start the study of water law.
Loretta Schouten

MARY ELLEN WOLFE, A LANDOWNER'S GUIDE TO WESTERN WATER

Roberts Rinehart, Publishers, Boulder, Colorado (1996);
17 5pp; $16.95; ISBN 1-57098-093-4, softcover.

RIGHTS,

A Landowner's Guide to Western Water Rights is a general overview of
the factors which set western water rights apart from water right issues
in the rest of the nation. From simply defining water rights to delving
into more complicated areas, this guide serves as a reference tool for
those interested in understanding the fundamentals of water allocation in the western United States.
The Guide opens with a brief introduction that focuses on the factors that led to the development of western water rights systems. Specifically, the introduction looks at the hardships faced by early settlers
as they struggled to cope with the scarcity of water in the West. While
the riparian system of water rights worked well for the eastern half of
the nation, such a system was unworkable in the arid western climate.
Both agriculture and mining, the livelihood of the vast majority of
early westerners, required the transport of large quantities of water far
from its source.
Part One answers the most frequently asked questions concerning
water rights, and then refers the reader to those pages with more detailed answers. Some examples include: 1) What is "diversion"? 2)
How is a water right established? 3) What is "beneficial use"? and 4)
What is the Public Trust Doctrine? Anyone confused by the basic terminology will find helpful and concise explanations in this section, although the Guide is set up in such a way that finding more detailed explanations is always quick and easy.
Part Two is the main focus of the book. Divided into three chapters, Chapter One provides an overview of various topics in western water law, including the three systems of water allocation found in the
United States: 1) riparian, 2) prior appropriation, and 3) "hybrid."
This chapter also looks at federal reserved water rights, ground water
rights, stream adjudications, and instream flow rights. Each topic is
treated in some detail, and different water right systems are compared
and contrasted.
Chapter Two describes the doctrine of prior appropriation. It be-
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gins with the six most common devices routinely used to determine if a
water appropriation is valid: diversion, intent, beneficial use, priority,
qualifications, and enforcement. Discussed next are the limits placed
on appropriations, the most important potential limitation being the
Public Trust Doctrine. In the wake of the California Supreme Court's
1983 decision in NationalAudubon Society v. Superior Court, longstanding
water rights may be in jeopardy if the water under those rights is found
to be necessary to protect the public interest. Chapter Two goes on to
discuss how water rights are obtained, transferred, changed, lost, and
litigated. Finally, the effect of the Winters v. United States decision on
federal and tribal reserved water rights is considered.
Chapter Three completes Part Two. It looks at how prior appropriation has weathered the twentieth century, and how it will fare in
the future. Whether such issues as reallocation, the Endangered Species Act, conservation, water quality, and watershed management can
survive within a system of prior appropriation is a question with which
all westerners will struggle well into the twenty-first century.
The Guide changes course in Part Three and focuses exclusively on
issues pertinent to landowners. This section is broken down into a series of eleven "tips," all of which revolve around certain considerations
that should be made before purchasing land. Obviously, many issues
should be considered depending on a landowner's needs. For instance, someone who intends to farm would have much more interest
in appurtenant water rights than someone building a vacation home.
Part Four profiles eighteen western states by providing direction to
appropriate state water rights agencies and summarizing the key attributes of each state's water rights system. Finally, the Guide concludes with a glossary of common water rights terminology. Each word
in the glossary is in "bold" print in the main text when first used.
A Landowner's Guide to Western Water Rights is a detailed look at the
unique issues facing western water users. A basic understanding of this
complex and often confusing area is within the reach of anyone who
can obtain a copy of the Guide. Whether westerners realize it or not,
we are all dependent on this finite resource. The question of whether
the doctrines which served us in the past can be relied on in today's
changing world does not lend itself to an easy answer. In the coming
century, as the population of the western United States continues to
increase, these issues will be brought to the forefront. Only through a
thorough understanding of western water rights can we reach a workable solution.
Matthew G. Paulson

COURT REPORTS

NINTH CIRCUIT
Alaska Wildlife Alliance v. National Park Service, 108 F.3d 1065 (9th
Cir. 1997) (holding that commercial fishing in Alaska's Glacier Bay
National Park is statutorily prohibited in the Park's designated wilderness areas, but not in its non-wilderness areas).
Alaska Wildlife Alliance sued the Secretary of the Interior and officials of the National Park Service claiming that commercial fishing in
Glacier Bay National Park ("Park") violated the Alaska National Interest Lands Conservation Act and the Organic Act which created the national park system. The Park Service conceded that commercial fishing
was prohibited by statute in the Park's wilderness areas, but argued
they had discretion to permit fishing in non-wilderness areas. The district court concluded that commercial fishing is statutorily prohibited
only in wilderness areas of the Park.
Plaintiffs appealed the district court's decision. The Allied Fishermen of Southeast Alaska ("Fishermen"), an association of commercial fishers, intervened on behalf of defendants and argued that plaintiffs lacked standing and that commercial fishing was permitted
throughout the entire Park.
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals found the plaintiffs met the
Lujan standing requirements: the experiences recounted in their affidavits demonstrated aesthetic and recreational harm; plaintiffs' injuries were traceable to commercial fishing; and plaintiff's injuries would
be redressed by a favorable ruling.
The court noted that the Organic Act gives the Secretary of the Interior authority to "make and publish such rules and regulations as he
may deem necessary or proper for the management of the parks,
monuments, and reservations under the jurisdiction of the National
Park Service." The court further noted the scope of the Secretary's
delegated authority.
The authorization of activities shall be construed and the protection,
management, and administration of these areas shall be conducted in
light of the high public value and integrity of the National Park System and shall not be exercised in derogation of the values and purposes for which these various areas have been established, except as
may have been or shall be directly and specifically provided by Congress.
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Plaintiffs argued that the Secretary's failure to prevent commercial
fishing in the Park derogated the Organic Act's purpose of conservation and therefore violated an express statutory directive.
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals rejected this argument as well
as the Fishermen's argument that commercial fishing was permitted
throughout the entire Park. The Court stated that the question is not
which interpretation it prefers, but whether the Park Service's interpretation is reasonable. The Court stated that "[n] o statute expressly
prohibits commercial fishing in the Park's non-wilderness areas or
demonstrates clear congressional intent to restrict the Park Service's
discretion to permit commercial fishing." Having found neither an
express statutory directive nor compelling evidence of clear congressional intent contradicting the Park Service's interpretation, the appellate court affirmed the judgment of the lower court and allowed fishing in non-wilderness areas.
Matt Dillman

TENTH CIRCUIT
Scheufler v. General Host Corp., 126 F.3d 1261 (10th Cir. 1997)
(holding that a person need not appropriate water rights to state a
claim for nuisance caused by contamination of groundwater resulting
in inability to cultivate crops).
Since 1908, the American Salt Company, a subsidiary of General
Host, owned and operated a salt manufacturing plant near Lyons,
Kansas. In 1977, owners of land upstream from the plaintiffs sued
General Host claiming contamination of the fresh water aquifer running under their land, resulting in land unfit for the production of irrigated crops. The landowners prevailed and the court awarded
$3,060,000 in damages for actual crop loss and $10,000,000 in punitive
damages.
Fourteen years after the initial case against General Host, plaintiffs
brought suit alleging that the defendant's salt plant posed a nuisance
rendering the plaintiffs' farms unfit for production of irrigated crops,
and interferring with their rights to use and enjoy their land. At the
time the suit was filed, none of the plaintiffs had applied for or received a water permit from the Kansas Department of Water Resources. Two years after plaintiffs filed suit, they applied for such
permits. At the date of trial, none of the permits had been acted upon
by the state.
Ajury returned a verdict in plaintiffs' favor, and held that failure to
appropriate water rights did not bar a nuisance claim. The district
court also held that plaintiffs' inability to obtain irrigation permits
from the state did not cause plaintiffs' inability to irrigate. The court
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awarded actual as well as punitive damages in the amount of $550,000.
The court awarded punitive damages because the defendant continued to pollute the aquifer during the years following the previous law
suit.
General Host appealed, alleging: 1) the plaintiffs' failure to appropriate water rights or obtain irrigation permits barred their nuisance
claim because plaintiffs sustained no actual damages; and (2) the punitive damages award was unfairly repetitious.
The court affirmed the district court's ruling on both the validity
of the nuisance claim and the appropriateness of the punitive damages
award. The court reversed the district court's ruling that plaintiffs'
failure to obtain appropriated water rights did not cause the plaintiffs'
inability to produce irrigated crops on their land.
Defendants asserted that plaintiffs did not have any water appropriation rights in the aquifer because they never received a permit.
The court determined that an appropriated right was not necessary to
claim nuisance. The court further determined that a finding of nuisance was not predicated on a finding of actual interference with use
of one's property. Since the defendants' contamination of the aquifer
would frustrate the potential future reasonable use of plaintiffs' property as irrigated land, plaintiffs were entitled to proceed with a nuisance claim.
The lack of water appropriation rights was not wholly irrelevant.
The district court correctly concluded that the failure to obtain appropriated water rights was a potential intervening cause for the plaintiffs' inability to grow irrigated crops on their land, rather than a complete bar to their nuisance claim.
The Court upheld the punitive damages award for the reasons
given by the district court - that the defendant had failed to stop polluting the aquifer following the original suit.
Heidi A. Anderson

COLORADO
Dallas Creek Water Co. v. Huey, 933 P.2d 27 (Colo.
that an application for reasonable diligence was timely
under claim of right within the applicable statutory
and that such filing properly conferred subject matter
the water court).

1997) (holding
filed by a "user
requirements,"
jurisdiction on

Dallas Creek appealed from an order of the Water Court for Water
Division No. 4 canceling its conditional water right for failure to timely
file an application for a finding of reasonable diligence. The Colorado
Supreme Court considered the circumstances under which amending
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an application for a conditional water right, previously filed by the
statutory deadline, renders that application void, thereby depriving the
water court of subject matter jurisdiction over the application.
In 1974, the water court granted a conditional decree for 10 cfs of
water for the Long Hill Pumping Plant at a specified point of diversion
on Dallas Creek. After transfer by the original owner, the decree was
continuously renewed and held by WRIKO, Inc. until 1993. In April
1993, the court notified WRIKO's owner that the decree was again up
for renewal. Plaintiff's non-lawyer agent timely filed the renewal application under the name of WRIKO in spite of the fact that the Dallas
Creek Company had taken possession of the Long Hill Pumping Plant.
In July 1993, the water court published public notice of the reasonable diligence application, and land owners in the Dallas Creek basin filed numerous statements of opposition. In September 1993, Dallas Creek entered an appearance. The water court allowed Dallas
Creek to participate for more than two years in discovery, motions, and
preparation for trial. Shortly before trial in January 1996, Dallas Creek
filed a formal motion to substitute Dallas Creek Company for WRIKO
as the real party in interest. The water court denied this motion holding that the application was untimely. The objectors moved to dismiss
the diligence application altogether alleging that WRIKO had been
dissolved in 1988 and, therefore, no real party in interest appeared as
an applicant within the diligence period. The water court agreed,
holding that the party on an application cannot be amended after the
filing deadline has passed. Therefore, because no real party in interest
had timely filed an application, the water court dismissed the case for
lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
Dallas Creek appealed, urging that as the user of the water right it
was entitled to proceed with the application as the real party in interest. The Colorado Supreme Court agreed, holding that the water
court abused its discretion in denying substitution of Dallas Creek as
the real party in interest. The court stated that the filing of a diligence
application, and subsequent public notice of that filing, "confers subject matter jurisdiction on the water court to proceed with a determination of reasonable diligence."
The court found the water court's strict construction of the submission requirements for diligence applications untenable, stating, "we
do not view party identification as an unalterable jurisdictional feature
of an application." The court based its opinion on two factors. First,
the statutes state that "any person" desiring a finding of reasonable
diligence may file an application. Second, Colorado Rule of Civil Procedure 17(a) requires that actions be prosecuted by real parties in interest. In the court's opinion, Dallas Creek qualified as a real party in
interest because it was the actual user of the water right through its
ownership of the Long Hill Pumping Plant.
The court cited several reasons for its conclusion. First, the agent
who filed the diligence application for Dallas Creek was not a lawyer.
He filed the application under WRIKO because he thought he had to
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do so since the water court previously granted the decree under that
name. The application stated that Dallas Creek was the actual user of
the water right. The court found the law recognizes that "water rights
are decreed to structures and points of diversion," and that "the owners and users of such rights may change from time to time." Because
the agent would have listed Dallas Creek as the applicant had he
known he could do so, because Dallas Creek was the actual user of the
water right and owner of the point of diversion (the Long Hill Pumping Plant), and because courts expect that owners and users may
change, the court found Dallas Creek could be substituted for the
original applicant.
Second, the court found that the motion for substitution of applicants "neither misled nor substantially prejudiced" the objectors. The
applicant gave proper public notice, and that notice contained clarification that Dallas Creek was the actual user of the water. In addition,
Dallas Creek's lawyer appeared on its behalf, and worked on the case
for over two years. The court noted that, when justice so requires,
courts have allowed applicants for water rights to amend applications.
Finally, the court found that, under Colorado Rule of Civil Procedure 15, "a substituted party benefits from the filing date of the original pleading" if adversely affected parties had sufficient notice to avoid
any prejudice. The objectors were aware that Dallas Creek was the
user of the water right, and that Dallas Creek's attorney represented
them in the diligence proceedings. The supreme court determined,
therefore, that Dallas Creek's substitution was effective as of the date
the agent filed the original diligence application.
The court remanded the case to the water court for determination
of whether Dallas Creek met the requirements for a finding of reasonable diligence and granting of a conditional decree.
DebbieEiland

Left Hand Ditch Co. v. Hill, 933 P.2d 1 (Colo. 1997) (holding that
shareholders in a mutual ditch company have a common law right to
inspect the company's shareholder list).
The Hills held shares in the Left Hand Ditch Company, a nonprofit corporation that provides water to its shareholders in the Niwot
region of Boulder County. In 1993, the Hills requested a copy of the
mutual ditch company's shareholder list. The Hills explained that
they wanted to inspect the shareholder list in order to sell or rent their
shares, to better understand Left Hand's future, and to better communicate with other shareholders.
Left Hand denied the Hills' request. Left Hand explained that it
wished to keep the list confidential and that it had alternate methods
available for assisting the Hills in renting or selling their shares.
The Hills filed suit in the Boulder County District Court seeking an
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order to compel the release of Left Hand's shareholder list. The court
dismissed the action finding that Colorado Revised Statutes section 75-117 of the Colorado Corporation Code, which grants a right of inspection to corporate shareholders of the shareholder list, does not
apply to mutual ditch companies as they are not "for profit" enterprises. Further, the court held that any common law right of inspection was superseded by the Corporation Code. The court of appeals
reversed the trial court's decision and held that section 7-5-117 does
apply to mutual ditch companies.
The Colorado Supreme Court addressed the issue of whether mutual ditch company shareholders have either a statutory or common
law right to inspect the company's shareholder list. The court found
that although the Corporation Code does not apply to mutual ditch
companies, shareholders in ditch companies do have a common law
right to inspect such companies' shareholder lists.
The court cited its previous case law which indicated that because
the "stock" owned by mutual ditch company shareholders is water,
which they may apply to a beneficial use, such "stock" is real property.
However, traditional corporate stock is considered personal property.
Thus, mutual ditch companies are not "true" corporations in a legal
sense. The court concluded, therefore, that mutual ditch companies
are special purpose corporations which are not governed by the Colorado Corporation Code.
Further, the court determined that no other statutes confer upon
mutual ditch company shareholders the right to inspect the company's
shareholder list. However, the court cited its previous holdings that
indicated shareholders have a "fundamental" common law right to inspect nonprofit water corporation shareholder lists. Relying on the
court's ruling in Dines v. Harris,the court found this right should be
"zealously guarded."
The court did not attempt to determine the level of propriety necessary for inspection under the common law right. It did conclude,
however, that the Hills' reasons for inspection did meet the "proper
purpose" standard for inspection of a shareholder list as delineated in
section 7-5-117(2).
DavidA. Laird

Shirola v. Turkey Caion Ranch Ltd. Liab. Co., 937 P.2d 739 (Colo.
1997) (holding that owners of unadjudicated statutorily exempt wells
have vested water rights and have standing to assert injury to those
rights upon the filing of an application for adjudication of those rights
with the water court).
Turkey Cafion Ranch planned to develop a subdivision on 323
acres of land in El Paso County, Colorado. Turkey Cafion sought to
provide water to the subdivision by drilling two wells into the fractured
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Manitou Limestone Formation underlying portions of Turkey Cafion's
land. Withdrawal from the wells would deplete surface water from
both the Turkey Creek and Red Creek drainages. Both drainages are
tributary to the Arkansas River.
On February 24, 1994, Turkey Caion applied to the water court
and requested approval of a conditional water right and an accompanying plan of augmentation relating to the two wells. Several parties
objected to the application. The objectors consisted primarily of forty
small domestic well owners. Their wells are defined by Colorado Revised Statutes section 37-92-602 (1990) as "602 wells". Such "602 wells"
are exempt from adjudication as they are entitled to a presumption
that they will not materially injure the water rights of others. However,
the owners of exempt wells may file for and obtain adjudication.
In July 1995, Turkey Cafion filed applications with the State Engineer for well permits. The State Engineer denied the applications because all of the relevant water sources were over-appropriated.
On September 8, 1995, the water court entered a decree approving
Turkey Cafion's conditional right and plan of augmentation. The water court found that all of the exempt well owners, except those who
had adjudicated their rights, lacked standing to assert injury to their
water rights because they had failed to adjudicate those rights.
The primary issue the Colorado Supreme Court faced was whether
owners of unadjudicated exempt wells have "vested water rights," as
defined in Colorado Revised Statutes section 37-92-305(3) (1990), and
therefore have standing to assert injury to their rights in water court.
The court held that owners of exempt wells have "vested water rights"
and may assert injury to these rights after they have filed for adjudication of their water rights.
The court reasoned that although an exempt well owner has a
"vested water right" before adjudication, the priority of that right is not
legally enforceable until the owner files an application for adjudication
with the water court. Upon application, the "owner has a statutorily
guaranteed expectation of the original priority date of the well" as the
well's priority relates back to the first date of appropriation upon adjudication pursuant to section 37-92-602(4). Therefore, an exempt
well owner's water right, which is already vested, becomes legally enforceable upon filing an application for adjudication, thus allowing the
owner to assert injury to that right. From a practical standpoint, the
court was concerned that to hold otherwise would result in a flood of
applications from exempt well owners who wished to ensure standing
if and when their water rights were injured.
The court finished its opinion with several factual and legal conclusions. First, the State Engineer, upon receipt of a permit application for a nonexempt well, must determine whether that well will cause
material injury to the vested water fights of others, including injury to
exempt wells, adjudicated or not. Although the State Engineer in this
case did not inspect the objectors' exempt wells for injury, the court
concluded that this was a not an issue because the State Engineer de-
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nied Turkey Cafion's applications due to insufficient amounts of unappropriated water.
Second, the objecting well owners who were denied standing in the
water court sought a new trial. The court refused a trial de novo because certain findings of the water court were unrelated to the exempt
well owners' assertions. However, the court did remand the case to the
water court to address those issues for which the objectors could present a primafacie showing of injury.
Third, the court instructed that on remand the water court must
determine whether Turkey Cafion's application for conditional rights,
along with its plan of augmentation, would materially injure the objectors' water rights. The water court must also consider, pursuant to the
court's holding in City of Colorado Springs v. Bender, whether the objectors were exercising their rights efficiently and if Turkey Cafion could
take measures to prevent injury to those rights.
Finally, the court stated that those objectors who had filed for adjudication prior to the date of trial had standing to assert injury to
their vested rights. Further, those objectors who opposed Turkey
Cafion's applications in a timely manner must be granted a reasonable
period of time to file applications to adjudicate their "602 wells" in order to have standing in the water court against Turkey Caion.
David A. Laird

Williams v. Midway Ranches Property Owners Ass'n, Inc., 938 P.2d 515
(Colo. 1997) (holding that resjudicatabars an objector opposing augmentation plan from litigating claims which could have been brought
when historical usage was previously at issue and actually determined).
Midway Ranches proposed to utilize shares of the Fountain Valley
Mutual Irrigation Company ("FMIC") to replace depletions from an
out-of-priority diversion and use of water by a tributary well in connection with a central water supply system for a new subdivision development. Williams, trustee for Greenview Trust, opposed Midway's
plan of augmentation. The State Engineer denied the well permit in
the absence of an approved augmentation plan, and Midway Ranches
appealed.
The issues the court considered on appeal were: 1) whether historic usage is the appropriate measure of a matured appropriation for
change and augmentation plan purposes; and 2) whether prior judicial determinations of historic usage are subject to redetermination.
In analyzing the first issue, the court reiterated that water rights in
Colorado arise by appropriation and beneficial use of unappropriated
water. An absolute decree confirms that an appropriation has vested
as a property right and entitles subsequent use of that water through
its decreed point of diversion. Over time, a pattern of historic diversions and use will mature and become the measure of that right for
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change purposes.
The court argued that it previously examined the link among historic usage under a water right, available yield credits for an augmentation plan, and the application of resjudicata,and concluded that the
"law of appropriation and use in Colorado has long proscribed changing or enlarging existing water rights to the injury of other existing
rights". Relying upon this precedent, the court concluded the water
court was correct in applying resjudicatain this case to prevent relitigation of historic use determinations made by previous water courts.
The second issue the court considered was whether prior determinations can be reopened through collateral attack. The court looked
at the following factors: 1) whether the court entering the judgment
had subject matter jurisdiction; 2) whether the same subject matter
and cause of action were involved in both cases; and 3) whether the
party seeking to litigate the claim should be bound by the prior determination.
The supreme court determined the subject matter of historical usage under the FMIC water rights prior to 1992 was for the purpose of
augmentation credit in the Security plan and the Midway Ranches
plan had remained the same. The court held that Greenview Trust
was bound by prior court judgments and decrees regarding the nature
and extent of historical usage of FMIC water rights. Therefore, the
application of res judicatawas appropriate. However, the court did not
intend that res judicata bar the water court from addressing circumstances which changed subsequent to the previous determination; nor
did it intend that resjudicatapreclude the water court from determining historic use in a change, augmentation, or expanded use injury
case when historic use had not been determined previously.
The court held that the water court correctly employed a combination of res judicata and evidence to determine the augmentation credit
available for use by Midway Ranches. However, the case was remanded
for revision of the water court decree to include: 1) identification of
FMIC water rights which Midway Ranches may rely upon pro rata for
use in its augmentation plan, by priority number, amount and appropriation and adjudication dates; and 2) limitation of FMIC to 5,800
shares, absent court review of proposed additional share issuance, to
safeguard against dilution of the 0.7 acre-foot yield per share.
Vicki L. Spencer

Issue 2

COURT REPORTS

FLORIDA
Intracoastal North Condominium Ass'n., Inc., v. Palm Beach County,
698 So.2d 384 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1997) (holding that a riparian right
of access is subservient to the public right to safe navigation, and that
increased water current which diminished access did not constitute a
taking).
The Intracoastal North Condominium Association ("Association")
owned a one-third acre parcel of property located on the Intracoastal
Waterway, which was near a bridge to the north. When a new bridge,
was constructed, the east approach to the bridge was altered and a
publicly owned peninsula was excavated and removed. Prior to construction, the channel under the bridge narrowed from 250 feet to 85
feet, which created strong currents and made navigation under the
bridge difficult and dangerous. The design of the new bridge and excavation of the peninsula enlarged the channel to 215 feet. The purpose of this design was to reduce tidal currents and improve navigation. However, the excavation of the peninsula changed the tidal
currents flowing past the Association's boat docks, which had accommodated the perpendicular mooring of five to seven boats on the Intracoastal Waterway. The tidal currents flowing past the docks diminished the Association's access to the Intracoastal and their ability to
moor boats at the docks, except during slack tides, which occurred approximately four times a day and lasted only thirty minutes.
As a result, the Association filed suit against Palm Beach County
and the Department of Transportation alleging inverse condemnation
and negligence related to the construction of the new bridge. The allegation maintained that the change in current deprived the Association of "all beneficial use and enjoyment" of its boat docks. The trial
judge denied the petition for inverse condemnation. The Association
appealed and the appellate court affirmed the trial court's decision.
The trial judge found that the diminution of the Association's access to the waterway did not constitute a taking. He reasoned that "the
Association's riparian right of access was subject to the superior right
of the public as to navigation and commerce on the Intracoastal." The
court cited an earlier case which provided that the rights and privileges of those who own land bordering navigable water are subject to
the rights of the public as enforced by proper public authority.
In presenting their argument to the trial court, the Association relied on three cases to support their taking allegation, all of which were
rejected by the appellate court. The court distinguished this case because it did not involve a complete denial of all access to navigable water, the government's conduct did not render the Association's property useless, and access to the Intracoastal was not "substantially
diminished."
Laura Lingle
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IDAHO
A & B Irrigation Dist. v. Idaho Conservation League, 1997 WL 612633
(Idaho) (holding that a provision regarding fire fighting does require
inclusion as a general provision in regulations and the period of use
for irrigation water rights is the irrigation season).
On September 5, 1995, A & B Irrigation District, among other parties ("Appellants"), filed a motion to designate a basin-wide issue with
the Snake River Basin Adjudication ("SRBA") district court. The basin-wide issue referred to whether certain general provisions are necessary for defining rights or for the efficient administration of water
rights. Appellants requested the SRBA district court resolve all objections to the inclusion of general provisions and other statements in the
Amended Director's Reports. The Director's Report on the Snake
River water system is prepared by the Director of the Idaho Department of Water Resources.
The irrigation districts appealed the SRBA district court's ruling
that certain general provisions are unnecessary for the definition of
rights or for the efficient administration of those water rights. The
court concluded that a general provision is an administrative provision
that generally applies to water rights, but need not apply to every water
right. A general provision is necessary if it is required to define the water right being decreed or to efficiently administer water rights in a water decree. The court held that provisions regarding fire fighting are
important as general provisions in decrees. The purposes of fire fighting illustrate alternate uses for which any water right may be used, and
fire fighting recognizes a lawful use of water with or without a water
right. Conversely, early and late season irrigation are not included in
decrees since they are determined annually by irrigators and are subject to the authority of the Director.
The court further held that a general provision regarding incidental stock water has no place in decrees since the Director has the
authority to define incidental stock watering regulations for the administration of a water right. Also, the use of excess water decreed as a
water right or a general provision has become unavailable. Excess flow
is not subject to definition in terms of quantity of water per year, an
element essential to the establishment and granting of a water right.
Beth Bulmer
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MARYLAND
Kirby v. Hook, 701 A.2d 397 (Md. 1997) (holding that use of water
through an underground pipeline was adverse for purposes of establishing a prescriptive easement, and that a party could tack the time of
a predecessor's adverse use to their own to satisfy the required time
period).
The water source at issue was a spring located on a parcel of land
that was once part of a single 3.42 acre parcel. The land was divided
into three parcels and sold to different owners. The Kirbys purchased
the spring parcel. The Hooks purchased parcel "B," the parcel that
was non-appurtenant to the Kirby's spring parcel. The previous owners of parcel B received oral consent from the Kirbys to install an underground water line running from the spring to parcel B. After the
pipeline was in place and in use, parcel B was sold to the Hooks. The
Hooks used the water from the spring for nineteen and one half years
until the Kirbys capped the pipeline. The Hooks filed suit in the circuit court claiming that: 1) as riparian land owners, they possessed a
right to use the water from the spring, and 2) they had a right to use
the water piped from the spring via an easement by prescription. The
Hooks asked the court to decide whether they had any riparian rights
in the spring located on the Kirbys' parcel when no permanent watercourse or stream came from that spring. The Hooks also asked
whether their use of the water was an adverse use for the purposes of
establishing a prescriptive easement, and whether they could tack the
predecessor's time of adverse use to their time so as to satisfy the requirement for a prescriptive easement.
The court held that the Hooks did not have riparian rights to the
spring, but that their use of the water through the pipeline was adverse
for purposes of establishing a prescriptive easement, and that the
Hooks could tack the time of the predecessor's adverse use to their
own time to satisfy the requirement for a prescriptive easement.
The court found that percolating waters formed the spring on the
Kirbys' parcel, and riparian rights do not govern percolating waters.
Therefore, the Hooks had no riparian rights to the spring on the Kirbys' parcel.
The court further found that a prescriptive easement arises when a
party makes an adverse, exclusive, and uninterrupted use of another's
real property for twenty years. Also, a party's use is adverse if it occurs
without permission. When the Kirbys gave the previous owners of parcel B the right to use the spring water, they did so orally, intending it
to be a permanent right. However, the statute of frauds states that a
party cannot orally give away a permanent right. When the Kirbys gave
a permanent right orally, the right became void. Because the right
given to the previous owners was void, the Hooks' continued use was
without permission and therefore adverse.
The court further reasoned that a party must show a color of title
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on the previous owners' right in order to tack their time of use to the
present possessor's time. The previous owners erroneously thought
they had a real property right to the water. This produced a color of
title that allowed the Hooks to tack on the previous owners' time of
adverse use.
Joseph A. Dawson

NEBRASKA
Springer v. Kuhns, 571 N.W.2d 323 (Neb. Ct. App. 1997) (holding that
a statute authorizing ground water transfer off overlying lands to adjacent lands for agricultural purposes operates retroactively on existing
agreements).
In 1995, Nebraska passed a statute that authorized ground water
transfers off overlying lands to adjacent lands for agricultural purposes. This case presents the question of whether that statute should
apply retroactively, specifically to an agreement made in 1989.
The Springers owned eighty acres of farm land, and offered to sell
sixty to Kuhns. The Springers wanted to keep the southern most
twenty acres to retain access to a well and underground pipeline with
which they planned to irrigate their adjoining land. Kuhns offered to
provide an easement for access to the well and pipeline if she could
purchase the entire eighty acres. The Springers agreed, and the parties signed a warranty deed. The Springers retained all water rights
and an easement. The easement provided "for access, maintenance
and repair to an irrigation pipeline and related equipment to the existing or replacement well ....

.

After five years, a dispute arose between the parties, and Kuhns refused to honor the reservation of water rights in the deed. The
Springers filed suit in district court, requesting either recission of the
deed, or "reformation of the deed and an order quieting title in them
to the retention of the water rights." The court issued a temporary injunction and, equating such reservation of water rights to that of mineral rights, issued quiet title in the Springers to the water and the
easement, and enjoined Kuhns from preventing the Springers' use of
the well. Kuhns alleged the district court erred in finding that the
agreement severed water rights from ownership of the overlying land.
The court of appeals affirmed the district court's holding, but on
different grounds. To reach its decision, the court examined the history of Nebraska ground water law and the legislature's intent in passing the 1995 statute. Prior to 1957, Nebraska water law prohibited
transfer of ground water from overlying land. Beginning in 1957, the
Nebraska legislature passed various laws that allowed for exceptions to
the general rule.
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The 1995 statute is one such exception. It allows transfer of
ground water to adjacent lands for agricultural purposes. The court
found that the 1989 agreement between the parties met the requirements of the statute because it served agricultural purposes, would not
adversely affect any other users, was consistent with applicable laws and
regulations, and served the public interest. The remaining issue was
whether the statute applied retroactively to the 1989 agreement.
The court found that a previously unlawful agreement could become lawful if the legislature intended, through a change in the law, to
validate the previous agreement. Although there is no specific language in the statute suggesting that the legislature intended to apply it
retroactively, the court held that the statute does apply retroactively.
The court based its reasoning on two factors: 1) legislative history reflected that the legislators knew such agreements had been made in
the past, and 2) the legislature did not void prior agreements. The
court reasoned that solely prospective application of the statute would
probably result in disruptive economic and legal consequences.
Debbie Eiland

NEVADA
Desert Irrigation, Ltd. v. State of Nevada, 944 P.2d 835 (Nev. 1997)
(holding that a detached parcel was not "land being developed" within
the statute when the party did not include it in the original site for water use, but that it would be manifestly unfair to cancel the water right
due. to inaccurate advice given by the State Engineer).
In 1971, the State Engineer granted a permit to a developer that allowed a certain amount of water per acre-feet annually for use at a
residential site known as the Allen Estates, located in the Pahrump Basin. In 1980, the developer formed a partnership with Desert Irrigation, Ltd. ("DI") and eventually quit claimed all his rights to DI. Over
the next several years, DI requested and received fifteen time extensions for an application for proof of beneficial use. While waiting for
its sixteenth time extension, DI discovered that the original amount
permitted for use exceeded the amount needed for the Allen Estates.
DI filed an application to change the point of diversion of the uncommitted water for use on a new residential site six miles from the Allen Estates. Following consultation with the State Engineer's office, DI
withdrew the application. The Engineer's office incorrectly informed
DI that the unused water rights would revert to an irrigation certificate, and would not be lost. After an investigation, the State Engineer
concluded that the new site was not within the original permit. The
State Engineer further found that DI was not putting the unused water
to beneficial use, and canceled the excess water rights.
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The question for the court was whether the State Engineer properly characterized the new site as one which fell outside the statutory
definition of "land being developed." The court also had to decide
whether it would be unfair to cancel the rights to the unused water
when DI relied on false information from the State Engineer.
The court held that the new site was not "land being developed"
under the statute, and therefore was not covered by the original permit. However, because DI relied on inaccurate advice when making its
decision, it would be manifestly unfair to cancel the uncommitted water rights.
The court looked to the legislative intent to decide the true definition of "land being developed" within the statute. The court concluded that the legislature intended "land being developed" to mean
the area where a permittee originally intended to put the water to
beneficial use. Since the new site was not part of the original area intended for water use by DI, the original permit did not include this
new site. The court further found that it was the State Engineer's
"statutory duty to administer the complex system of water rights within
the state [and] ....

that the lay members of the public are entitled to

rely upon its advice as to the procedures to be followed under the state
water law." The State Engineer's office incorrectly informed DI that
the unused water right would revert to an irrigation permit if DI could
not prove some beneficial use of the uncommitted water. Under Nevada statutory law, unused water reverts back to the public domain.
However, the court concluded that it would be manifestly unfair to
cancel DI's unused water rights before allowing DI to prove some
beneficial use of the unused water.
Joseph A. Dawson

NEW MEXICO
Brantley Farms v. Carlsbad Irrigation Dist., 1998 WL 67209 (N.M. Ct.
App. 1998) (holding that: 1) the writs issued by the lower court failed
to allege sufficient facts; 2) the District's duty to distribute water is discretionary, and therefore not subject to mandamus; and 3) that the
United States was an indispensable party absent from the action).
Brantley Farms raised crops and livestock within the Carlsbad Irrigation District. The United States owned two reservoirs upstream from
Brantley. Each year, the District's Board of Directors determined the
amount of water each member of the District would receive for the
upcoming growing season. In 1996, the Board allotted three acre feet
of water to each member. During the spring and summer of 1996, an
unusual amount of rainfall resulted in the capture of an additional
30,000 acre feet of water in the upstream reservoirs. Based on several
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factors, including current drought conditions, the Board decided to
reserve this excess water for the 1997 growing season rather than release it to members as an additional allotment in 1996.
In response to the Board's decision, Branley Farms filed an action
in state court. The Board filed this appeal after the trial court issued
alternative and preemptory writs ordering the release of additional water.
On appeal, the court held that an insufficient basis existed for the
issuance of the writs. The applicable statute states that the duty to distribute water arises only if "the volume of water in any... reservoir...
shall not be sufficient to supply the continual wants of the entire district.... ." The writs failed to discuss whether there was an amount of
water in any of the District's works that was "insufficient to supply the
continual wants of the entire district." Accordingly, the court found
that the writs failed to allege sufficient facts.
Next, the court addressed the underlying issue of mandamus, stating that when a duty is discretionary, rather than mandatory, mandamus cannot lie. The applicable statute states that "it shall be the duty
of the Board... to distribute... water... as they may in their judgment think best for the interests of all parties concerned." The court
quashed both writs, holding that this language effectively removed any
possibility of a mandatory duty on the part of the Board.
Finally, the court held that the United States, as owner of both upstream reservoirs, was an indispensable party to the action. All persons
whose interests are affected by a judgment or order are necessary and
indispensable. The court found the United States, whose interest in
both reservoirs was affected by the issuance of the writs, was absent
from the action.
Matthew Paulson

NEW YORK
Guglielmo v. Unanue, 664 N.Y.S.2d 662 (N.Y. App. Div. 1997) (holding that the plaintiff had no right to enforce covenant in third party
deed requiring minimum water level in nearby lake through a deed
containing no water rights).
Landowner brought an action against owners of a lakeshore tract
of land and asserted numerous claims directed at defendant's failure
to maintain a minimum water level in a nearby lake. Specifically,
plaintiff claimed that defendants wrongfully, and in violation of the
covenant running with the land owned by defendants, failed to maintain the dam that controlled the lake's water level thereby making it
impossible for plaintiff to use.
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In 1986, plaintiff purchased property near Tillson Lake intending
to use the nearby lake for recreation. Plaintiff focused on the 1975
deed and covenants from which defendants acquired their lakefront
tract, and which required the defendants to "forever maintain and
keep full of water at the present water level" the waters of Tillson Lake.
The covenant was "to run with the land" and further provided that
should "the dam [controlling the lake] become damaged, destroyed or
in need of repairs, it shall be repaired... promptly so as to restore and
preserve the present level of the lake." Additionally, plaintiff asserted
that defendants conspired to drain the lake and deprive him of his
right to use the lake for recreational purposes. Finally, plaintiff alleged that the defendants were acting maliciously, punishing plaintiff
for his successful opposition to defendant's development plans around
the lake.
Defendants, in compliance with a Department of Environmental
Conservation directive to repair the dam, drained the lake to institute
necessary repairs. However, following repeated acts of vandalism resulting in illegal filling of the lake, defendants emptied the lake and
reapplied for the fill permit. Defendants then commenced a third
party action against the previous owners of plaintiff's land, alleging
that they "falsely and fraudulently represented to plaintiff that the lake
was full of water and would remain that way." The trial court dismissed
the amended complaint for failure to state a cause of action. The appellate court affirmed.
The court held that the covenant upon which plaintiff based his
claim did not affect or benefit plaintiff's chain of title. Furthermore,
the court found that no portion of the lakeside tract was near plaintiffs parcel. Thus, plaintiffs deed contained no water rights or covenants concerning the water level of the lake.
Kedrin Hanscum

SOUTH DAKOTA
Steiner v. County of Marshall, 568 N.W.2d 627 (S.D. 1997) (holding
that a prescriptive easement against excessive water will not begin to
accrue until downstream water users suffer damage from water).
Four upstream landowners ("Landowners") sought to enjoin the
County of Marshall ("County") from obstructing the flow of water under Fort Road. Originally, the road was built with a seventy-two inch
culvert. In 1961, the road was raised eight feet and a thirty-six inch
culvert replaced the seventy-inch culvert. The road was located near
Cattail Lake, which remained dry until 1994 when unusual precipitation caused the lake to fill. As a result, the road began to act as a dam.
In 1995, flooding occurred upstream of Fort Road. The Landowners
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filed a complaint against the County and an association of downstream
landowners ("Association") intervened, claiming their prescriptive
easement precluded the County from installing another culvert which
would threaten their land.
On the date of trial, the Landowners and the County agreed on a
consent judgment. The Association appealed the lower court's holding which accepted the Landowners and the County's consent judgment. The consent judgment provided that the Landowners would release the County from any liability and, in return, the County would
install another sixty-inch culvert in the road, as well as monitor water
levels that would flow through the culverts.
The court held that one party - whether an original party, a party
joined later, or an intervenor - could not stop other parties from setfling their own disputes. Thus, while an intervenor is entitled to present evidence and have its objection heard at a hearing on whether to
approve a consent judgment, the party does not have the power to
block a decree by withholding its consent.
Further, the court held as a matter of law that any prescriptive
easement the Association might have would not begin to accrue until
there was damage. Downstream land would have to sustain flood
damage before the Association could impose a prescriptive easement
on the Landowners. Since downstream land had not sustained any
flood damage, the lower court properly dismissed the Association's
claim.
The Association also asserted that the lower court erred when it
dismissed its claims as a matter of law, arguing that they were entitled
to a trial on whether injunctive relief should be granted. The court
held that the Association's only basis for an injunction was their claim
regarding a prescriptive easement and since this cause of action was
invalid, the Association had no basis on which to grant injunctive relief.
Loretta L. Schouten

WASHINGTON
Okanogan Wilderness League v. Town of Twisp, 947 P.2d 732 (Wash.
1997) (holding that nonuse of a water right for nearly fifty years raised
a presumption of abandonment, and that municipality was not statutorily exempt).
In 1912, the Town of Twisp acquired a water right with the intent
to divert 10 cubic feet per second ("cfs") from the Twisp River. Twisp
perfected the right by diverting water. In 1927, Twisp sought approval
from the state to change the point of diversion on the Twisp River. In
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1930, a certificate of change was issued that documented a water right
of 10 cfs from the Twisp River. However, based on the size of the new
pipe used to divert water, the most Twisp ever used was 3.85 cfs.
Sometime between 1939 and 1948, Twisp stopped diverting surface
water from the river and began to draw water from groundwater wells
located in town. Twisp later applied for and received two groundwater
well certificates with priority dates of 1967 and 1971 for the instantaneous withdrawal of 3.55 cfs. Twisp then applied for and received a
change in the point of diversion of the 1912 water right which
changed diversion from the surface waters of the Twisp River to the
two new wells located within the town.
The Okanogan Wilderness League ("OWL") claimed that the 1912
right had been abandoned. The Pollution Control Hearings Board
("Board") rejected their argument and concluded that no intent to
abandon had been shown. After OWL filed a petition for judicial review, the Okanogan County Superior Court affirmed the Board's decision by memorandum opinion and denied the petition for review.
OWL appealed the decision of the superior court.
The main issue presented to the Washington Supreme Court was
whether Twisp's failure to beneficially use the 1912 water right for
nearly fifty years precluded a change in the diversion point. Resolution of this issue depended upon whether that right had been abandoned or otherwise extinguished. A change in the diversion point may
be granted only to the extent the water has been put to a beneficial
use, has not been abandoned or otherwise extinguished, and does not
cause detriment or injury to other water right holders.
The court noted the general rule in western water law that nonuse
is evidence of intent to abandon, and that long periods of nonuse raise
a rebuttable presumption of intent to abandon. As a defense to the
common law abandonment rule, Twisp argued that a 1967 statute exempted its municipal water rights from statutory relinquishment
through nonuse. The court held the statute inapplicable, followed the
common law rule of abandonment, and shifted the burden of proof to
Twisp to give reasons justifying why its nonuse was consistent with the
high priority of putting water to a beneficial use.
The court held that, due to the date when the statute was enacted,
the statutory forfeiture exemption for municipalities did not exempt
Twisp from the common law abandonment rule. The court held that
in light of the nonuse of the water right since at least 1948, there was a
presumption of abandonment. Twisp's explanation of its nonuse was
insufficient to overcome the presumption of intent to abandon. The
decision of the lower court was subsequently reversed.
Eric V Snyder

